

**1992-1996 FINDINGS**  
**OF THE KOREAN WAR WORKING GROUP**

## **INTRODUCTION**

The Korean War Working Group (KWWG) was established in 1993 with Congressman Sam Johnson (R-TX) as the U.S. co-Chairman. Currently, John Herbst, U.S. State Department, also serves as a U.S. commissioner on the KWWG. Colonel Aleksandr Semenovitch Orlov is the Russian co-chairman for the KWWG.<sup>1</sup> Also, participating as a Russian commissioner on the KWWG is Colonel Viktor Vasilyevich Mukhin.<sup>2</sup>

Since the establishment of the KWWG, the commissioners have participated in twelve plenums both in Russia and the United States. The commissioners, furthermore, have met with American family members of unaccounted for servicemen from the Korean War in order to explain the efforts of the Commission and the KWWG to come to a full accounting of their missing loved ones.

For three years the KWWG of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs has engaged in a concerted effort to obtain information on the fate of missing American servicemen from the Korean War. This effort has followed along two basic lines of inquiry -- clarification of circumstances of loss and, the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union. The report is divided into two basic sections. The first will discuss "Clarification on Circumstances of Loss" and the second will address the question of "the Transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union."

"It should be noted that the KWWG has determined, based on interviews and research in Russian and American archives, that the People's Republic of China (PRC) was heavily involved with the disposition of American POWs in northern China and North Korea. Both sides agree that it would be useful to the Commission's work and the resolution of Korean War POW/MIA issues for China to be approached on outstanding POW/MIA issues by the American side, notwithstanding China's official claim in July 1994 that 'China settled the cases of American POWs in the Korean War long ago and there is no outstanding issue in this regard.'"

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<sup>1</sup> Colonel Orlov is a retired Russian officer. He is a senior researcher at the Institute of Military History of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the former editor of **Military History Review**.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel Mukhin is head of the Military-Archive and Military Memorial Center of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

## Clarification of Circumstances of Loss

This line of inquiry has generated positive results. This approach is based on the fact that the Soviets were directly and significantly involved in the air war in Korea. For example, over the three years of the Korean War more than 70,000 Soviet military personnel served in the Korean Theater of Operations. At its peak, some 26,000 Soviets were present in Korea and were directly engaged in combat operations against American aviation.<sup>3</sup> Given this magnitude of engagement, there is no doubt that the Soviets shot down, killed, and possibly captured American airmen. As all good armies, the Soviet Army kept records of its successes to, among other things, reward its most successful aircrews and anti-aircraft gunners.

The KWWG found the archival documents provided by the Russians to be very useful. As a result, the KWWG placed emphasis on reviewing Russian archival records supplemented by interviews with Soviet veterans throughout all regions of the former Soviet Union. When the Russian records were compared with American records, and interviews of American veterans, we were able to significantly clarify the circumstances of loss surrounding some missing American servicemen.

As a result of the archival information provided by the Russians, the American side of the KWWG now believes that in at least twenty-three cases of Americans considered to be MIA, there is currently sufficient information to conclude that the servicemen died. Moreover, there are an additional fifty-four cases where Russian data, although inconclusive, provides a more complete picture of the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of these American servicemen.<sup>4</sup>

To date, the Russians have provided the U.S. side with three types of archival documents. The first is the anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) reports. The Soviets stationed four AAA divisions in or around North Korea to guard bridges over the Yalu River and power stations.<sup>5</sup> While helpful, these reports

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<sup>3</sup> Jon Halliday, "Secret War of the Top Guns", **The Observer**, no date.

<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that these are dynamic statistics. As more and more information is acquired from the Russians and other sources, the number of cases where the U.S. side can say that more is known about the circumstances of loss will increase.

<sup>5</sup> Of the four anti-aircraft divisions stationed in and around North Korea, the U.S. side received extensive records for the 28th and 87th AAA Divisions although there were some gaps in the data. The

reflect the confusion or “fog” of war. They were often handwritten as each battery commander would rush to claim a “kill”, i.e. the shootdown of an aircraft. Often the AAA batteries would send out search parties to locate the wreckage of destroyed aircraft. Often the search parties would submit written reports detailing what was found at the crash site to include aircrew remains. The “kill” numbers were often inflated because several batteries would claim to have shot down an aircraft, when in reality it was one aircraft shot down by several neighboring batteries.

The second type of document received from the Russians is lists of American aircraft shot down by Soviet fighters during the Korean War. One key document of this sort is titled “List of Information from the Ministry of Defense Central Archive Documents Concerning the Fate of USAF Crews from Aircraft which were Shot Down by Fighters over North Korean Territory from 1950-1953.” The list provides the date, time, type of aircraft, and the possible crash location.<sup>6</sup> The notations on the fate of the pilot and/or crew are very brief and provide little background information. However, in several cases it does note that the pilot/crew perished, but does not indicate where the remains were buried, if at all. The aviation regiments, like the AAA batteries, also on occasion sent out search teams to study the wreckage of shot down aircraft. Several of these reports were furnished to the U.S. side.

POW interrogation reports are the third type of document furnished by the Russians. This is a broad category of documents. Of the fifty-nine, so-called, interrogation reports the U.S. side received, two are duplicates and one is of an Australian serviceman. Thus, there are only fifty-six interrogations. Of the fifty-six interrogations, only thirty are typical interrogation protocols, i.e. a record of questions asked and answers received. Of the remaining twenty-six interrogations, one is a POW register, and three are lists of personal effects of non-returned and probably dead American servicemen. These personal effects lists were counted as interrogations by the Russians since the personal items transited an interrogation center. The rest are short, one paragraph biographies of American servicemen. Finally, it should be noted that most servicemen listed returned to Allied military control after the war.

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records from the 35th and 92nd AAA Divisions were limited. The Russians explained these gaps by noting that at times these units had little hostile contact with UN aviation.

<sup>6</sup> TFR-180

The U.S. side was able to supplement the Russian archival documents with information gleaned from interviews with Soviet veterans. It should be underscored that the Russians have allowed several teams of U.S. investigators to travel about Russia to interview ordinary Russian citizens who were associated with the Korean War. Although Russian officials have the right to be present for any interview with a Russian citizen, the Russian officials usually waived this right. Consequently, U.S. investigators have had, and continue to have, direct and unimpeded access to Russian veterans and citizens.

The U.S. side believes more archival information from the Russians will make it possible to account for an increasing number of Americans still considered missing in action. The U.S. side expects to review photo albums kept by the various fighter regiments. These photo albums reportedly detail shootdowns of American aircraft to include photos of aircraft wreckage. The Russians promised the U.S. an opportunity to review several hundred pages of shootdown material kept in various unit histories. This additional information should allow the U.S. to clarify a number of MIA cases.

U.S.-Russian cooperation has progressed since the two sides first met in 1992. Indicative of this is a meeting that took place in October 1995. Colonel Aleksandr Semenovitch Orlov, a Russian commissioner serving in the KWWG, traveled to Washington, D.C. where he spent a week with U.S. analysts reviewing and analyzing Russian and U.S. information on a number of Korean War MIA cases.

The purpose of this meeting was two-fold. First, both sides wanted to review the "List of 31." This is a list of American F-86 pilots who are designated as MIA from the Korean War. U.S. analysts developed the list in 1993 as an analytical tool to determine whether F-86 pilots may have been taken to the USSR. The analysts reviewed available U.S. records and came up with thirty-one F-86 pilots who possibly could have survived the crash of their aircraft. A shortcoming with the "List of 31" is that it was prepared before we had access to the Russian records.

The second goal of the meeting was to review new information surrounding the circumstances of loss of seventy-seven American MIAs. Over the last few years, the U.S. has gathered additional data on many of these cases of which the Russian side of the Commission was not apprised. We believed

that if both sides could review the data together, a common understanding could be reached on several of the outstanding MIA cases.

Consequently, the Russian and American Korean War analysts met and reviewed together the information gathered to date pertaining to the fate of these missing American servicemen. Both the Russian and American sides reviewed each of the cases and were able to come to a common assessment.

From the review of the "List of 31", the Russian and American sides agreed on the likelihood that seven of the pilots perished. As for the remaining twenty-four cases on this list, no information has thus far turned up in Russian documents or through the interviews of former Soviet citizens.

As for the remaining cases, both sides agreed that it appears highly probable that ten had died while more research was needed in the rest of the cases. Hence, there are seventeen incidents where both the Russian and American analysts believe it is highly probable that the servicemen in question died.<sup>7</sup>

These meetings proved to be productive and demonstrated that when the Russian and American sides sit down together and review definitive information regarding the fate of MIAs, a mutual agreement can be reached.

The following is a list of eighty-one American servicemen that we know a modicum more about their fates because of documents and information received from the Russians. It should be noted, however, that in several cases there is still substantial ambiguity. The Russian data may not solve the cases and, indeed, may not relate directly to them. But the data does shed some light on the fate of these unaccounted for American servicemen.

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<sup>7</sup> Since this meeting with the Russian representative, the U.S. side has added additional names to the list of those for whom there is a high level of certainty that they perished.

**LIST OF UNACCOUNTED FOR AMERICAN SERVICEMEN FOR WHOM THERE IS A  
HIGH LIKELIHOOD OF DEATH**

- |     |                        |     |                      |
|-----|------------------------|-----|----------------------|
| 1.  | Major Felix Asla       | 22. | ████████████████████ |
| 2.  | 1Lt Austin Beetle      | 23. | ████████████████████ |
| 3.  | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 4.  | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 5.  | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 6.  | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 7.  | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 8.  | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 9.  | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 10. | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 11. | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 12. | Captain Robert Niemann |     |                      |
| 13. | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 14. | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 15. | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 16. | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 17. | 1Lt Jack Turberville   |     |                      |
| 18. | Captain Halbert Unruh  |     |                      |
| 19. | ████████████████████   |     |                      |
| 20. | ████████████████████   |     |                      |

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**AMERICAN SERVICEMEN MISSING IN ACTION**

**FOR WHOM THERE IS RUSSIAN DATA RELATIVE TO THEIR CASES**

- |     |                         |     |                      |
|-----|-------------------------|-----|----------------------|
| 1.  | ████████████████████    | 21. | ████████████████████ |
| 2.  | Asla, Felix, Major      | 22. | ████████████████████ |
| 3.  | Attinger, Douglas, A1C* | 23. | ████████████████████ |
| 4.  | ████████████████████    | 24. | ████████████████████ |
| 5.  | ████████████████████    | 25. | ████████████████████ |
| 6.  | Beetle, Austin, Lt      | 26. | ████████████████████ |
| 7.  | ████████████████████    | 27. | Fuehrer, Alois, CPT  |
| 8.  | Bergmann, Louis, SGT    | 28. | ████████████████████ |
| 9.  | ████████████████████    | 29. | ████████████████████ |
| 10. | ████████████████████    | 30. | ████████████████████ |
| 11. | Bloesch, Fred, Lt       | 31. | Harker, Charles, Lt  |
| 12. | Bonney, Buddy, SSG*     | 32. | ████████████████████ |
| 13. | Botter, William, SSG    | 33. | ████████████████████ |
| 14. | ████████████████████    | 34. | ████████████████████ |
| 15. | ████████████████████    | 35. | ████████████████████ |
| 16. | ████████████████████    | 36. | ████████████████████ |
| 17. | ████████████████████    | 37. | ████████████████████ |
| 18. | ████████████████████    | 38. | ████████████████████ |
| 19. | ████████████████████    | 39. | ████████████████████ |
| 20. | de Luna, Leonard, Lt    | 40. | ████████████████████ |

41. ██████████  
42. Lawson, Milton, PVT  
43. ██████████  
44. ██████████  
45. ██████████  
46. ██████████  
47. Lowe, James, CPT  
48. ██████████  
49. ██████████  
50. ██████████  
51. ██████████  
52. ██████████  
53. Mooradian, Ara, CPT  
54. Niemann, Robert, Lt  
55. ██████████  
56. ██████████  
57. ██████████  
58. ██████████  
59. ██████████  
60. ██████████  
61. ██████████

62. Royer, Ted, Lt  
63. ██████████  
64. ██████████  
65. ██████████  
66. ██████████  
67. ██████████  
68. ██████████  
69. ██████████  
70. Thompson, Elwood, SSG\*  
71. ██████████  
72. Turberville, Jack, Lt\*  
73. Unruh, Halbert, CPT  
74. Van Fleet, James, Lt  
75. ██████████  
76. ██████████  
77. ██████████  
78. ██████████  
79. ██████████  
80. ██████████  
81. ██████████

\* See the ██████████ case summary    /\*\* See the Bergmann case summary

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

### **General**

DPMO	.....	Defense POW MIA Office
JCSD	.....	Joint Commission Support Directorate
USRJC	.....	U.S. - Russia Joint Commission
CILHI	.....	Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii
MIA	.....	Missing in Action
POW	.....	Prisoner of War
KIA	.....	Killed in Action
BNR	.....	Body not Recovered
RMC	.....	Returned to Military Control
TFR	.....	Task Force Russia
USAF	.....	United States Air Force

### **Military Ranks**

A1C	.....	Airman First Class
SGT	.....	Sergeant
SSG	.....	Staff Sergeant
TSGT	.....	Technical Sergeant
MSG	.....	Master Sergeant
LT	.....	Lieutenant
CPT	.....	Captain
MAJ	.....	Major

COL ..... Colonel

Russian Abbreviations

IAK ..... Fighter Aviation Corps( 64<sup>th</sup> IAK)

IAP ..... Fighter Aviation Regiment (64<sup>th</sup> IAP)

## **MAJOR FELIX ASLA, JR.**

*Summary of Incident.* On 1 August 1952, a MiG aircraft was seen chasing and firing on the F-86 piloted by Major Asla. His aircraft lost the left wing and was last seen spinning downward 15 miles southeast of Sakchu, North Korea (XE 8365). A subsequent aerial search of the area failed to reveal any trace of the missing pilot or his aircraft. No further information as to the fate of the pilot exists. The serial number of Major Asla's F-86 was 51-2767.

### *Personnel Involved.*

Asla, Felix Jr., MAJ

MIA

### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 291: Operational Summary Number 00214 of the Headquarters of the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK dated 1 August 1952 states in Part V, "One of the downed F-86s fell 7 km southeast of Sakchu. The side number is USAF 12267, the ... fuselage was marked with 9 stars... The aircraft was destroyed, the pilot perished and his identity cannot be established."

JCSD analysts concluded that the tail number of Major Asla's aircraft "12767" was probably mistakenly recorded as "12267" in the Russian document. (51-2767 would have been displayed on the tail as 12767. It was common practice to shorten the tail numbers by omitting the first number in the production year). All other information in the Russian and U.S. records agrees.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

*Additional Information.* The U.S. received from a British source, a copy of a photograph alleged to be the remains of Major Asla. It is a gruesome photograph leaving no doubt that the individual pictured perished in the crash. The British source said he obtained the photograph from the Russian archives at Podol'sk. It is believed to be the remains of Major Asla because accompanying the photograph were other photographs of an aircraft wreck. The tail number of the aircraft shown in one of the accompanying photographs is that of the aircraft flown by Major Asla (12767). There is also a photograph of the fuselage showing the nine red stars as mentioned in the operational summary.

A copy of this photograph was sent to CILHI with a request that a forensic specialist at CILHI attempt to verify that the remains are Major Asla's. On 18 January 1996, CILHI informed the U.S. that "it is not possible to exclude or confirm that the remains depicted in this photograph ...are those of Major Felix Asla, Jr., 16568 A, U.S. Air Force."

#### Current Status

Based on the Russian documents and photographs, both sides of the USRJC agree that there is a high probability that Major Asla perished in the crash.

## **LT AUSTIN BEETLE**

*Summary of Incident.* USAF casualty records indicate that LT Austin Beetle, pilot of an F-86, was lost in air-to-air combat on 4 July 1952 at approximately 1257 hours. LT Beetle drowned almost immediately after ejecting over Chodo Island. He could not be recovered with grappling hooks used by United Nations (U.N.) forces although they were no more than 300 yards away when LT Beetle hit the water.

### *Personnel Involved.*

Beetle, Austin, LT

KIA

### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 269: According to Operational Summary Number 00186 from the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK for 4 July 1952, an F-86 was shot down by Soviet MiGs. The summary reports, “At 1145, Captain Sevast’yonov’s group engaged and fired upon four F-86s near Chisyu-Bikhen. Two pilots fired on the enemy aircraft. Sr. Lieutenant Mishin shot down one F-86.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Current Status

The Soviet account for the 1145 shoot down appears to be consistent with the loss of LT Beetle. LT Beetle’s status in CILHI data base is KIA/BNR.

## **SGT LOUIS BERGMANN**

*Summary of Incident.* On 12 April 1951, a flight of B-29s departed Kadena Air Base for a combat mission over North Korea. The flight was attacked by a number of enemy aircraft. Moments later SGT Bergmann's B-29 was observed leaving the formation with one engine and left wing in flames and shortly afterwards spiraling downward out of control. The aircraft exploded upon impact with the side of a mountain.

### *Personnel Involved.*

████████████████████	MIA	SGT Bevans, Robert	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	SGT Bergmann, Louis	MIA
1LT Aaron, George	KIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	poss. KIA	SGT Gant, John	RMC
2LT Bullock, Elmer	KIA	SGT Millward, George	RMC
MSG Jones, Robert	KIA		

### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 76-8 to 76-14: The Russian side of the Commission presented to the U.S. side a document entitled "Brief Biographical Data on Prisoners". Under the heading "Prisoners from B-29 No. 69682, 93<sup>rd</sup> Squadron 19<sup>th</sup> Air Group", biographical information obtained from SGT Gant, SGT Millward and SGT Bergmann is summarized. With the exception of SGT Bergmann, all POWs mentioned in this section of the Russian document were subsequently repatriated.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Personal Accounts

A report received from the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, dated 15 October 1951, revealed that a Korean Military Observer allegedly received word that five persons were seen



parachuting from the disabled plane before it crashed. He further related that of the five, four had been captured by the enemy forces and that a search was in progress for the fifth.

Statements from former POWs and witnesses confirm that three of the eleven individuals from the B-29 survived the crash and were captured. SGT Gant, SGT Millward, and SGT Bergmann were held prisoner in the same camp. SGT Gant and SGT Millward were repatriated during Operation Big Switch. Both Gant and Millward saw SGT Bergmann alive in the camp. In fact, SGT Gant shared a cell with SGT Bergmann. Repatriated POWs from other crews as well recall meeting SGT Bergmann while in captivity. He was seen alive several times between September and November 1951. At one point during his imprisonment, SGT Bergmann apparently became ill with amebic dysentery and he was taken to a hospital to be treated by a Hungarian medical team. Whether or not he returned alive from the hospital is unknown. It can, however, be said with certainty that SGT Bergmann was seen alive in a POW camp after the crash of the aircraft.

#### Current Status

Both Russian and U.S. sources confirm that SGT Bergmann survived the crash, was in a POW camp and was interrogated. SGT Bergmann did not return to United States military control after the war. The U.S. side has requested that the Russians provide additional information on SGT Bergmann. To date, no additional information has been provided. The ultimate fate of SGT Bergmann remains unknown.

Repatriated crew members reported that there were only three survivors. JCSD believes that there is a high probability that the “unaccounted for” (MIA) crew members, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_, perished in the crash.

*Additional Information.* According to documentation and statements of repatriated POWs, of the eleven B-29 crew members, two were captured and returned, one was captured and not returned and eight did not survive the crash. Additional information has since been found regarding four of the deceased crew members. On 8 December 1993, The United States Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) received a shipment of 31 skeletal remains from the Korean War. These

remains were recovered by the North Korean Government and turned over to the U.N. Command. Remains were then taken to CILHI for processing. In 1994 the remains of the following individuals from the B-29 crew were identified by CILHI:

1. 1LT Aaron, George
2. 2LT Bullock, Elmer
3. MSG Jones, Robert

The identification of the remains believed to be those of [REDACTED] pending.

**SGT ROBERT BEVANS**

See the summary on “SGT Louis Bergmann”

**B-29 SHOT DOWN 23 OCTOBER 1951**

*Summary of Incident.* [REDACTED] B-29 was shot down on 23 October 1951 over Korea. The aircraft caught fire and was last seen disappearing into the clouds. Approximately 233 search missions were made during the three day period of 23 - 26 October. The co-pilot of the missing plane, LT Beissner, was rescued three hours after landing in the water.<sup>8</sup> No trace of the remaining crew was found. Upon returning to military control, LT Beissner reported that after a fire developed in the damaged engine, the aircraft commander instructed the crew to bail out. All of the crew members were believed to have successfully bailed out. LT Beissner was among the last to leave the plane . is currently listed as MIA. Of the thirteen member crew, one was rescued, remains of one were recovered from the Korean Bay, five were captured and repatriated, two are listed POW/BNR, and four are MIA/BNR.

*Personnel Involved.*

Unaccounted for:

[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA
MOORADIAN, Ara, CPT	MIA
FUEHRER, Alois, SGT	MIA
[REDACTED]	POW/BNR
BOTTER, William, SSG	POW/BNR

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<sup>8</sup> The name of the rescued co-pilot is also listed as LT BEISSMER in the casualty records.

Accounted for:

WENTWORTH, Lloyd, LT	RMC
KISSER, Kenneth, SSG	RMC
STRINE, John, SSG	RMC
JONES, James, SGT	RMC
MacCLEAN, Gerald, SGT	RMC
BEISSNER, Fred, LT	Rescued
COFFEY, Arthur, CPL	KIA

#### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 138-86: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of operational summaries from the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps. This unit, based in North Korea, was responsible for many of our shoot downs. TFR 138-86 is a report from 23 October 1951. This report mentions the shoot down of two B-29s on that day. The report states that both aircraft crashed and the crew of one perished. Unfortunately, no further details are given as to the disposition of the crew on the other aircraft or remains of the perished crew.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

#### Personal Accounts

The following information pertains to LT Ara Mooradian , a missing crew member from the same B-29 incident as [REDACTED].

On 27 October 1992, TFR-Moscow interviewed Nikolay D. Kazersky, a 1950-51 inmate of the Zimka labor camp in the Komi ASSR. Kazersky told of his contact in 1952 or 1953 with an American pilot from California shot down over North Korea and forced down over Vladivostok. He stated that the pilot said there had been a crew of three. Kazersky described him as about age 30,

slender, dark hair and complexion, and of southern European background. He also had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks.

TFR provided this information to the Air Force Casualty Office which concluded that LT Mooradian came closest to the description based on biographical information. The following information on Mooradian corresponded to Kazersky's information:

1. His shoot down date would have placed him in the camp at that time.
2. He fit the physical description.
3. The ethnic tag could also apply to an Armenian.
4. Born in California.

Information that did not correspond:

1. His aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea, on the opposite side of the peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. He was the bombardier rather than the pilot.
3. There were 13 in his crew rather than three.

#### Current Status

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has asked the Russians to provide any additional information they have concerning this incident. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to arrive at any firm conclusions. To date, no additional information has been provided.

Summary of Incident. On 7 May 1951, this B-29 departed Yokota Air Base for a bombing mission in the Pyongyang area of North Korea. After arriving in the target area, the plane was severely damaged by enemy flak causing a fire in the right wing and two engines. The aircraft commander radioed that they would have to crash land and were heading for friendly territory. Shortly thereafter, another radio report was received indicating that the fire could not be controlled and that the crew would have to leave the disabled aircraft. The parachutes of four unidentified crew members were then seen leaving the plane before it crashed to the ground southwest of Pyongyang. An extensive aerial search was initiated by Air Rescue units and the wreckage of the burning aircraft was sighted, but all efforts to locate the crew members were to no avail.

*Personnel Involved.*

Unaccounted for:

████████████████████	POW/BNR
████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA

Accounted for:

McTAGGART, William C., CPT	RMC
JONES, Richard M., S/SGT	RMC
SMITH, Ellsworth E, S/SGT	RMC

### Archival Records

*Russian.* The alleged Pravda article. JCSD is trying to obtain a copy.

*U.S.* The Individual Deceased Personnel File (293 file) of [REDACTED] contains several documents entitled "Returnee Report on Death of an Individual in a Captured Status". According to repatriated POWs who witnessed his death, [REDACTED] died of dysentery and malnutrition while in a North Korean POW Camp and was interred in November 1951.

### Personal Accounts

In August 1992, JCSD members interviewed Colonel Gavril Korotkov, a retired senior Soviet intelligence officer. Colonel Korotkov stated that he personally interrogated two American POWs. Korotkov could not recall the names of any of the American POWs who were processed through Khabarovsk, except for a [REDACTED] (first name unknown).<sup>9</sup>

Colonel Aleksandr Semenovitch Orlov, a retired Soviet intelligence officer and current Commissioner on the Russian side of the Joint Commission, met with [REDACTED] in North Korea in June 1951 and set up an interview between [REDACTED] and a local Pravda correspondent. According to Colonel Orlov, the article appeared in the summer of 1951. JCSD has not seen a copy of this article.

### Current Status

According to U.S. Air Force records, [REDACTED] died of dysentery and malnutrition in November 1951, six months after his capture. The Russian side of the Commission has been forthright with the fact that the Russians interviewed [REDACTED] while he was a POW.



## **LT FRED BLOESCH B-29 SHOT DOWN 13 SEPTEMBER 1952**

*Summary of Incident.* According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was “flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival”. One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during “Operation Big Switch”. The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

### *Personnel Involved*

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, “from 2235 - 0106, the 87<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800m to 7500m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and 5 corpses were found...The search continues.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.<sup>10</sup> To date, no additional information has been provided.

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<sup>10</sup> Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

## **SSG WILLIAM BOTTER**

*Summary of Incident.* SSG Botter's B-29 was shot down on 23 October 1951 over Korea. The aircraft caught fire and was last seen disappearing into the clouds. Approximately 233 search missions were made during the three day period of 23 - 26 October. The co-pilot of the missing plane, LT Beissner, was rescued three hours after landing in the water.<sup>11</sup> No trace of the remaining crew was found. Upon returning to military control, LT Beissner reported that after a fire developed in the damaged engine, the aircraft commander instructed the crew to bail out. All of the crew members were believed to have successfully bailed out. LT Beissner was among the last to leave the plane. SSG Botter is currently listed as POW/BNR. Of the thirteen member crew, one was rescued, remains of one were recovered from the Korean Bay, five were captured and repatriated, two are listed POW/BNR, and four are MIA/BNR.

### *Personnel Involved.*

#### Unaccounted for:

████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
MOORADIAN, Ara, CPT	MIA
FUEHRER, Alois, SGT	MIA
████████████████████	POW/BNR
BOTTER, William, SSG	POW/BNR

#### Accounted for:

WENTWORTH, Lloyd, LT	RMC
KISSER, Kenneth, SSG	RMC

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<sup>11</sup> The name of the rescued co-pilot is also listed as LT BEISSMER in the casualty records.

STRINE, John, SSG	RMC
JONES, James, SGT	RMC
MACCLEAN, Gerald, SGT	RMC
BEISSNER, Fred, LT	Rescued
COFFEY, Arthur, CPL	KIA

### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 138-86: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of operational summaries from the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps. This unit, based in North Korea, was responsible for many of our shoot downs. TFR 138-86 is a report from 23 October 1951. This report mentions the shoot down of two B-29s on that day. The report states that both aircraft crashed and the crew of one perished. Unfortunately, no further details are given as to the disposition of the crew on the other aircraft or remains of the perished crew.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Personal Accounts

The following information pertains to LT Ara Mooradian, a missing crew member from the same B-29 incident as SSG Botter.

On 27 October 1992, TFR-Moscow interviewed Nikolay D. Kazersky, a 1950-51 inmate of the Zimka labor camp in the Komi ASSR. Kazersky told of his contact in 1952 or 1953 with an American pilot from California shot down over North Korea and forced down over Vladivostok. He stated that the pilot said there had been a crew of three. Kazersky described him as about age 30, slender, dark hair and complexion, and of southern European background. He also he had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks.

TFR provided this information to the Air Force Casualty Office which concluded that

LT Mooradian came closest to the description based on biographical information. The following information on Mooradian corresponded to Kazersky's information:

1. His shoot down date would have placed him in the camp at that time.
2. He fit the physical description.
3. The ethnic tag could also apply to an Armenian.
4. Born in California.

Information that did not correspond:

1. His aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea, on the opposite side of the peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. He was the bombardier rather than the pilot.
3. There were 13 in his crew rather than three.

#### Current Status

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has asked the Russians to provide any additional information they have concerning this incident. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to arrive at any firm conclusions. To date, no additional information has been provided.

*Summary of Incident.* On 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was “flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival.” One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during “Operation Big Switch”. The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

*Personnel Involved.*

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA		MIA
	MIA		MIA
	MIA		MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA		MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA		MIA
	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, “from 2235 - 0106, the 87<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and 5 corpses were found...The search continues.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated in above summary.

### Current status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.<sup>12</sup> To date, no additional information has been provided.

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<sup>12</sup> Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

████████████████████

*Summary of Incident.* ██████████ B-29 was shot down on 23 October 1951 over Korea. The aircraft caught fire and was last seen disappearing into the clouds. Approximately 233 search missions were made during the three day period of 23 - 26 October. The co-pilot of the missing plane, LT Beissner, was rescued three hours after landing in the water.<sup>13</sup> No trace of the remaining crew was found. Upon returning to military control, LT Beissner reported that after a fire developed in the damaged engine, the aircraft commander instructed the crew to bail out. All of the crew members were believed to have successfully bailed out. LT Beissner was among the last to leave the plane. is currently listed as MIA. Of the thirteen member crew, one was rescued, remains of one were recovered from the Korean Bay, five were captured and repatriated, two are listed POW/BNR, and four are MIA/BNR.

*Personnel Involved.*

Unaccounted for:

████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
MOORADIAN, Ara, CPT	MIA
FUEHRER, Alois, SGT	MIA
████████████████████	POW/BNR
BOTTER, William, SSG	POW/BNR

Accounted for:

WENTWORTH, Lloyd, LT	RMC
KISSER, Kenneth, SSG	RMC

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<sup>13</sup> The name of the co-pilot is also listed as LT BEISSMER in the casualty report.



STRINE, John, SSG	RMC
JONES, James, SGT	RMC
MACCLEAN, Gerald, SGT	RMC
BEISSNER, Fred, LT	Rescued
COFFEY, Arthur, CPL	KIA

### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 138-86: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of operational summaries from the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps. This unit, based in North Korea, was responsible for many of our shoot downs. TFR 138-86 is a report from 23 October 1951. This report mentions the shoot down of two B-29s on that day. The report states that both aircraft crashed and the crew of one perished. Unfortunately, no further details are given as to the disposition of the crew on the other aircraft or remains of the perished crew.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Personal Accounts

The following information pertains to LT Mooradian , a missing crew member from the same B-29 incident as [REDACTED]

On 27 October 1992, TFR-Moscow interviewed Nikolay D. Kazersky, a 1950-51 inmate of the Zimka labor camp in the Komi ASSR. Kazersky told of his contact in 1952 or 1953 with an American pilot from California shot down over North Korea and forced down over Vladivostok. He stated that the pilot said there had been a crew of three. Kazersky described him as about age 30, slender, dark hair and complexion, and of southern European background. He also he had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks.

TFR provided this information to the Air Force Casualty Office which concluded that

LT Mooradian closest to the description based on biographical information. The following information on LT Mooradian corresponded to Kazersky's information:

1. His shoot down date would have placed him in the camp at that time.
2. He fit the physical description.
3. The ethnic tag could also apply to an Armenian.
4. He came from California.

Information that did not correspond:

1. His aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea, on the opposite side of the peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. He was the bombardier rather than the pilot.
3. There were 13 in his crew rather than three.

#### Current Status

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has asked the Russians to provide any additional information they have concerning this incident. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to arrive at any firm conclusions. To date, no additional information has been provided.

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* On 18 June 1951, ██████████ F-86 formation was attacked by eight enemy MiG-15s. ██████████ F-86 was last seen making a right break trying to avoid the attackers. The flight leader stated that MiG-15s were seen firing but no results observed. A search of the area revealed no indication of the pilot or the aircraft.

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

None

Personal Accounts

Several witnesses have given statements concerning this incident. Although no archival material has been produced to confirm these testimonies, all the statements appear to confirm one another.

Askold Germon: A retired Soviet Air Force Colonel reported that he was able “to determine, with a reasonable degree of reliability, the fate of ██████████.” Germon learned that on 18 June 1951 an American F-86 was involved in a collision during an air engagement. Both aircraft crashed as a result of the incident. The Soviet airman was able to parachute to safety, but the American was killed. This incident was reported in the 21 June 1951 edition of Izvestiya. Other Soviet veterans have previously reported seeing ██████████ identification card.<sup>14</sup> ██████████

Vladimir Vladimirovich Dorofeyev: Dorofeyev claimed that he developed information that ██████████ had a mid-air collision with a Soviet MiG during a dog fight. The MiG pilot by the name of Subotin bailed out and survived. Allegedly, Subotin witnessed ██████████ death when his plane crashed.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Paul Cole, *POW/MIA Archive Research Project: Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Berlin, Volume 1: Moscow Research* (DFI International, Washington D.C., 1995)

<sup>15</sup> Per request from the U.S., the Russian side of the Commission has located the Soviet pilot Subotin. Unfortunately, he is currently very ill and not capable of an interview.

Vladimir Mikhailovich Roshchin: Soviet Korean War veteran recalls seeing the papers of a pilot of a shot down plane. According to Roshchin, these papers belonged to Karl Crone.

#### Current Status

There are discrepancies in the testimonies regarding dates, correct spelling and first name of the American pilot. The majority of the circumstances however, are consistent. Based on the testimonies, it is reasonable to assume that the pilot referred to by the witnesses [REDACTED] Moreover, he probably did not survive the crash. Both the U.S. and Russian sides continue to search for additional archival documentation that may confirm this assessment.

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* On 10 February 1952, the F-86 piloted by ██████████ was shot down by fire from a MiG-15.<sup>16</sup> “His aircraft went into a steep dive...Seconds later, the F-86 went into a series of lazy dives, climbs and spirals, and then crashed into the side of a hill approximately twelve miles northeast of Sonch’on. Although it appeared that the canopy had been jettisoned, the accompanying pilot was unable to determine whether ██████████ had left his aircraft prior to the crash. Friendly aircraft searched the crash site but were unable to find any trace of the missing officer. Efforts to locate his parachute were also unsuccessful, the search being extremely difficult due to the background of snow covered terrain.”

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████ MIA

(Information was obtained from Russian and Chinese sources. It should be noted that both the Russians and the Chinese have claimed credit for the shoot down.)

Archival records

*Russian.* None.

*U.S.* According to F-86 Sabre, ██████████, who was expected to become the Korean War’s “ace of aces...the leading ace of the war” was killed on 10 February 1952.

*Other.* A 1990 Beijing publication, Chinese Military Power Almanac, 1949-1989, reported that Chinese Korean War Volunteers’ (CVF) Battle Records stated that American ace ██████████ was shot down by Zhang Jihui on 10 February 1952.

A 1989 Korean War Logistic Work Experience Summary-Pictorial, endorsed by former Chinese President, Yang Shangkun, showed pictures of ██████████ along side of a photo of his dog tags. The caption above the pictures stated, “Deceased American ace jet pilot ██████████ picture and dog tag. ██████████ was shot down by Zhang Jihui.”

A March 1953 book published by Chinese Youth Publication Press, *Fearless Warrior of Our Great Nation*, included an interview with Zhang Jihui, the Chinese pilot who claimed to have shot down [REDACTED], on the details and the sequence of the shoot down. Furthermore, the article also discussed that the deceased pilot's dog tags were found during a search of the F-86 crash site.

### Personal Accounts

According to Colonel Germon,<sup>17</sup> [REDACTED] was shot down and killed shortly after he had shot down two Soviet MiGs. "At the sight of the crash," Germon added, "besides documents the search team found his pistol. It is quite possible that he was shot down by Mikhail A. Averin."

Lt Gen. Georgii Lobov, commander of the 64<sup>th</sup> Air Corps, noted in his memoirs, "Our pilots shot down... [REDACTED], the top American ace of the war at the time (killed)."

Additional Information (April 1995) Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), United States Division Deputy Chief conveyed the results of a Chinese investigation on this case. He said that [REDACTED] had been shot down by Zhang Jihui in air combat on 10 February 1952. His plane crashed into the side of a hill. [REDACTED] had been found dead at the crash site. The Chinese MFA did not think that the Chinese had been involved in handling the body...The Chinese had looked at the plane and a Chinese person had found articles at the crash site. An American Air Force Ribbon found at the site is on display in an exhibit hall in Anyang City. The Chinese MFA was unable to locate the dog tag depicted in the photograph.

(August 1995) A member of the U.S. Consulate Shenyang reported that [REDACTED] dog tags are on display at the Dandong Korean War Museum. The tag is exhibited with photos of an American reported to be [REDACTED], articles said to be taken from him or his aircraft and pieces of wreckage said to be from the F-86 he was flying.

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<sup>16</sup> [REDACTED] rank at the time of the incident was Major. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel while MIA.

<sup>17</sup> Paul Cole, *POW/MIA Archive Research Project: Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Berlin, Volume I: Moscow Research* (DFI International, Washington D.C., 1995) Askold Germon-Retired Soviet Air Force Colonel.

### Current Status

Several independent sources confirm the shoot down of ██████████ on 10 February 1952. There is no direct evidence from Russian archives that confirms that ██████████ was killed in the crash of his F-86. Although Chinese and Korean sources testify that ██████████ was killed in the crash, it should be noted that both the Russians and the Chinese have claimed credit for this kill. Moreover, the discovery of ██████████ dog tags and personal effects in a Chinese museum leads one to believe that additional information on the fate of ██████████ may be available. The Commission continues to investigate this case.

## LT LEONARD DE LUNA

*Summary of Incident.* On 12 April 1953, LT de Luna took off on a single aircraft night interdiction combat mission at 1951 hours. His F-84 was reported over target area YD 2488. His radar blip was lost from the scope at 2042 hours. Another aircraft in the target area observed two bomb blasts followed by a third larger explosion approximately 40 minutes later.

### *Personnel Involved.*

DE LUNA, Leonard, LT                      MIA

### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 261: Operational Summary Number 102 from the 64<sup>th</sup> IAK in Andung for 12 April 1953 states, “at 1604, eight MiG 15s from the 913<sup>th</sup> IAP (led by Captain Semenov) flying in the Bikhen region at 500m altitude, engaged four F-84s. One pilot, Captain Semenov, fired and shot down one F-84 at a distance of 800 m on the target’s rear aspect.”

*U.S.* According to USAF records, two F-84s were lost on 12 April 1953. The one above piloted by LT de Luna and the other piloted by ██████████. Both these individuals are listed as MIA.<sup>18</sup>

### Current Status

Russian Operational Summary Number 102 most likely refers to one of these two incidents. Unfortunately, the report does not contain enough details to narrow it down to one. Moreover, the Russian report does not state the fate of the pilot of the shot down F-84. In any case, the loss of at least one F-84 on 12 April 1953 is confirmed by this Russian document. The possibility exists that this may have been LT Leonard de Luna’s aircraft.

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<sup>18</sup> According to Paul Cole, the Soviet records appear to be more consistent with the loss of ██████████. However, based on the documents available to the U.S. , it is our assessment that the Russian data is inconclusive.





See the summary on “SGT Louis Bergmann”

Summary of Incident. On 22 August 1952, ██████████ departed from Suwon Air Base for the Chong Chong Gang River. At approximately 1047 hours, the F-86s patrolling at more than 37,000 feet were attacked by MiGs. ██████████ last known location was YD 5099.

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

*Russian.* Operational Summary No. 00202 of the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK for 22 August 1952 states, “Flights completed their mission in the area of Kajsen, Anju and Dzyunsen. Captain Frolov’s flight encountered and engaged six F-86s at 0950 hours at 37,350 feet...Two pilots shot at the enemy aircraft. Senior Lt (Ignatov?) shot down one F-86 from a distance of 500-600 meters...The enemy aircraft crashed in the area of Kajsen; the (aircraft) remains were found; the pilot perished.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

Personal Accounts

This case has been associated with an interview of a retired Soviet Colonel. According to Paul Cole, POW/MIA Archive Research Project...Volume I: Moscow Research (DFI International), status should be changed from MIA to POW based on a personal account. During a 1992 interview, Soviet veterans Col. Georgi Plotnikov and Col. Valentin Sozinov recalled, “The name Major Delit came up in my conversation with Lobov. I don’t know what his position is. But he (Delit) also ejected and was captured, then escorted somewhere...” It is clear from further reading of the interview transcript that the veterans were not certain of the name of the individual nor whether or not he was ever a POW. The only information they seemed to have was the fact that the person allegedly mentioned by Lobov was a Major. It should be emphasized that this information was based on second hand hearsay. The individuals interviewed had no direct knowledge of this information. The USRJC has investigated this case and has found no evidence that suggests these incidents or names are related.

### Current Status

Based on the positive association between the U.S. and Russian data on the day, time, geographic location, and circumstances, there is significant evidence that the Russian records describe the shoot down of [REDACTED]. Moreover, according to U.S. records, [REDACTED] was the only air loss suffered on 22 August 1952. Both sides of the Commission agree that there is a high probability that the pilot mentioned in the Russian document as having perished was indeed [REDACTED].

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* ██████████ B-29 was shot down on 23 October 1951 over Korea. The aircraft caught fire and was last seen disappearing into the clouds. Approximately 233 search missions were made during the three day period of 23 - 26 October. The co-pilot of the missing plane, LT Beissner, was rescued three hours after landing in the water.<sup>19</sup> No trace of the remaining crew was found. Upon returning to military control, LT Beissner reported that after a fire developed in the damaged engine, the aircraft commander instructed the crew to bail out. All of the crew members were believed to have successfully bailed out. LT Beissner was among the last to leave the plane. ██████████ is currently listed as POW/BNR. Of the thirteen member crew, one was rescued, remains of one were recovered from the Korean Bay, five were captured and repatriated, two are listed POW/BNR, and four are MIA/BNR.

*Personnel Involved.*

Unaccounted for:

██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA
MOORADIAN, Ara, CPT	MIA
FUEHRER, Alois, SGT	MIA
██████████	POW/BNR
BOTTER, William, SSG	POW/BNR

Accounted for:

WENTWORTH, Lloyd, LT	RMC
KISSER, Kenneth, SSG	RMC

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<sup>19</sup> The name of the co-pilot is also listed as LT BEISSMER in the casualty file.

STRINE, John, SSG	RMC
JONES, James, SGT	RMC
MACCLEAN, Gerald, SGT	RMC
BEISSNER, Fred, LT	Rescued
COFFEY, Arthur, CPL	KIA

### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 138-86: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of operational summaries from the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps. This unit, based in North Korea, was responsible for many of our shoot downs. TFR 138-86 is a report from 23 October 1951. This report mentions the shoot down of two B-29s on that day. The report states that both aircraft crashed and the crew of one perished. Unfortunately, no further details are given as to the disposition of the crew on the other aircraft or remains of the perished crew.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Personal accounts

The following information pertains to LT Ara Mooradian , a missing crew member from the same B-29 incident as [REDACTED].

On 27 October 1992, TFR-Moscow interviewed Nikolay D. Kazersky, a 1950-51 inmate of the Zimka labor camp in the Komi ASSR. Kazersky told of his contact in 1952 or 1953 with an American pilot from California shot down over North Korea and forced down over Vladivostok. He stated that the pilot said there had been a crew of three. Kazersky described him as about age 30, slender, dark hair and complexion, and of southern European background. He also he had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks.

Task Force Russia (TFR) provided this information to the Air Force Casualty Office which concluded that LT Mooradian came closest to the description based on biographical information. The following information on LT Mooradian corresponded to Kazersky's information:

1. His shoot down date would have placed him in the camp at that time.
2. He fit the physical description.
3. The ethnic tag could also apply to an Armenian.
4. Born in California.

Information that did not correspond:

1. His aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea, on the opposite side of the peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. He was the bombardier rather than the pilot.
3. There were 13 in his crew rather than three.

#### Current Status

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has asked the Russians to provide any additional information they have concerning this incident. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to arrive at any firm conclusions. To date, no additional information has been provided.

## **SGT ALOIS FUEHRER B-29 SHOT DOWN 23 OCTOBER 1951**

*Summary of Incident.* SGT Fuehrer's B-29 was shot down on 23 October 1951 over Korea. The aircraft caught fire and was last seen disappearing into the clouds. Approximately 233 search missions were made during the three day period of 23 - 26 October. The co-pilot of the missing plane, LT Beissner, was rescued three hours after landing in the water.<sup>20</sup> No trace of the remaining crew was found. Upon returning to military control, LT Beissner reported that after a fire developed in the damaged engine, the aircraft commander instructed the crew to bail out. All of the crew members were believed to have successfully bailed out. LT Beissner was among the last to leave the plane. SGT Fuehrer is currently listed as MIA. Of the thirteen member crew, one was rescued, remains of one were recovered from the Korean Bay, five were captured and repatriated, two are listed POW/BNR, and four are MIA/BNR.

### *Personnel Involved.*

#### Unaccounted for:

████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
MOORADIAN, Ara, CPT	MIA
FUEHRER, Alois, SGT	MIA
BOTTER, William, SSG	POW/BNR

#### Accounted for:

WENTWORTH, Lloyd, LT	RMC
KISSER, Kenneth, SSG	RMC
STRINE, John, SSG	RMC

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<sup>20</sup> The name of the co-pilot is also listed as LT BEISSMER in the casualty file.

JONES, James, SGT	RMC
MacCLEAN, Gerald, SGT	RMC
BEISSNER, Fred, LT	Rescued
COFFEY, Arthur, CPL	KIA

### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 138-86: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of operational summaries from the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps. This unit, based in North Korea, was responsible for many of our shoot downs. TFR 138-86 is a report from 23 October 1951. This report mentions the shoot down of two B-29s on that day. The report states that both aircraft crashed and the crew of one perished. Unfortunately, no further details are given as to the disposition of the crew on the other aircraft or remains of the perished crew.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Personal Accounts

The following information pertains to LT Ara Mooradian , a missing crew member from the same B-29 incident as SGT Fuehrer.

On 27 October 1992, TFR-Moscow interviewed Nikolay D. Kazersky, a 1950-51 inmate of the Zimka labor camp in the Komi ASSR. Kazersky told of his contact in 1952 or 1953 with an American pilot from California shot down over North Korea and forced down over Vladivostok. He stated that the pilot said there had been a crew of three. Kazersky described him as about age 30, slender, dark hair and complexion, and of southern European background. He also he had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks.

TFR provided this information to the Air Force Casualty Office which concluded that

LT Ara Mooradian came closest to the description based on biographical information. The following information on LT Ara Mooradian corresponded to Kazersky's information:



1. His shoot down date would have placed him in the camp at that time.
2. He fit the physical description.
3. The ethnic tag could also apply to an Armenian.
4. Born in California.

Information that did not correspond:

1. His aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea, on the opposite side of the peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. He was the bombardier rather than the pilot.
3. There were 13 in his crew rather than three.

#### Current Status

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has asked the Russians to provide any additional information they have concerning this incident. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to arrive at any firm conclusions. To date, no additional information has been provided.

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* On 10 July 1953, while coming off a bombing run, ██████████ F-84 was hit by flak. The aircraft did about 6 rolls and crashed at YD 553759, exploded and burned. The pilot was under constant observation and at no time was an attempt to eject made. No sign of life or parachute was observed on the ground. Pilot had no chance of survival.

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████ MIA

#### Archival records

*Russian.* TFR 138-255 to 259: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of shoot down reports from units of the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK. Pages 255 to 259 are a detailed account, including sketches and maps, of the shoot down of an F-84 on 10 July 1953. According to the report, "The search revealed that the aforementioned aircraft crashed on the slope of a hill 1,000 meters SW of the town of Kusonri approximately 10 km NW of Sunchon...The fuselage and other aircraft surfaces were scattered into small pieces as a result of the powerful explosion. Other than that, the pilot's charred body (the torso and part of the head) was found amongst the wreckage." The report goes on to list several witnesses to the incident as well as physical evidence found at the site.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

#### Current Status

Research and analysis of this case provides strong evidence that the incident mentioned in the Russian document is the shoot down of ██████████. A thorough review of all U.S. records pertaining to personnel losses and aircraft losses for July 1953 was conducted. Of all the losses suffered in the month of July, ██████████ incident is the only possible match. Furthermore, the details in both the Russian and U.S. documents are exact - the date, time, aircraft type, circumstances and coordinates. Both sides of the Commission agree that there is significant evidence that the pilot of this aircraft perished and that it was indeed ██████████.

████████████████████

*Summary of Incident.* According to USAF records, a B-29 (44-62183) was reported destroyed in a mid-air explosion and observed falling to earth in three burning sections. According to statements of 16 witnesses from accompanying aircraft, no parachutes were observed and the possibility of anyone surviving was small. However, at least one member of the crew, Anton Brom, survived the explosion, was held as a POW and subsequently repatriated.

*Personnel Involved.*

████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
CPT BROM, Anton	RMC	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA		

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 272: Russian Operational Summary No. 00613 from the Headquarters of the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK reports “the aircraft explosion and the retreat of two burning B-29s were observed by search light crews...according to Korean and Chinese comrades, one B-29 fell into the sea 20 km SE of Simni-do and exploded. Up to four cutters approached the area where the aircraft fell.” A second paragraph confirms that “During the night of 11 June 1952, night fighters shot down three B-29 aircraft and damaged one other. The corpses of 8 American pilots were found, as well as debris from one aircraft.”

The following documents pertain to ██████████, a crew member of B-29 No. 44-62183.

TFR 16: [REDACTED] name appears on a list of 59 names compiled by the Russians entitled List of United States Air Force Personnel, Shot Down in Aerial Combat or by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point. Of the 59 names, two are duplicates and one is a non-American. The majority of the 56 U.S. servicemen on this list have been repatriated. [REDACTED] is one of the five from this list who is still “unaccounted for.” The Russians subsequently provided the U.S. side with the documents that the list of 59 was based upon. They have referred to these documents as interrogation reports. However, in some cases, the “interrogation” document was not an interrogation report per se, but a list of personal effects. The Russian explanation for this is that in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well. Entry # 24 on this list states, “18 June 1953... ”

TFR 76-39: This document is a list of personal effects entitled, “Inventory of [REDACTED], gunner from the 19<sup>th</sup> Bomber Group. Shot down in a B-29 by a MiG-15 the night of 10 June 1952.” Unfortunately, the fate of [REDACTED] is not specified.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

*Other.* A passage in a Chinese book published by The Academy of Military Science History Department also confirms the B-29 shoot downs on the night of 10 June.<sup>21</sup>

### Current Status

The shoot downs mentioned in the Russian document correspond to the loss of two USAF B-29s. Servicemen from both crews are still unaccounted for. Unfortunately, it cannot be determined with certainty, which aircraft and crew were found by the Russian search team. The Russians maintain that [REDACTED] perished and only his personal documents transited an interrogation point. The Russian side of the USRJC has been asked to provide any documents that could clarify this case. To date, no additional information has been provided.

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<sup>21</sup> *The War to Resist U. S. Aggression and Support Korea*, Academy of Military Science History Department (People's Liberation Army) December 1990.

## **LT CHARLES HARKER**

*Summary of Incident.* On 3 May 1953 LT Harker was flying in an F-84 “on a night intruder mission. At approximately 2105 hours, he made his last radio contact. Shortly after his last call, LT Harker faded from the radar scope. The area was searched but no wreckage could be established.”

### **Personnel Involved.**

HARKER, Charles, LT                      MIA

### **Archival Records**

*Russian.* TFR 16: LT Harker’s name appears on a list of 59 names compiled by the Russians entitled List of United States Air Force Personnel, Shot Down in Aerial Combat or by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point. Of the 59 names, two are duplicates and one is a non-American. The majority of the 56 U.S. servicemen on this list have been repatriated. LT Harker is one of the five from this list who is still “unaccounted for”. The Russians subsequently provided the U.S. side with the documents that the list of 59 was based upon. They have referred to these documents as interrogation reports. However, in some cases, the “interrogation” document was not an interrogation report per se, but a list of personal effects. The Russian explanation for this is that in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well. Entry #48 on the list states, “4 May 1953...2LT Charles A. Harker.”

TFR 76-33: This document is entitled “ Inventory of Documents from 2LT Charles A. Harker from the 311<sup>th</sup> AS 58<sup>th</sup> Fighter-Bomber Group. Service No. AO 2224102 Shot Down at Night in Aerial Combat with a MiG 15 4 May 1953.” This is a one page document listing the personal effects of LT Harker such as ID card, ration card, red cross card, driver’s license, etc. Unfortunately, there is no mention as to the disposition of the pilot or his remains.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Current Status

The Russian side of the Commission maintains that LT Harker perished in the crash and that only his personal effects transited an interrogation point. There is insufficient evidence on which to base any conclusions. The Russian side has been asked to provide any information regarding this incident. To date, there has been no additional information.

Summary of Incident. [REDACTED] was one of the 14 member crew of a B-29 shot down on 12 January 1953. The aircraft was engaged by an estimated 12 aircraft approximately 20 miles east of Uiju before it disappeared from the radar scope. According to U. S. records, "On 22 January 1953, Peking radio reported that all but three of the crew had been captured, those three having been killed. Only Colonel Arnold and Captain Vaadi...were mentioned as having been captured."

*Personnel Involved.*

Unaccounted for:

[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA

Accounted for:

ARNOLD, John K. COL	RMC
BENJAMIN, Harry, A1C	RMC
BAUMER, William, MAJ	RMC
BROWN, Howard, TSG	RMC
BROWN, Wallace, LT	RMC
BUCK, John W., LT	RMC
KIBA, Steve E, A1C	RMC
LLEWELLYN, Elmer, CPT	RMC
SCHMIDT, Daniel, A2C	RMC
THOMPSON, John W.	RMC



Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 37-23: A high level correspondence states, “according to the report from MGB USSR advisor in China, 9 crew members of an aircraft from the 91<sup>st</sup> Reconnaissance Detachment, American Strategic Aviation, which was shot down in the area of An’dun on 12 January 53, were taken prisoner. The chief of communication services and supply, Colonel EHNNOT (Arnold) and staff officer of operational reconnaissance service Major BAUL (Baumer) were also on the aircraft...” The eleven crew members (nine plus Arnold and Baumer) that were mentioned as having been captured were confirmed as POWs and subsequently repatriated.

The Russian side has provided to the U.S. side 30 sets of documents containing information on POWs. Some of the documents are full interrogation reports while others are summaries or lists. Nevertheless, the entire batch of documents is referred to as the “interrogation reports”. This document is entitled “Register of POWs”. It lists brief biographical data on the eleven members of the crew who were captured. The end comment on the document confirms that the remaining three crew members, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, and \_\_\_\_\_, were reported as having been killed in the crash.

*U.S.* USAF records as mentioned above in summary.

Current Status

\_\_\_\_\_ is mentioned in three independent sources as having perished in the crash - U.S. reports, Peking reports and Soviet reports. Unless there are adequate grounds or subsequent information that challenges the veracity of these reports, the evidence implies that \_\_\_\_\_ perished in the crash.

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See the summary on “SGT Louis Bergmann”

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was “flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival”. One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during “Operation Big Switch.” The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

*Personnel Involved.*

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	██████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, “from 2235 - 0106, the 87<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.<sup>22</sup> To date, no additional information has been provided.

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<sup>22</sup> Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* On 9 May 1952, an F-84 piloted by ██████████ was “hit by ground fire during a bomb run at an altitude between 1000 - 1500 feet. The aircraft burst into flames. Immediately thereafter, the aircraft exploded and was last seen burning on the ground. No radio contact was made, no chute observed.”

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████ KIA/BNR

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 138-133 to 137: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of shoot down reports from units of the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK. Pages 133 to 137 contain “material concerning the F-84 shot down on 9 May 1952...” The five pages include a photo copy of a data plate from the aircraft, a statement, a sketch of the crash site and fragments from an American map. According to the Russian document, this statement was “compiled at the crash site of an F-84. The aircraft crashed in the hills near the town of Tok-inri in the Rikhen district. The fuselage was flattened, the engine was smashed, the tail section was broken off and located 70 meters from the fuselage...The pilot burned with the aircraft, and local inhabitants buried his remains.”

*U.S.* ██████████ was the only F-84 pilot shot down on 9 May 1952 who is currently carried as KIA/BNR. Moreover, the data plate found by the Russians at the crash site lists the aircraft as type F-84E15RE. According to our records, ██████████ was the only pilot flying an F-84E15RE. This fact alone excludes other pilots within that time frame.<sup>23</sup>

Current Status

Both sides of the Commission agree that there is a high probability that ██████████ perished in the crash and his remains were buried by local inhabitants.

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<sup>23</sup> This Russian document was originally associated with a shoot down that occurred on 8 May 1952.

████████████████████

*Summary of Incident.* According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was “flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival.” One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during “Operation Big Switch”. The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

*Personnel Involved.*

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, “from 2235 - 0106, the 87<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in above summary.

### Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.<sup>24</sup> To date, no additional information has been provided.

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<sup>24</sup> Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was “flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival.” One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during “Operation Big Switch.” The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

*Personnel Involved.*

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA		MIA
	MIA		MIA
	MIA		MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA		MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA		MIA
	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, “from 2235 - 0106, the 87<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.



### Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.<sup>25</sup> To date, no additional information has been provided.

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<sup>25</sup> Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

## **PVT MILTON LAWSON**

*Summary of Incident.* PVT Lawson, a Marine Corps Reservist , was called to active duty on 27 July 1950 to serve in the Ground Forces in North Korea. On or about 5 December 1950, after telling a fellow Marine he thought his feet were frostbitten, PVT Lawson began to walk to an aid station near the town of Hagaru-ri. He was never seen or heard from again. PVT Lawson was declared MIA.

*Background.* On 22 June 1991, 60 Minutes aired a program called The Last Gulag: Perm 35. This program was narrated by Mike Wallace of CBS News and the film footage of the Russian prison camp was shot by the French. While watching this program, thirteen of Milton Lawson's friends and relatives identified one of the inmates as Lawson.

### **Archival Records**

None

### **Personal Accounts**

In September 1992, a member of Task Force Russia met with a former Perm 35 inmate "who easily identified a reputed MIA photo of PVT Lawson as a friend and former inmate named Vladimir Shchebol."

On 5 June 1995, Task Force Russia interviewed Vladimir Iosifovich Shchebol. He confirmed that journalists had been to Perm 35 and had taken pictures and films of several inmates. He stated that he had been born in Belarus and did not even have any knowledge of Lawson. During the interview, Task Force Russia took photographs of Shchebol.

### **Current Status**

Based on an analysis of the photographs of Shchebol and Lawson and the testimony of Shchebol himself, it is highly probable that the man identified as Lawson on the 60 Minutes program was in fact Vladimir Shchebol. Other than the alleged association of PVT Lawson with a Russian prison camp by friends and family, there is no Russian activity regarding this case.

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* On 2 September 1951, ██████████ F-86 was shot down over North Korea. He radioed that he was going to try to reach the northwest coast of Korea and bail out over water. According to Air Force casualty reports, another member of the flight observed him parachuting from the damaged F-86 near the mouth of the Ch'ongchongang River. The observer circled above and watched as the chute hit the water. Air Rescue units were alerted and an aerial search was immediately initiated. No trace of the missing officer could be found, but during the search an unidentified launch was seen in the vicinity of where ██████████ parachute was last sighted. An additional witness states that he observed the aircraft as it hit the water and did not see ██████████ bail out nor his parachute. ██████████ is listed as POW/BNR on the CILHI Korean War Data Base.<sup>26</sup>

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████ POW/BNR

Archival Records

*Russian.* Soviet Operational Summary Number 0277 of the Headquarters, 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Corps for 2 September 1951, reports that six F-86 aircraft were shot down that day. The summary states, "The 17<sup>th</sup> Fighter Regiment encountered 10 F-86s at 10,000 meters in the region of Syukusen at 1035 hours. As a result of the attack conducted against the enemy fighters by the regiment, Major Pulov<sup>27</sup> shot one down...One F-86, according to crew observations, scattered in the air."<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> In a recent study, *POW/MIA Archive Research Project: Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Berlin, Volume 1: Moscow Research* (DFI International, Washington D.C., 1995) Paul Cole suggests that ██████████ casualty status be changed from MIA to POW/BNR. However, U.S. records indicate that ██████████ status is POW/BNR.

<sup>27</sup> Major Pulov is currently living in the Moscow area but is very ill. JCSD will attempt to interview him.

<sup>28</sup> Paul Cole also indicates that an illegible word in the Russian document might be "Bailed out". As stated above, the actual translation reads, "F-86... **SCATTERED** in the air."

*U.S.* An intelligence report received from the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, in November 1951, reveals that [REDACTED] was believed to have been rescued by persons aboard a large power boat observed at the time of the search. The report further stated that this craft was known to be operated by the enemy.<sup>29</sup>

#### Current Status

There is obviously conflicting evidence in this case. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to provide all search reports and any additional information on this incident. In light of the circumstances, the possibility cannot be excluded that [REDACTED] survived the crash. To date, no further information has been found.

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<sup>29</sup> The following was noted in AFM 200-25, "...inquiry regarding the validity of the above report [boat sighting] revealed that the information may have been in error since purported source of the information had no record of subject being picked up by a Communist power boat."

Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was “flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival.” One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during “Operation Big Switch.” The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

*Personnel Involved.*

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA		MIA
	MIA		MIA
	MIA		MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA		MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA		MIA
	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, “from 2235 - 0106, the 87<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.<sup>30</sup> To date, no additional information has been provided.

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<sup>30</sup> Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* On 4 December 1950 around noon time, ██████████(924A also AO-16783) took off in a RB-45 from Yokota Air Base, Japan. Since ██████████ was not a regular member of the aircraft crew, but was rather a senior Air Force intelligence officer assigned to the Pentagon and on TDY in the Far East, ██████████ served as an observer on this mission.<sup>31</sup> At approximately 1250 hours, the RB-45 was intercepted by a flight of MiG-15 fighters and was shot down 70 km east of Andung. At least one person managed to parachute from the aircraft.<sup>32</sup>

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████	AO 794-558, pilot
██████████	AO 800-628, co-pilot
██████████	AO 928-027, navigator

Archival Records

*Russian.* ██████████ name does not appear on any of the lists of names provided to the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission.

TFR 242: This is a set of two documents. Originally the Russians provided the U.S. side of the Commission with one document that was in reality a sanitized, pasted together version of the two. A contractor working for the Defense POW/MIA Office, however, was able to provide the U.S. side of the Commission copies of the two original documents.

The first document is a message dated 17 December 1950. It is from General Belov, who was then the commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, to Generals Shtemenko and Batitskii.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> ██████████ was a graduate of West Point, Class of 1927. He was assigned as an assistant air attaché to Berlin, Germany in 1939, and served there until the outbreak of war. He was interned at Bad Nauheim and held until May 1942 when he was exchanged. In 1946 ██████████ was assigned to Bucharest, Romania where he served as military attaché. In 1948 he was accused of espionage by the Soviet backed regime, arrested, placed on trial, and found guilty. ██████████ was subsequently declared **persona non grata** and expelled from Romania in 1949. Upon his return to the United States in 1949, he transferred into the United States Air Force and was assigned to the Directorate of Intelligence. On Thanksgiving Day, 1950, he went TDY to Headquarters Far East Air Forces in Japan.

<sup>32</sup> Because of conflicting statements on the number of people who managed to bail out of the RB-45, the case of ██████████ is inextricably intertwined with that of ██████████, the aircraft's pilot.

<sup>33</sup> At the time General Sergie Shtemenko was the Soviet Minister of Defense and General Pavel Fedorovich Batitskii was the first deputy commander of the Air Force.

The purpose of the message was to inform the senior Soviet leadership that for the first time an RB-45 had been shot down. At the time, the RB-45 was seen as the “hottest”, light bomber in the American inventory and General Belov was clearly pleased to inform Moscow of his unit’s success. In the message, Belov reported, “An aircraft shot down on 12-4-50 of the B-45 type fell in a region 70 km east of Andun. The aircraft caught fire in the air and upon falling to earth burned up completely.

**The crew bailed out in parachutes** [emphasis added]. The pilot

██████████ was taken prisoner...The crew numbering 3 persons bailed out in parachutes. The navigator having landed ran off, where the radio operator disappeared to he did not see. The captive himself was burned and is in critical condition.” It is clear from this message that the Soviets did not know there were four and not three people on the RB-45.

The next day, General Stepan Akimovich Krasovskii, then a senior Soviet advisor to the North Koreans, sent a cryptic message to Moscow, “I report that the pilot from the shot down RB-45 died on route and the interrogation was not completed.”<sup>34</sup>

TFR 76-31: This is the transcript of ██████████ interrogation. According to a note at the bottom of the document, a Major Kuznetsov prepared the questions. It is not clear who conducted the interrogation, but a Chinese official translated the original English text into Russian.<sup>35</sup>

During the interrogation, ██████████ stated that the RB-45 ‘has a crew of three - a pilot, navigator, and radio operator.’ Later ██████████ recounted, “The plane caught fire and all **three** (emphasis added) crew members bailed out. I saw one run off, I don’t know where the other went to, and I landed where the plane crashed.” It is important to note that ██████████ did not mention during the interrogation that his RB-45 was carrying a fourth crew member - ██████████. Indeed, a close reading of the transcript strongly suggests that ██████████ was deliberately trying to conceal from his captors the fact there was a fourth man aboard the aircraft.

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<sup>34</sup> Stepan Akimovich Krasovskii (1897-1983) was promoted to Marshal of Aviation in 1959. From 1956 until 1970 he was commander of the prestigious Military Air Force Academy named after Iu. A. Gagarin.

<sup>35</sup> Colonel Hamilton B. Shawe, Jr., USAF, Ret for a short time shared a prison cell with ██████████. At the time, then Lieutenant Shawe was interrogated by a Soviet major accompanied by English and Russian speaking Chinese interrogators. Shawe stated in a letter to DPMO, “To the best of my ██████████ ...was also interrogated by Russians.”



U.S. A document titled "Air Force Personnel Reported to Have Died in POW-Camp, Been Very Ill in POW Camp or Killed in Crash..." simply states "██████████ told another POW he was only survivor. Believed ██████████ was dead."

21 September 1955: In a letter to a Mr. Joseph P. Nagoski, U.S. Department of State from LTC Richard A. Steele, USAF, Chief, Casualty Branch, Personnel Services Division, Directorate of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF, LTC Steele provides the following details of the shoot down on the RB-45 carrying ██████████. "... ██████████ furnished the following details concerning his missing status to Captain Hamilton B. Shawe, Jr.<sup>37</sup>

██████████ indicated that while flying a B-45 (sic) along the Yalu River, the aircraft was attacked by five MiGs and two engines were shot out. He stated that **he was the only one who escaped from the aircraft** (emphasis added), having managed to get the canopy off and bail out at an altitude of about 1,000 feet. ██████████ landed in the burning wreckage and was severely burned about the hands and face. After evading capture, for 3 or 4 days without shoes, he turned himself in to the North Koreans...he was placed in a cell with Captain Shawe in Sinuiji, North Korea. Two days later they were removed from the cell and Captain Shawe joined a group of prisoners starting a march to another prison camp. ██████████ could not walk and was carried to an ox cart by fellow prisoners. The North Koreans said he was being taken to a hospital for medical treatment, because he was suffering from frostbite and gangrene of both legs. He was not seen again by repatriates after 16 December 1950, and they reported his condition was so bad at that time that he was not expected to survive."

Propaganda Broadcast - On 21 May 1951 U.S. listening stations intercepted an enemy (no further information) propaganda broadcast "in which a Lieutenant Colonel Lorel, United States Air Force, was mentioned as being captured in northern Korea. The spelling of the name could not be verified, was believed to be phonetic, and resembled none of the names of Air Force personnel missing in Korea, with the exception of ██████████."<sup>38</sup>

### Personal Accounts

<sup>36</sup> The source of this information was Colonel Hamilton B. Shaw, Jr., USAF, Ret. who shared a cell with ██████████.

<sup>37</sup> ██████████ was promoted to major posthumously.

Colonel Aleksandr Fedorovich Andrianov - He was the pilot who shot down the RB-45 that carried [REDACTED]<sup>38</sup>. He was first interviewed by a Department of Defense contractor and later by the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs at the April 1995 Working Group Talks in Moscow.

During the first interview, Colonel Andrianov described in detail the shootdown, “When I fired the first time, it was still too far. And then the distance was about 600 to 800 meters. I started firing. And here I saw that something fell from him...And during the second approach, he (the RB-45) burst into flames. And here he started to descend and **only the pilot** (emphasis added) jumped out of the aircraft. The crew was supposed to be three or four people, I don’t remember exactly now. We probably got them when we were firing. The plane hit the hill before our eyes. An explosion. We kept circling above. The pilot landed with his parachute. He was picked up by a special team, the Korean team would pick up all the pilots who were shot down, including ours. And he went to prison.”

In April 1995, Colonel Andrianov expanded up his earlier testimony, “At approximately 3,000 meters or lower, **I saw one parachute deploy from the aircraft. All of my colleagues saw only one parachute as well. None of us saw any other parachutes** [emphasis added]. Although I have heard that others jumped, we did not note any other parachutes....However, I clearly saw the aircraft crash and explode.”

Although Colonel Andrianov was not present, he was able to describe during the first interview how the pilot of the RB-45 ultimately died based on what a friend Colonel Pavel Vasilyevich Fironov told him. Fironov was a lieutenant colonel at the time and the regimental political officer. It was Fironov who interrogated the American pilot. “He (the pilot) was kind of arrogant”, according to Andrianov. “...(T)he Koreans executed him the same way. They got a piece of plywood. They wrote down all he said on that plywood -- ‘I am an American pilot. This is my third surveillance flight. According to my data such and such towns and plants were destroyed, such and such number of older people and children were killed’. And with it they let him go to Singisyu. They gave him a one man escort. That patrolman was given specific instructions not to interfere too much. First, he walked as if through a

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<sup>38</sup> AFPMP-12-E 704 Missing (4 Dec 50) SR&D Case #80

<sup>39</sup> Colonel Andrianov was born in 1919 and is a veteran of both the Second World War and the Korean War.

formation. People were on both sides. First, they only shouted at him, cursed him, threw sticks. The patrolman did not interfere too much. Then, they started to spit at him, hit him...he was finished.”

Colonel Pavel Vasilyevich Fironov - In early 1995, Colonel Fironov was interviewed in Moscow by an investigator from the Joint Commission. This was for Fironov at least his second interview. Not long before, he was interviewed by Igor Morozov, a Russian journalist working for the BBC. Apparently during this interview, Fironov was given background information on the shootdown of the RB-45 and in particular information on the crew members. As a result, Fironov’s testimony to the Joint Commission can be considered at potentially influenced or “tainted”.

BBC Interview - In March 1996, the BBC television network aired on Time Watch a special report titled “Stalin’s Secret War”. One segment of this program discussed the case of [REDACTED]. Colonel Fironov was introduced as the man who interrogated [REDACTED]. Then for several moments Fironov was interviewed in Russian with an English voice over. Portions of the interview were edited out and replaced with the narrator’s summary of what Fironov said.

Fironov describes his initial meeting with [REDACTED], the fact that he had a fact book on the Soviet Air Force (described by the narrator as a “highly classified document”), and the anger of the North Korean general, who was also present for the interrogation, over [REDACTED] perceived arrogance.

Then switching to a photograph of [REDACTED], the narrator says, “The North Korean general angered by [REDACTED] belligerence had him marched to the local town, a placard with the words “War Criminal” hung around his neck. [REDACTED] was beaten to death by the local people.”

The program does not indicate how Fironov knew that the person he interrogated was [REDACTED] and not [REDACTED] or another airman. However, when an investigator from the Joint Commission interviewed Fironov a few months after his interview by the BBC, it seemed that Fironov’s identification of [REDACTED] is less certain.

During the interview with the Joint Commission investigator, Fironov recounted that the man identified himself as “the commander of that crew, although he himself told me that he was a regimental commander.” When asked if this man was [REDACTED], Fironov replied, “Yes, yes, yes.” Then when

asked, “And how is that you heard his name?”, Fironov said, “Who? The regimental commander? Morozov’s (the Russian journalist who first interviewed Fironov) daughter told me this.”

Later, during the April 1995 Working Group Talks in Moscow, Colonel Fironov was interviewed by members of the Joint Commission. When asked to describe the man he interrogated, Colonel Fironov said, “I would say (he was) about 32 - no more than 32 years of age”. Asked if the man he met wore glasses, Fironov replied, “No”. Finally when requested to describe his prisoner, Fironov said, “About like me. Regarding his physical characteristics, he was similar to me”. Colonel Fironov is of slender build and about 5’ 7” tall while [REDACTED] was 5’ 6” inches tall and stout at 183 lbs. [REDACTED] was also forty-six years of age and wore glasses. [REDACTED], however, was 31 years of age, tall, and slender at 6’ 2” and 195 lbs. He did not wear glasses.

It should also be noted that during Colonel Fironov’s first interview with an investigator from the Joint Commission, Fironov was asked, “Tell me, did you hear what happened to him, this person with whom you talked?”

Fironov replied, “No, how would I know?”

Investigator, “You didn’t hear that they killed him, or that he died?”

“No, no”, Fironov responded.

A similar line of questioning was raised with Fironov at the April 1995 Working Group Talks by a Joint Commission staffer who asked, “When he (the RB-45 crewman) asked you to spare his life, was it within your power to do so?”

“We had no relationship whatsoever with the prisoner,” Colonel Fironov answered. “Don’t you understand that all we did was conducted a discussion with him regarding aircraft? We had no other relationship regarding the prisoner.”

Colonel Fironov in his two interviews with members of the Joint Commission apparently sought to distance himself from his earlier testimony that the American flyer he interrogated was killed by an irate crowd of North Korean civilians.

Current Status.

There is a high probability that [REDACTED] died in the crash of the RB-45 on which he flew. Furthermore, it is argued that the American flyer interrogated by Colonel Fironov was [REDACTED], the pilot of the RB-45, and not [REDACTED].

First, this assessment is based on an evaluation of Colonel Fironov's description of the man he interrogated. Fironov's description more closely fits that of [REDACTED] than it does of [REDACTED]. Second, Colonel Fironov inadvertently seems to have been influenced by a statement from a Russian journalist's daughter suggesting he had interrogated a [REDACTED]. Third, an American airman who [REDACTED] occupied a cell with a man who identified himself at [REDACTED] strongly suggests that it was indeed [REDACTED] who survived the crash and not [REDACTED]. Fourth, this American airman, Lieutenant Shawe said that [REDACTED] told him that only he ([REDACTED]) survived the crash of the aircraft. The fact that [REDACTED] told his captors that the entire three man crew managed to bail out can be attributed to a conscious effort on part to deceive his North Korean/Chinese captors. A further indication of this deceptiveness is the fact that [REDACTED] told his captors that there were only three men on the RB-45 and not four! Fifth, the fact that Colonel Andrianov, the man who shot down the RB-45, saw only one parachute supports the assessment that only one crew member bailed out. Sixth, the contemporary Russian documentary record shows that a [REDACTED] was interrogated. There is no mention in the Russian documents available to the U.S. side of the Commission suggesting that a colonel was captured on or about 4 December 1950. Had an American colonel been captured, especially one with an intelligence background, the senior Soviet leadership would have certainly been informed immediately.

Colonel Fironov's statement that the flyer he interrogated was killed by an angry North Korean crowd can not be verified although it is plausible. Fironov's veracity on this point is weakened by his apparent effort to back away from supporting this statement.

Although the U.S. side of the Commission firmly believes that there is a high probability that [REDACTED] died in the crash of the RB-45 and was not captured, the Commission will continue to seek additional information that will clear up any ambiguity surrounding this case.

### CPT JAMES LOWE

*Summary of Incident.* According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was “flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival.” One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during “Operation Big Switch.” The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

#### *Personnel Involved.*

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

#### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, “from 2235 - 0106, the 87<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.<sup>40</sup> To date, no additional information has been provided.

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<sup>40</sup> Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

**SGT PHILLIP MANDRA**

A separate summary is being prepared



Summary of Incident. "On 8 July 1950, [REDACTED], Infantry, was killed in action in Chonan, Korea. He was the (34<sup>th</sup> Infantry) Regimental Commander and was leading a subordinate battalion of his unit in an effort to repel a severe attack by tanks and infantry against his positions. While endeavoring to single-handedly knock out a tank with a bazooka at a range of 15 yards, he was killed instantly by a tank projectile which struck him squarely in the body at close range."<sup>41</sup>

#### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 300-1 is a telegram addressed to Zakharov and signed by Shtykov (Soviet Ambassador to North Korea). This document is a progress report on the Korean War as of 24 July 1950. Most of the document is about the success the North Korean People's Army is having against the US Army's 34<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment of the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division-lists of equipment captured, POW numbers, etc. This document states, "The 34<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 24<sup>th</sup> American Division was routed during the battles for the town of Tajden. 108 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, among these was Commander of the American 34<sup>th</sup> Regiment."

*U.S.* According to CILHI and other sources, there were four separate commanders of the 34<sup>th</sup> IR prior to 24 July 1950. They were and their tenure as Commanding Officer are:

COL Jay B. Lovless	25 June - 7 July 1950	Relieved and returned to Japan
[REDACTED]	7 - 8 July 1950	Killed in action
LTC Robert Wadlington.	8 - 18 July 1950	Temporary Commanding Officer Never captured
COL Charles Beauchamp	18 July 1950 - 1951	Departed Korea approx. April 1951 for Tokyo

Of the four possible candidates above, [REDACTED] is the only Commander who was at the appropriate place and time. He is currently listed on the CILHI list as KIA/BNR based on the

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<sup>41</sup> Headquarters, Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK), Battle Casualty Message and various reports. (12/13 July 1950)

eyewitness account of his being struck at point blank range by a tank projectile. Although his remains were not recovered, his death was never in question prior to receipt of this Russian report.

#### Current Status

It is possible that [REDACTED] did not die as reported and was captured. In the heat of battle, the eyewitness account could be in error. It is equally possible that the Russian report is in error and that the officer reported captured was not the Commanding Officer, but one of the staff officers for the regiment. This case has been presented to the Russian side of the Commission. The Russians maintain that their report must be in error, however, no additional information has been provided to substantiate either possibility.

Summary of Incident. [REDACTED], USMC is currently listed on the CILHI Korean War data base as MIA-BNR. According to the USMC casualty report, [REDACTED] status was changed to KIA-BNR due to evidence of death in 1953. This change is not reflected on current lists. It is likely that this evidence was the statements of repatriated crew members. [REDACTED]

was one of three crew members on a TBM-3 that was shot down on 21 December 1951. Two crew members survived the crash, were held as POWs and subsequently repatriated.

*Personnel Involved.*

Unaccounted for:

[REDACTED]	MIA
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Accounted for:

STILL, Richard L., LT	RMC
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THRASH, William G., LTC	RMC
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Archival Records

*Russian.* The Russians have provided us with the interrogation reports of several U.S. servicemen captured in North Korea. These reports were forwarded to the Russians by the Chinese. The majority of these individuals have been repatriated. Among these reports was the testimony of one of [REDACTED] crew members. According to the report, [REDACTED] was killed in the aircraft.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary

Current Status

Based on the witness statements of his own crew, it seems highly probable [REDACTED] was killed in the aircraft.

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* On 4 April 1952 at 0108 hours, a B-26 with ██████████ as the navigator departed Kunsan Airdrome, South Korea to perform a night combat mission. The aircraft arrived in the target area and reported to ground control that the mission could not be accomplished because of unfavorable weather conditions. Shortly after, at 0330 hours the control station again established radio contact with the B-26 and assigned it an alternate target. This was the last communication. The crew was reported missing in action when the aircraft failed to return to the base.

*Personnel Involved.*

VAN FLEET, James Alward Jr., LT	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA		

Archival Records

*Russian.* None

*U.S.* A report dated 26 May 1952 from Air Intelligence indicates “that a twin (engine) U. N. bomber crashed in the vicinity of Haeju at dawn on 4 April 1952. Records reveal that the subject B-26 was the only Air Force plane lost on that date. The intelligence report further indicates that an inhabitant of the area stated he observed the remains of one American lying thirty meters from the crash site...He had no knowledge of the fate of the other crew members or the identity of the deceased...”

Personal Accounts

*Donets.* On 22 June 1994, Task Force Russia members held an interview with former Soviet Army Captain (Ret) Gennadii Semyenovitch Donets. Donets had served as the Air Intelligence Officer in the combat operations center of the 64<sup>th</sup> IAK. Donets recalled hearing that the B-26 Bomber piloted by LT James Van Fleet (son of General Van Fleet) was intercepted and shot down during a bombing mission and that the entire crew had perished. ██████████ was a crew member of this B-26. Gennadii Donets is considered by some to be a credible and knowledgeable source of information. His

statements track with the facts as recorded by U. S. sources. Collectively, these events are highly suggestive of the fact that [REDACTED] and the entire crew of this B-26 perished.

*Ananchenko.* A recent interview by JCSD-Moscow has uncovered information that may indirectly be related to this case. The following information pertains to LT Van Fleet, the pilot of the B-26 on which [REDACTED] was a crew member. A former MVD Lieutenant Ananchenko informed JCSD personnel that in 1956, he was involved in escorting a group of prisoners from one Soviet camp to another Soviet camp. Ananchenko was told by the operations officer that one of the prisoners claimed to be the son of an American four star General. Ananchenko believed he was a spy who came to the Soviet Union during WWII and was captured.

The U.S. researched all four star generals in the U.S. Army starting from Pershing and the only one that had a son who is listed as MIA was General James Van Fleet, Sr.<sup>42</sup> LT James Alford Van Fleet, Jr., son of General Van Fleet, graduated from West Point in 1949. This would make him approximately 28 years old in 1956. Ananchenko, who was approximately 25 in 1956 when this incident took place, recalls that the American prisoner was about his age or a few years older.

#### Current Status

There is insufficient evidence at this point to come to any firm conclusions about the fate of [REDACTED], LT Van Fleet or any other member of the crew. The Russians have been asked to provide any information regarding this case. To date, we have received no Russian archival records regarding this case. JCSD has investigated Ananchenko's statement, however, the information can not be verified at this time.

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<sup>42</sup> General Van Fleet was the Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea and later Commander of the Far East Command.

Summary of Incident. On 4 December 1950 around noon time, [REDACTED] (AO 794-558) took off in a RB-45 from Yokota Air Base, Japan. At approximately 1250, the RB-45 was intercepted by a flight of MiG-15 fighters and was shot down 70 km east of Andung. At least one person managed to parachute from the aircraft.<sup>43</sup>

#### Personnel Involved

[REDACTED]	Observer <sup>44</sup>
[REDACTED]	AO 800-628, co-pilot
[REDACTED]	AO 928-027, navigator

#### Archival Records

*Russian.* [REDACTED] name does not appear on any of the lists of names provided to the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission.

TFR 242: This is a set of two documents. Originally the Russians provided the U.S. side of the Commission with one document that was in reality a sanitized, pasted together version of the two. A contractor working for the Defense POW/MIA Office, however, was able to provide the U.S. side of the Commission copies of the two original documents.

The first document is a message dated 17 December 1950. It is from General Belov, who was then the commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, to Generals Shtemenko and Batitskii.<sup>45</sup>

The purpose of the message was to inform the senior Soviet leadership that for the first time an RB-45 had been shot down. At the time, the RB-45 was seen as the “hottest”, light bomber in the American inventory and General Belov was clearly pleased to inform Moscow of his unit’s success. In the message, Belov reported, “An aircraft shot down on 12-4-50 of the B-45 type fell in a region 70 km east of Andun. The aircraft caught fire in the air and upon falling to earth burned up completely.

**The crew bailed out in parachutes** (emphasis added). The pilot

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<sup>43</sup> Because of conflicting statements on the number of people who managed to bail out of the RB-45, the case of [REDACTED] is inextricably intertwined with that of [REDACTED], the aircraft’s pilot.

<sup>44</sup> [REDACTED] was a senior USAF intelligence officer stationed at Headquarters, USAF in Washington, D.C. but sent TDY to Headquarters, Far East Air Forces.

<sup>45</sup> At the time General Sergie Shtemenko was the Soviet Minister of Defense and General Pavel Fedorovich Batitskii was the first deputy commander of the Air Force.

██████████ was taken prisoner...The crew numbering 3 persons bailed out in parachutes. The navigator having landed ran off, where the radio operator disappeared to he did not see. The captive himself was burned and is in critical condition.” It is clear from this message that the Soviets did not know there were four and not three people on the RB-45.

The next day, General Stepan Akimovich Krasovskii, then a senior Soviet advisor to the North Koreans, sent a cryptic message to Moscow, “I report that the pilot from the shot down RB-45 died on route and the interrogation was not completed.”<sup>46</sup>

TFR 76-31: This is the transcript of ██████████ interrogation. According to a note at the bottom of the document, a Major Kuznetsov prepared the questions. It is not clear who conducted the interrogation, but a Chinese official translated the original English text into Russian.<sup>47</sup>

During the interrogation, ██████████ stated that the RB-45 ‘has a crew of three - a pilot, navigator, and radio operator.” Later ██████████ recalled, “The plane caught fire and all **three** (emphasis added) crew members bailed out. I saw one run off, I don’t know where the other went to, and I landed where the plane crashed.” It is important to note that

██████████ did not mention during the interrogation that his RB-45 was carrying a fourth crew member - ██████████. Indeed, a close reading of the transcript strongly suggests that

██████████ was deliberately trying to conceal from his captors the fact there was a fourth man aboard the aircraft.

U.S. A document titled “Air Force Personnel Reported to Have Died in POW-Camp, Been Very Ill in POW Camp or Killed in Crash...” simply states “██████████ told another POW he was only survivor. Believed ██████████ was dead.”<sup>48</sup>

21 September 1955: In a letter to a Mr. Joseph P. Nagoski, U.S. Department of State from LTC Richard A. Steele, USAF, Chief, Casualty Branch, Personnel Services Division, Directorate of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF, LTC Steele provides the following details of the shoot down

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<sup>46</sup> Stepan Akimovich Krasovskii (1897-1983) was promoted to Marshal of Aviation in 1959. From 1956 until 1970 he was commander of the prestigious Military Air Force Academy named after Iu. A. Gagarin.

<sup>47</sup> Colonel Hamilton B. Shawe, Jr., USAF, Ret for a short time shared a prison cell with ██████████. At the time, then Lieutenant Shawe was interrogated by a Soviet major accompanied by English and Russian speaking Chinese interrogators. Shawe stated in a letter to DPMO, “To the best of my recollections ██████████ ...was also interrogated by Russians.”

on the RB-45 carrying [REDACTED]. "... [REDACTED] furnished the following details concerning his missing status to Captain Hamilton B. Shawe, Jr.<sup>49</sup>

[REDACTED] indicated that while flying a B-45 (sic) along the Yalu River, the aircraft was attacked by five MiGs and two engines were shot out. He stated that **he was the only one who escaped from the aircraft** (emphasis added), having managed to get the canopy off and bail out at an altitude of about 1,000 feet. [REDACTED] landed in the burning wreckage and was severely burned about the hands and face. After evading capture, for 3 or 4 days without shoes, he turned himself in to the North Koreans...he was placed in a cell with Captain Shawe in Sinuiji, North Korea. Two days later they were removed from the cell and Captain Shawe joined a group of prisoners starting a march to another prison camp. [REDACTED] could not walk and was carried to an ox cart by fellow prisoners. The North Koreans said he was being taken to a hospital for medical treatment, because he was suffering from frostbite and gangrene of both legs. He was not seen again by repatriates after 16 December 1950, and they reported his condition was so bad at that time that he was not expected to survive."

Propaganda Broadcast - On 21 May 1951 U.S. listening stations intercepted an enemy (no further information) propaganda broadcast "in which a Lieutenant Colonel Lorel, United States Air Force, was mentioned as being captured in northern Korea. The spelling of the name could not be verified, was believed to be phonetic, and resembled none of the names of Air Force personnel missing in Korea, with the exception of [REDACTED]."<sup>50</sup>

### Personal Accounts

Colonel Aleksandr Fedorovich Andrianov - He was the pilot who shot down the RB-45 that carried [REDACTED].<sup>51</sup> He was first interviewed by a Department of Defense contractor and later by the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs at the April 1995 Working Group Talks in Moscow.

During the first interview, Colonel Andrianov described in detail the shootdown, "When I fired the first time, it was still too far. And then the distance was about 600 to 800 meters. I started firing.

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<sup>48</sup> The source of this information was Colonel Hamilton B. Shaw, Jr., USAF, Ret. who shared a cell with [REDACTED].

<sup>49</sup> [REDACTED] was promoted to major posthumously.

<sup>50</sup> AFPMP-12-E 704 Missing (4 Dec 50) SR&D Case #80

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And here I saw that something fell from him...And during the second approach, he (the RB-45) burst into flames. And here he started to descend and **only the pilot** (emphasis added) jumped out of the aircraft. The crew was supposed to be three or four people, I don't remember exactly now. We probably got them when we were firing. The plane hit the hill before our eyes. An explosion. We kept circling above. The pilot landed with his parachute. He was picked up by a special team, the Korean team would pick up all the pilots who were shot down, including ours. And he went to prison."

In April 1995, Colonel Andrianov expanded up his earlier testimony, "At approximately 3,000 meters or lower, **I saw one parachute deploy from the aircraft. All of my colleagues saw only one parachute as well. None of us saw any other parachutes** (emphasis added). Although I have heard that others jumped, we did not note any other parachutes....However, I clearly saw the aircraft crash and explode."

Although Colonel Andrianov was not present, he was able to describe during the first interview how the pilot of the RB-45 ultimately died based on what a friend Colonel Pavel Vasilyevich Fironov told him. Fironov was a lieutenant colonel at the time and the regimental political officer. It was Fironov who interrogated the American pilot. "He (the pilot) was kind of arrogant", according to Andrianov. "... (T)he Koreans executed him the same way. They got a piece of plywood. They wrote down all he said on that plywood -- 'I am an American pilot. This is my third surveillance flight. According to my data such and such towns and plants were destroyed, such and such number of older people and children were killed'. And with it they let him go to Singisyu. They gave him a one man escort. That patrolman was given specific instructions not to interfere too much. First, he walked as if through a formation. People were on both sides. First, they only shouted at him, cursed him, threw sticks. The patrolman did not interfere too much. Then, they started to spit at him, hit him...he was finished."

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Then switching to a photograph of [REDACTED], the narrator says, "The North Korean general angered by [REDACTED] belligerence had him marched to the local town, a placard with the words "War Criminal" hung around his neck. [REDACTED] was beaten to death by the local people."

The program does not indicate how Fironov knew that the person he interrogated was [REDACTED] and not [REDACTED] or another airman. However, when an investigator from the Joint Commission interviewed Fironov a few months after his interview by the BBC, it seemed that Fironov's identification of [REDACTED] is less certain.

During the interview with the Joint Commission investigator, Fironov recounted that the man identified himself as "the commander of that crew, although he himself told me that he was a regimental commander." When asked if this man was [REDACTED], Fironov replied, "Yes, yes, yes." Then when asked, "And how is that you heard his name?", Fironov said, "Who? The regimental commander? Morozov's (the Russian journalist who first interviewed Fironov) daughter told me this."

Later during the April 1995 Working Group Talks in Moscow, Colonel Fironov was interviewed by members of the Joint Commission. When asked to describe the man he interrogated, Colonel Fironov said, "I would say (he was) about 32 - no more than 32 years of age". Asked if the man he met wore glasses, Fironov replied, "No". Finally when requested to describe his prisoner, Fironov said, "About like me. Regarding his physical characteristics, he was similar to me". Colonel

[REDACTED]

Fironov is of slender build and about 5' 7" tall while [REDACTED] was 5' 6" inches tall and stout at 183 lbs. [REDACTED] years of age and wore glasses. [REDACTED],

however, was 31 years of age, tall, and slender at 6' 2" and 195 lbs. He did not wear glasses.

It should also be noted that during Colonel Fironov's first interview with an investigator from the Joint Commission, Fironov was asked, "Tell me, did you hear what happened to him, this person with whom you talked?"

Fironov replied, "No, how would I know?"

Investigator, "You didn't hear that they killed him, or that he died?"

"No, no", Fironov responded.

A similar line of questioning was raised with Fironov at the April 1995 Working Group Talks by a Joint Commission staffer who asked, "When he (the RB-45 crewman) asked you to spare his life, was it within your power to do so?"

"We had no relationship whatsoever with the prisoner," Colonel Fironov answered. "Don't you understand that all we did was conducted a discussion with him regarding aircraft? We had no other relationship regarding the prisoner."

Colonel Fironov in his two interviews with members of the Joint Commission apparently sought to distance himself from his earlier testimony that the American flyer he interrogated was killed by an irate crowd of North Korean civilians.

#### Current Status

There is a high probability that [REDACTED] died either from wounds or at the hands of a hostile crowd. This conclusion is supported by Russian documents that state that the pilot of the RB-45 died "in route" before his interrogation could be completed. Precisely how [REDACTED] died, however, is not clear. Furthermore, it is argued that the American flyer interrogated by Colonel Fironov was [REDACTED], the pilot of the RB-45, and not [REDACTED].

First, this assessment is based on an evaluation of Colonel Fironov's description of the man he interrogated. Fironov's description more closely fits that of [REDACTED] than it does of [REDACTED]. Second, Colonel Fironov inadvertently seems to have been influenced by a statement from a Russian journalist's daughter suggesting he had interrogated a [REDACTED]

██████████. Third, an American airman who occupied a cell with a man who identified himself at strongly suggests that it was indeed ██████████ who survived the crash and not ██████████. Fourth, this American airman, Lieutenant Shawe said that ██████████ told him that only he ( ██████████ ) survived the crash of the aircraft and that ██████████ was wounded and very ill. The fact that ██████████ told his captors that the entire three man crew managed to bail out can be attributed to a conscious effort on ██████████ part to deceive his North Korean/Chinese captors. A further indication of this deceptiveness is the fact that ██████████ told his captors that there were only three men on the RB-45 and not four! Fifth, the fact that Colonel Andrianov, the man who shot down the RB-45, saw only one parachute supports the assessment that only one crew member bailed out. Sixth, the contemporary Russian documentary record shows that a ██████████ was interrogated and that the pilot of the RB-45 died. There is no mention in the Russian documents available to the U.S. side of the Commission suggesting that a colonel was captured on or about 4 December 1950. Had an American colonel been captured, especially one with an intelligence background, the senior Soviet leadership would have certainly been informed immediately.

Colonel Fironov's statement that the flyer he interrogated was killed by an angry North Korean crowd can not be verified although it is plausible. Fironov's veracity on this point is weakened by his apparent effort to back away from supporting this statement. But whether ██████████ died of wounds or was killed by a crowd, it is nevertheless stated unambiguously in the Russian record that ██████████ died.

### **CPT ARA MOORADIAN B-29 SHOT DOWN 23 OCTOBER 1951**

*Summary of Incident.* CPT Ara Mooradian B-29 was shot down on 23 October 1951 over Korea. The aircraft caught fire and was last seen disappearing into the clouds. Approximately 233 search missions were made during the three day period of 23 - 26 October. The co-pilot of the missing plane, LT Beissner, was rescued three hours after landing in the water.<sup>52</sup> No trace of the remaining crew was found. Upon returning to military control, LT Beissner reported that after a fire developed in the damaged engine, the aircraft commander instructed the crew to bail out. All of the crew members were believed to have successfully bailed out. LT Beissner was among the last to leave the plane. CPT Ara Mooradian is currently listed as MIA. Of the thirteen member crew, one was rescued, remains of one were recovered from the Korean Bay, five were captured and repatriated, two are listed POW/BNR, and four are MIA/BNR.

#### *Personnel Involved.*

##### Unaccounted for:

████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA
MOORADIAN, Ara, CPT	MIA
FUEHRER, Alois, SGT	MIA
████████████████████	POW/BNR
BOTTER, William, SSG	POW/BNR

##### Accounted for:

WENTWORTH, Lloyd, LT	RMC
KISSER, Kenneth, SSG	RMC

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<sup>52</sup> The name of the co-pilot is also listed as LT BEISSMER in the casualty file.

STRINE, John, SSG	RMC
JONES, James, SGT	RMC
MacCLEAN, Gerald, SGT	RMC
BEISSNER, Fred, LT	Rescued
COFFEY, Arthur, CPL	KIA

### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 138-86: TFR 138 is a 300 plus page document consisting of operational summaries from the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps. This unit, based in North Korea, was responsible for many of our shoot downs. TFR 138-86 is a report from 23 October 1951. This report mentions the shoot down of two B-29s on that day. The report states that both aircraft crashed and the crew of one perished. Unfortunately, no further details are given as to the disposition of the crew on the other aircraft or remains of the perished crew.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Personal Accounts

On 27 October 1992, TFR-Moscow interviewed Nikolay D. Kazersky, a 1950-51 inmate of the Zimka labor camp in the Komi ASSR. Kazersky told of his contact in 1952 or 1953 with an American pilot from California shot down over North Korea and forced down over Vladivostok. He stated that the pilot said there had been a crew of three. Kazersky described him as about age 30, slender, dark hair and complexion, and of southern European background. He also he had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks.

TFR provided this information to the Air Force Casualty Office which concluded that LT Mooradian came closest to the description based on biographical information. The following information on LT Mooradian corresponded to Kazersky's information:

1. His shoot down date would have placed him in the camp at that time.
2. He fit the physical description.
3. The ethnic tag could also apply to an Armenian.
4. He came from California.

Information that did not correspond:

1. His aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea, on the opposite side of the peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. He was the bombardier rather than the pilot.
3. There were 13 in his crew rather than three.

#### Current Status

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has asked the Russians to provide any additional information they have concerning this incident. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to arrive at any firm conclusions. To date, no additional information has been provided.

## **LT ROBERT FRANK NIEMANN** <sup>53</sup>

*Summary of Incident.* On 12 April 1953, LT Niemann departed Kimpo Air Base as the number four pilot in a flight of four F-86 aircraft on an escort mission along the Sui Ho Reservoir, North Korea. Due to bad weather, the planes being escorted were forced to return to base. Nevertheless, LT Niemann's flight continued its patrol, but separated into two elements. Enemy aircraft were encountered by LT Niemann and his wing man and during the ensuing action he was heard to say, "Here he comes again." No further transmission was received from LT Niemann. Repeated attempts to contact him were to no avail and an air search of the area revealed no trace of him or his plane.

### *Personnel Involved.*

NIEMANN, Robert Frank, LT      MIA

### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 16: LT Niemann's name appears on a list of 59 names compiled by the Russians entitled, List of United States Air Force Personnel, Shot Down in Aerial Combat or by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point. Of the 59 names, two are duplicates and one is a non-American. The majority of the 56 U.S. servicemen on this list have been repatriated. LT Niemann is one of the five from this list who is still "unaccounted for." The Russians subsequently provided the U.S. side with the documents that the list of 59 was based upon. They have referred to these documents as interrogation reports. However, in some cases, the "interrogation" document was not actually an interrogation report but a list of personal effects. The Russian explanation for this is that in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e., ID card, ration card, etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement, as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well. Entry # 49 on this list states, "12 April 1953...LT Robert Niemann...Pilot perished..."

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<sup>53</sup> The spelling of the name Niemann is consistent throughout this summary. It should be noted, however, that his name has been spelled several different ways in U.S. and Russian records. (Neiman, Naiman, Najmann, etc.)



TFR 76-34: This document is a list of personal effects entitled, "Inventory of Pilot's Documents of an F-86 Aircraft of the 334<sup>th</sup> AA, 4<sup>th</sup> Air Group, 2LT Robert Niemann, Shot Down in Aerial Combat with a MiG-15 on 12 April 1953 in the Region South - West of Siodzio. Pilot Killed."

TFR 261: Operational Summary Number 102 of the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK for 12 April 1953 mentions several aircraft that were engaged and shot down on that day. Unfortunately, it is not possible to ascertain from the Russian record which Soviet pilot shot down LT Niemann on that date.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

#### Personal Accounts

In 1992, a TFR contractor, Paul Cole, interviewed Viktor Bushuyev, a retired Soviet Colonel. During a discussion about the interrogation of crew members of a B-29, Bushuyev stated that at first two of the crew members were unwilling to talk but three days later "Niemann" wrote down answers. According to the notes from the interview, this was a misunderstanding. The interviewer immediately questioned the name. Bushuyev replied he was referring to Arnold, not Niemann<sup>54</sup>. The Russian side of the Commission has also affirmed that it was Arnold and not Niemann. The Russian side of the Commission has steadfastly maintained that only LT Niemann's personal effects transited an interrogation site.

#### Current Status

Based on the documents we received from the Russians, both sides of the USRJC agree that there is a high probability the LT Robert Niemann died in the crash.

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*Summary of Incident.* According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was "flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with

negative results. No chance of survival.” One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during “Operation Big Switch.” The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

*Personnel Involved.*

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, “from 2235 - 0106, the 87<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

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<sup>54</sup> Colonel Arnold was the commander of a B-29 that was shot down on 12 January 1953. He was captured, held as a POW in China and subsequently repatriated to the United States following the war.

### Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.<sup>55</sup> To date, no additional information has been provided.

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<sup>55</sup> Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

\_\_\_\_\_

*Summary of Incident.* On 4 April 1952 at 0108 hours, a B-26 with \_\_\_\_\_ as the gunner departed Kunsan Airdrome, South Korea to perform a night combat mission. The aircraft arrived in the target area and reported to ground control that the mission could not be accomplished because of unfavorable weather conditions. Shortly after, at 0330 hours the control station again established radio contact with the B-26 and assigned it an alternate target. This was the last communication. The crew was reported missing in action when the aircraft failed to return to the base.

*Personnel Involved.*

VAN FLEET, James Alward Jr., LT	MIA	_____	MIA
_____	MIA		

Archival records

*Russian.* None

*U.S.* A report dated 26 May 1952 from Air Intelligence indicates “that a twin (engine) U. N. bomber crashed in the vicinity of Haeju at dawn on 4 April 1952. Records reveal that the subject B-26 was the only Air Force plane lost on that date. The intelligence report further indicates that an inhabitant of the area stated he observed the remains of one American lying thirty meters from the crash site...He had no knowledge of the fate of the other crew members or the identity of the deceased...”

Personal Accounts

*Donets.* On 22 June 1994, Task Force Russia members held an interview with former Soviet Army Captain (Ret) Gennadii Semyenovitch Donets. Donets had served as the Air Intelligence Officer in the combat operations center of the 64<sup>th</sup> IAK. Donets recalled hearing that the B-26 Bomber piloted by LT James Van Fleet (son of General Van Fleet) was intercepted and shot down during a bombing mission and that the entire crew had perished. \_\_\_\_\_ was a crew member of this B-26. Gennadii Donets is considered by some to be a credible and knowledgeable source of information. His

statements track with the facts as recorded by U. S. sources. Collectively, the [REDACTED] are highly suggestive of the fact that [REDACTED] and the entire crew of this B-26 perished.

*Ananchenko.* A recent interview by JCSD-Moscow has uncovered information that may indirectly be related to this case. The following information pertains to LT Van Fleet, the pilot of the B-26 on which [REDACTED] was a crew member. A former MVD Lieutenant Ananchenko informed JCSD personnel that in 1956, he was involved in escorting a group of prisoners from one Soviet camp to another Soviet camp. Ananchenko was told by the operations officer that one of the prisoners claimed to be the son of an American four star General. Ananchenko believed he was a spy who came to the Soviet Union during WWII and was captured.

The U.S. researched all four star generals in the U.S. Army starting from Pershing and the only one that had a son who is listed as MIA was General James Van Fleet, Sr.<sup>56</sup> LT James Alford Van Fleet, Jr., son of General Van Fleet, graduated from West point in 1949. This would make him approximately 28 years old in 1956. Ananchenko, who was approximately 25 in 1956 when this incident took place, recalls that the American prisoner was about his age or a few years older.

#### Current Status

There is insufficient evidence at this point to come to any firm conclusions about the fate of [REDACTED], LT Van Fleet or any other member of the crew. The Russians have been asked to provide any information regarding this case. To date, we have received no Russian archival records regarding this case. JCSD has investigated Ananchenko's statement, however, the information can not be verified at this time.

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<sup>56</sup> General Van Fleet was the Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea and later Commander of the Far East Command.

Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was “flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival.” One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during “Operation Big Switch.” The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

*Personnel Involved.*

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA		MIA
	MIA		MIA
	MIA		MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA		MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA		MIA
	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, “from 2235 - 0106, the 87<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.<sup>57</sup> To date, no additional information has been provided.

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<sup>57</sup> Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

\_\_\_\_\_

*Summary of Incident.* On 31 May 1952 at 1957 hours, a B-26 on which \_\_\_\_\_ was a navigator departed South Korea to perform a night combat mission between Sinanju and the Yalu River in North Korea. Approximately one hour after departure, a routine report was received from the B-26 which revealed that it was experiencing no difficulty in flight and was proceeding on course to target area. No further contact was established with the B-26 and its crew was reported missing.

*Personnel Involved*

_____	MIA	_____	MIA
_____	MIA		

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 249 is a 23 page document that entirely pertains to this particular case. The following excerpt is from page one, TFR 249-1, of this document:

“...A search group established that on 31 May 1952 a burning B-26 type aircraft passed at low altitude through the Sonchen region and crashed near the village An-Khari.

The aircraft broke into pieces upon impact; the three-man crew perished and was buried by Korean citizens on the following day. The force of the impact scattered aircraft fragments in a 50 - 100 meter radius.

At the crash, the search group gathered separate parts; documents; charred maps in English, scale 250000; plates from the plane and a pilot’s dog tag...”

The subsequent pages contain inventories of documents found at the crash site, photographs of the crash site, a photo of the dog tag, statements, air plane parts, etc.

TFR 249-5 states, “Copy of a Dog Tag of a Perished Pilot from the Downed Type B-26 Enemy Aircraft on 31 May 1952.” Below this title is a drawing of the dog tag of \_\_\_\_\_, the pilot, including serial number and blood type.



10 February 1994, The Washington Times ran an article that was quoted from Izvestiia, a Russian newspaper. The Russian article was the story of how the dog tags (probably the sketches) of were found in a military archive in Russia. The Russian article and TFR-249 contained the same information.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary

#### Current Status

Based on the Russian report, photographs and physical evidence found in this case, there is little doubt that [REDACTED] and the crew perished in the crash.

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* According to USAF records, a B-29 (44-62183) was reported destroyed in a mid-air explosion and observed falling to earth in three burning sections. According to statements of 16 witnesses from accompanying aircraft, no parachutes were observed and the possibility of anyone surviving was small. However, at least one member of the crew, Anton Brom, survived the explosion, was held as a POW and subsequently repatriated.

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
CPT BROM, Anton	RMC	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA		

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 272: Russian Operational Summary No. 00613 from the Headquarters of the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK reports “the aircraft explosion and the retreat of two burning B-29s were observed by search light crews...according to Korean and Chinese comrades, one B-29 fell into the sea 20 km SE of Simni-do and exploded. Up to four cutters approached the area where the aircraft fell.” A second paragraph confirms that “During the night of 11 June 1952, night fighters shot down three B-29 aircraft and damaged one other. The corpses of eight American pilots were found, as well as debris from one aircraft.”

The following documents pertain to ██████████, a crew member of B-29 No. 44-62183.

TFR 16: [REDACTED] name appears on a list of 59 names compiled by the Russians entitled List of United States Air Force Personnel, Shot Down in Aerial Combat or by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point. Of the 59 names, two are duplicates and one is a non-American. The majority of the 56 U.S. servicemen on this list have been repatriated. [REDACTED] is one of the five from this list who is still “unaccounted for.” The Russians subsequently provided the U.S. side with the documents that the list of 59 was based upon. They have referred to these documents as interrogation reports. However, in some cases, the “interrogation” document was not an interrogation report per se, but a list of personal effects. The Russian explanation for this is that in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well. Entry # 24 on [REDACTED] “10 June 1953...”

TFR 76-39: This document is a list of personal effects entitled, “Inventory of [REDACTED], a gunner from the 19<sup>th</sup> Bomber Group. Shot down in a B-29 by a MiG-15 the night of 10 June 1952.” Unfortunately, the fate of [REDACTED] is not specified.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

*Other.* A passage in a Chinese book published by The Academy of Military Science History Department also confirms the B-29 shoot downs on the night of 10 June.<sup>58</sup>

### Current Status

The shoot downs mentioned in the Russian document correspond to the loss of two USAF B-29s. Servicemen from both crews are still unaccounted for. Unfortunately, it cannot be determined with certainty, which aircraft and crew were found by the Russian search team. The Russians maintain that [REDACTED] perished and only [REDACTED] his personal documents transited an interrogation point. The Russian side of the USRJC has been asked to provide any documents that could clarify this case. To date, no additional information has been provided.

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<sup>58</sup> *The War to Resist U. S. Aggression and Support Korea*, Academy of Military Science History Department (People's Liberation Army) December 1990.

### **LT TED ROYER**

*Summary of Incident.* According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was “flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival.” One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during “Operation Big Switch.” The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

#### *Personnel Involved.*

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

#### **Archival Records**

*Russian.* TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, “from 2235 - 0106, the 87<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.<sup>59</sup> To date, no additional information has been provided.

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<sup>59</sup> Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* On 23 October 1951, the F-84 piloted by ██████████ departed Taegu Air Base for a bomber escort mission over NW Korea. Upon approaching the target area, two MiG-15s were encountered and ██████████ attacked the planes. The flight was returning to escort position when ██████████ F-84 was attacked. A garbled message was received from ██████████ at this time and ██████████ names were observed coming out from under his aircraft. The aircraft was out of control. Efforts to contact ██████████ were to no avail. Circumstances prevented continuous observation and the aircraft was lost from view ██████████ was not seen to leave the aircraft during the brief period of observation. No organized ground search could be conducted since the incident occurred in enemy territory.

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 76-26: The Russian side has provided to the U. S. side a document listing the personal effects of ██████████. This document is entitled “List of Captured Documents” These items have been verified as belonging to ██████████. Included on the list of items were an identification card, pilots license, and aviators qualification all in his name. According to the Russian’s, in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well. The Russian side maintains that ██████████ perished and only his personal effects transited an interrogation point.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> When this list of documents, TFR 76-26, was given to the U.S. side, it was attached to a cover sheet stating, “documents taken from a dead American flier ULLRIKH KHALBER”, TFR 76-25. (see UNRUH, Halbert file) Neither a cover sheet for ██████████ nor additional documents for Unruh have been provided.

U.S. [REDACTED] name appears in the 77 page document entitled The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union. This document is actually a collection of studies and hypotheses compiled by the U.S. to use as a working tool. His name is mentioned in connection with a study conducted by TSGT Siedling as a Korean War POW on whom the Russian archives should contain information.

#### Personal Accounts

Task Force Russia members conducted a series of interviews with former Soviet Army Officer (Ret) Gennadii Semyenovich Donets. During the Korean War, Donets served as an Air Intelligence Officer in the combat operations center of the 64<sup>th</sup> IAK. Donets recalled personally seeing the ID card and other documents of an individual named “ [REDACTED] .” Additionally, he recalled that the pilot “ [REDACTED] ” perished in the crash. [REDACTED]

#### Current Status

Both sides of the USRJC agree that based on Russian documents and testimonies, there is a high probability that [REDACTED] perished in the crash.



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See the summary on “SGT Louis Bergmann”

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* ██████████ was a member of a two plane flight of F-86 aircraft which departed for a combat fighter mission on 3 May 1952. During an engagement with enemy aircraft, aircraft was seen by the flight leader to dive away from an enemy MiG and execute evasive maneuvers at an extremely low altitude. ██████████ was informed of his low altitude and instructed to pull up. Immediately thereafter he leveled the wings of the F-86 which then struck the surface of the water in a low-angle high-speed glide approximately 3 miles off shore near the mouth of the Yalu River. According to the flight leader, ██████████ F-86 hit the water at too great a speed for a safe ditching. Enemy aircraft forced the leader to leave the area. Prior to his departure, he did not see ██████████ abandon the F-86 nor the aircraft sink beneath the water. Later in the day, search aircraft returned to the site of the crash-landing. North Korean surface craft were observed in the vicinity, but no trace of ██████████ or his aircraft were found.

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 284: Operational Summary number 00124 of the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK for 3 May 1952 contains direct evidence concerning ██████████. The information in the Russian document describing the shoot down of ██████████ is consistent with USAF data. According to the document, “Senior Lieutenant Mazikin saw 2 F-86s ahead of him, which were pursuing one MiG-15 at 16:38 at the approach to the Myaogou airfield. Senior Lieutenant Mazikin attacked the enemy and shot down one F-86...The body of a pilot was found in the remains of one of the F-86s shot down in the area of Myaogou airfield. From documents, it has been established that the pilot is Captain Dzhil’bert Tenni who belonged to the 51<sup>st</sup> Fighter Air Group.”

TFR 274: Operational Summary number 00132 of the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK for 11 May 1952 also mentions the shoot down of ██████████. According to part five of the document, “Captain Dzhil’bert of the 51<sup>st</sup> Group, who was shot down on 4 May, wrote in his log that ... (unrelated info.)”

[REDACTED]

TFR 76: The Russian side provided several documents listing the personal effects of pilots that were shot down. According to the Russians, the personal effects (i.e. ID card, license, money) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. In several cases, these documents state the fate of the pilot. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice. Document TFR 76-37,38 is entitled, "Documents from the F-86 flier CPT DZHIL'BERT Tenni shot down on 3 May 52 in the area of Myaogou Airfield (flier dead)."

*U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.*

#### Personal Accounts

In June 1994, Task Force Russia members and representatives from the Russian side of the Commission interviewed Russian Army Captain (Ret) Gennadii Semyenovitch Donets who served as an air intelligence officer for the 64<sup>th</sup> IAK in Korea from 1950 - 1953. Donets recalled looking at the personal ID cards and other documents of someone named Tanney, Albert and another pilot.

Additionally, he recalled hearing [REDACTED] talk on the radio with other U.S. pilots before he crashed. According to Donets, the pilot ([REDACTED]) died when his aircraft crashed.

#### Current Status

Based on documents that we received from the Russians and testimony of former Russian officers, both sides of the USRJC agree that there is a high probability that [REDACTED] died in the crash.

Summary of Incident. On 20 July 1953 [REDACTED] was on a mission to attack the Yang Ni Dong bridge complex at Sinanju. Another pilot on the same flight stated, "I observed

[REDACTED] F-86 receive a direct hit by AA and explode. I observed the right wing of the aircraft fall away engulfed in flame and other smaller pieces of the aircraft falling around a large mass that appeared to be the fuselage...I observed what appeared to be the fuselage hit the north bank of the river but observed no parachute." The serial number of [REDACTED] F-86 was 52-4469 and it crashed at YD 241890.

#### *Personnel Involved.*

[REDACTED] MIA

#### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 323: The following information was found in a report written by a Russian search and rescue team from Field Post No. 77970. "On 19 July 1953, we received an assignment to conduct a search for an aircraft shot down by AA on 19 July 1953. We learned from the local inhabitants that at approximately 1900 hours (Korean time) an enemy aircraft engulfed in flames appeared from a northerly direction at low altitude and fell into the river 40-50 meters from the shore. When we arrived at the sight, we saw the aircraft. The nose section had sunk and approximately one and a half meters of the tail section was above the water. We swam up to the plane and saw that it was an F-86. On the tail section in big black numbers was written No. 24629."

*U.S.* The aircraft with the exact number mentioned in the Russian document 24629 (52-4629) belonged to an aircraft that was operational until September 1955-over two years after the Korean War. The following is a list of all the F-86 serial numbers that were lost in July 1953:

F-86E	51-2756	F-86E	51-2824
F-86E	52-2836	F-86F	52-4368
F-86F	52-4469	F-86F	52-4491

Although none of the numbers match exactly, only one serial number has all the elements of the one mentioned in the Russian document. This information has been recorded from English on the burnt aircraft, to Korean and finally to Russian. It was common practice not to display the first number of the production year on the tail. The actual number displayed would have been No. 24469. Therefore, the numbers mentioned in both documents only differ by one numeral. It is highly likely that this number was mistakenly recorded in the Russian document.

Furthermore, the pilot of the F-86 with the s/n 52-4469 was [REDACTED]. The circumstances in both the U.S. account and the Russian account of the shoot down of [REDACTED] are almost identical. A sketch of the crash site accompanied the Russian document. The location of the crash was the same in both the U.S. and Russian versions.

#### Current Status

The similarities outweigh the few discrepancies that exist between the two documents. It has been our experience in the past that dates, times and serial numbers may be off by a small margin. Hence, based on the comparison of the two documents, we believe there is significant evidence that the aircraft found by the Russians was piloted by [REDACTED]. There was, unfortunately, no mention as to the disposition of the pilot in the Russian document.

Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was “flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with negative results. No chance of survival.” One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during “Operation Big Switch.” The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

*Personnel Involved.*

ROYER, Ted, LT	MIA		MIA
	MIA		MIA
	MIA		MIA
BLOESCH, Fred, LT	MIA		MIA
LOWE, James, CPT	MIA		MIA
	MIA	PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C	RMC

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 268: Operational Summary No. 00257 for the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> IAK dated 13 September 1952 reported, “from 2235 - 0106, the 87<sup>th</sup> Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division fired on 35 B-29s at altitudes ranging from 6800 - 7500 m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and five corpses were found...The search continues.”

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343 with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as subsequent search reports.<sup>61</sup> To date, no additional information has been provided.

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<sup>61</sup> Moscow Weekly Report dated 5 July 1995

## **LT JACK TURBERVILLE**

*Summary of Incident.* On 18 November 1952 at 1600 hours, a flight of four F-86s departed Suwon Air Base, Korea for a combat patrol mission over the Chongchong River, North Korea. During the return flight, LT Turberville radioed that he was having difficulty with his oxygen. The message was somewhat garbled and appeared to end abruptly. His plane was then observed to nose down sharply and disappear into an overcast. Subsequent search of the area failed to reveal any trace of the missing officer or his aircraft.

### *Personnel Involved.*

TURBERVILLE, Jack, LT                      MIA

### Archival Records

*Russian.* The Russian side has provided to the U.S. side several interrogation reports of American POWs. According to the Russians, the interrogations were conducted by the Koreans or Chinese and the information was then forwarded to Soviet advisors. When questioned about personnel losses, a former POW stated LT Turberville was presumed to have died due to a malfunction of his oxygen system.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Current Status

The statement in the Russian document is consistent with USAF records. Both sides of the USRJC agree that there is a high probability that LT Turberville perished.



### CPT HALBERT UNRUH

*Summary of Incident.* 5 April 1951, a B-26 piloted by CPT Unruh departed Taegu Air Base for a night intruder mission in the Pyongyang area. Shortly after take off, a routine report was received from LT (rank at time) Unruh indicating that there were no difficulties and they were proceeding on course to target area. No further contact was made. The fate of the crew and aircraft is unknown.

#### *Personnel Involved.*

UNRUH, Halbert, CPT                      MIA

#### Archival Records

*Russian.* CPT Unruh's name appears on the list of 71 more formally known as List of U. S. Air Force Crew Members Participating in Combat Operations in North Korea 1950-53, and About Whom Information Has Been Found in Documents of the 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps. This list was compiled by the Russians and given to the U.S. side in 1992. Number 67 on this list states, "UI'RIKh KhOL'BERT-perished in crash."

TFR 76-25: The Russian side of the USRJC has provided an additional document which mentions the fate of CPT Unruh. TFR 76 -25 is a cover sheet which states, "I am submitting to you a translation of the document taken from the dead American flier ULL'RIKH KHAL'BERT, shot down by AAA on 4 April 1951 near KHAKUSEN..." Unfortunately, the attached document lists the personal effects belonging to [REDACTED] vice CPT Unruh. Regardless of the mix up, the cover letter states that the personal effects of CPT Unruh were retrieved. According to the Russians, in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well.

*U.S.* CPT Unruh's name appears in the 77 page document formally titled The Transfer of United States Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union. This document is actually a collection of studies and hypotheses compiled by the U. S. side to use as a working tool. CPT Unruh's name appears in this

document as part of a study conducted by TSGT Siedling on Korean War POWs on whom the Russian archives may contain information.

#### Current Status

Despite the obvious “mix up” of the [REDACTED] Unruh files, there is little reason to doubt the veracity of the Russian documents. The Russian side has complied with our request to try to locate the “correct” documents belonging to CPT Unruh. Both sides of the USRJC agree that there is a high probability that CPT Unruh perished.

## LT JAMES VAN FLEET

*Summary of Incident.* 4 April 1952 at 0108 hours, a B-26 piloted by LT Van Fleet departed Kunsan Airdrome, South Korea to perform a night combat mission. The aircraft arrived in the target area and reported to ground control that the mission could not be accomplished because of unfavorable weather conditions. Shortly after, at 0330 hours the control station again established radio contact with the B-26 and assigned it an alternate target. This was the last communication. The crew was reported missing in action when the aircraft failed to return to the base.

### *Personnel Involved.*

VAN FLEET, James Alward Jr., LT	MIA	████████████████████	MIA
████████████████████	MIA		

### Archival Records

*Russian.* None

*U.S.* A report dated 26 May 1952 from Air Intelligence indicates “that a twin (engine) U. N. bomber crashed in the vicinity of Haeju at dawn on 4 April 1952. Records reveal that the subject B-26 was the only Air Force plane lost on that date. The intelligence report further indicates that an inhabitant of the area stated he observed the remains of one American lying thirty meters from the crash site...He had no knowledge of the fate of the other crew members or the identity of the deceased...”

### Personal Accounts

*Donets.* 22 June 1994, Task Force Russia members held an interview with former Soviet Army Captain (Ret) Gennadii Semyenovitch Donets. Donets had served as the Air Intelligence Officer in the combat operations center of the 64<sup>th</sup> IAK. Donets recalled hearing that the B-26 Bomber piloted by LT James Van Fleet (son of General Van Fleet) was intercepted and shot down during a bombing mission and that the entire crew had perished. Gennadii Donets is considered by some to be a credible and knowledgeable source of information. His statements track with the facts as recorded by U. S.

sources. Collectively, these events are highly suggestive of the fact that LT Van Fleet and the entire crew of this B-26 perished.

*Ananchenko.* A recent interview by JCSD-Moscow has uncovered information that may indirectly be related to this case. A former MVD Lieutenant Ananchenko informed JCSD personnel that in 1956, he was involved in escorting a group of prisoners from one Soviet camp to another Soviet camp. Ananchenko was told by the operations officer that one of the prisoners claimed to be the son of an American four star General. Ananchenko believed he was a spy who came to the Soviet Union during WWII and was captured.

The U.S. researched all four star generals in the U.S. Army starting from Pershing and the only one that had a son who is listed as MIA was General James Van Fleet, Sr.<sup>62</sup> LT James Alford Van Fleet, Jr., son of General Van Fleet, graduated from West point in 1949. This would make him approximately 28 years old in 1956. Ananchenko, who was approximately 25 in 1956 when this incident took place, recalls that the American prisoner was about his age or a few years older.

#### Current Status

There is insufficient evidence at this point to come to any firm conclusions about the fate of LT Van Fleet or any other member of the crew. The Russians have been asked to provide any information regarding this case. To date, we have received no Russian archival records regarding this case. JCSD has investigated Ananchenko's statement, however, the information can not be verified at this time.

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<sup>62</sup> General Van Fleet was the Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea and later Commander of the Far East Command.

Summary of Incident. [REDACTED] was one of the 14 member crew of a B-29 shot down on 12 January 1953. The aircraft was engaged by an estimated 12 aircraft approximately 20 miles east of Uiju before it disappeared from the radar scope. According to U. S. records, "On 22 January 1953 Peking radio reported that all but three of the crew had been captured, those three having been killed. Only Colonel Arnold and Captain Vaadi...were mentioned as having been captured."

*Personnel Involved.*

Unaccounted for

[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA

Accounted for

ARNOLD, John K. COL	RMC
BENJAMIN, Harry, A1C	RMC
BAUMER, William, MAJ	RMC
BROWN, Howard, TSG	RMC
BROWN, Wallace, LT	RMC
BUCK, John W., LT	RMC
KIBA, Steve E, A1C	RMC
LLEWELLYN, Elmer, CPT	RMC
SCHMIDT, Daniel, A2C	RMC
THOMPSON, John W.	RMC

Archival records

*Russian.* TFR 37-23: A high level correspondence states, “according to the report from MGB USSR advisor in China, 9 crew members of an aircraft from the 91<sup>st</sup> Reconnaissance Detachment, American Strategic Aviation, which was shot down in the area of An’dun on 12 January 53, were taken prisoner. The chief of communication services and supply, Colonel EHNNOT (Arnold) and staff officer of operational reconnaissance service Major BAUL (Baumer) were also on the aircraft...” The eleven crew members (nine plus Arnold and Baumer) that were mentioned as having been captured were confirmed as POWs and subsequently repatriated.

The Russian side has provided to the U.S. side 30 sets of documents containing information on POWs. Some of the documents are full interrogation reports while others are summaries or lists. Nevertheless, the entire batch of documents is referred to as the “interrogation reports”. This document is entitled “Register of POWs”. It lists brief biographical data on the eleven members of the crew who were captured. The end comment on the document confirms that the remaining three crew members, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, and \_\_\_\_\_, were reported as having been killed in the crash.

TFR 182-25: This Russian document states, “I am forwarding a list of personal documents of ...LT Vuris” (Voorhis). This document is apparently a cover letter for the transmittal of items from the downed B-29 to Moscow. It is noted that the attached documents were taken from “our Chinese comrades.” The attachments apparently included interrogation reports, captured documents, and some personal documents. According to the Russians, in cases where servicemen perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card, manuals, etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

### Current Status

██████████ is mentioned in three independent sources as having perished in the crash- U.S. reports, Peking reports and Soviet reports. Unless there are adequate grounds or subsequent information that challenges the veracity of these reports, the evidence implies that ██████████ perished in the crash.

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* On 16 July 1953, ██████████ was the number four pilot in a flight of four F-84s which departed Taegu Air Base, Korea on an interdiction mission in the Sinanju-Anju area of North Korea. As the flight was leaving the target area, ██████████ radioed that his aircraft had been hit. Another call from ██████████ was heard which stated, "I'm getting out." This was the last transmission heard from ██████████. The remainder of the flight circled the area for approximately 25 minutes but saw no sign of ██████████, a parachute, or wreckage of an aircraft.

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 138-235: TFR 138 is a 300 page document passed to the U.S. side of the Commission from the Russians. It contains various reports from units of the Soviet 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps such as shoot down reports, operational summaries, and search reports. These documents are lacking chronological continuity. In some cases, entire months are missing. Page 235 is a report dated 18 July 1953. The report refers to an F-80 that was apparently shot down on 17 July 1953. The significant statement in this report is the second paragraph which states, "During the search for the parachutist who went down on 16 July 53, ...(unrelated info. follows)." We do not have the actual Soviet report from 16 July 1953. Nothing more is mentioned about the parachutist.

*U.S.* ██████████ was the only Air Force loss suffered on 16 July 1953. The statement in the Russian document tracks with the circumstances recorded in the U. S. records.

Current Status

Based on the comparison of the Russian and U.S. documents, we believe there is significant evidence ██████████ was successful in his attempt to bail out of the aircraft. However, there is no subsequent information that mentions the fate of ██████████. Whether he survived the jump or not is



unknown. The Russians have been asked to provide the report from 16 July 1953 and any other relative documents. To date, no additional information has been provided.

Summary of Incident. [REDACTED] was one of the 14 member crew of a B-29 shot down on 12 January 1953. The aircraft was engaged by an estimated 12 aircraft approximately 20 miles east of Uiju before it disappeared from the radar scope. According to U. S. records, "On 22 January 1953 Peking radio reported that all but three of the crew had been captured, those three having been killed. Only Colonel Arnold and Captain Vaadi...were mentioned as having been captured."

*Personnel Involved.*

Unaccounted for:

[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA
[REDACTED]	MIA

Accounted for:

ARNOLD, John K. COL	RMC
BENJAMIN, Harry, A1C	RMC
BAUMER, William, MAJ	RMC
BROWN, Howard, TSG	RMC
BROWN, Wallace, LT	RMC
BUCK, John W., LT	RMC
KIBA, Steve E, A1C	RMC
LLEWELLYN, Elmer, CPT	RMC
SCHMIDT, Daniel, A2C	RMC
THOMPSON, John W.	RMC
VAADI, Eugene CPT	RMC

## Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 37-23: A high level correspondence states, “according to the report from MGB USSR advisor in China, 9 crew members of an aircraft from the 91<sup>st</sup> Reconnaissance Detachment, American Strategic Aviation, which was shot down in the area of An’dun on 12 January 53, were taken prisoner. The chief of communication services and supply, Colonel EHNNOT (Arnold) and staff officer of operational reconnaissance service Major BAUL (Baumer) were also on the aircraft...” The eleven crew members (nine plus Arnold and Baumer) that were mentioned as having been captured were confirmed as POWs and subsequently repatriated.

The Russian side has provided to the U.S. side 30 sets of documents containing information on POWs. Some of the documents are full interrogation reports while others are summaries or lists. Nevertheless, the entire batch of documents is referred to as the “interrogation reports”. This document is entitled “Register of POWs”. It lists brief biographical data on the eleven members of the crew who were captured. The end comment on the document confirms that the remaining three crew members, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, and \_\_\_\_\_, were reported as having been killed in the crash.

*U.S.* USAF records as mentioned above in summary.

## Current Status

\_\_\_\_\_ is mentioned in three independent sources as having perished in the crash - U.S. reports, Peking reports and Soviet reports. Unless there are adequate grounds or subsequent information that challenges the veracity of these reports, the evidence implies that \_\_\_\_\_ perished in the crash.

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* On 31 May 1952 at 1957 hours, a B-26 piloted by ██████████ departed South Korea to perform a night combat mission between Sinanju and the Yalu River in North Korea. Approximately one hour after departure, a routine report was received from the B-26 which revealed that it was experiencing no difficulty in flight and was proceeding on course to target area. No further contact was established with the B-26 and its crew was reported missing.

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████	MIA	██████████	MIA
██████████	MIA		

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 249 is a 23 page document that entirely pertains to this particular case. The following excerpt is from page one, TFR 249-1, of this document:

“...A search group established that on 31 May 1952 a burning B-26 type aircraft passed at low altitude through the Sonchen region and crashed near the village An-Khari.

The aircraft broke into pieces upon impact; the three-man crew perished and was buried by Korean citizens on the following day. The force of the impact scattered aircraft fragments in a 50-to-100-meter radius.

At the crash, the search group gathered separate parts; documents; charred maps in English, scale 250000; plates from the plane and a pilot’s dog tag...”

The subsequent pages contain inventories of documents found at the crash site, photographs of the crash site, a photo of the dog tag, statements, air plane parts, etc.

TFR 249-5 states, “Copy of a Dog Tag of a Perished Pilot from the Downed Type B-26 Enemy Aircraft on 31 May 1952.” Below this title is a drawing of the dog tag of ██████████, the pilot, including serial number and blood type.

On 10 February 1994, The Washington Times ran an article that was quoted from Izvestiia, a Russian newspaper. The Russian article was the story of how the dog tags [probably sketches] of [REDACTED] were found in a military archive in Russia. The Russian article and TFR-249 contained the same information.

*U.S.* USAF records as stated above in summary.

#### Current Status

Based on the Russian report, photographs and physical evidence found in this case, there is little doubt that [REDACTED] and the entire crew perished in the crash.

██████████  
*Summary of Incident.* On 13 April 1952 after radioing that his F-86 had been hit,

██████████ was seen heading south toward the Yellow Sea. Repeated efforts to contact him were to no avail. Minutes after the last radio message, the pilot of a friendly aircraft observed a huge splash in the waters of the Yellow Sea, followed by an oil slick. Subsequent search of the reported crash area failed to reveal any trace of the missing officer or his aircraft.

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████ MIA

#### Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 16: We believe the name of ██████████ appears on two documents provided to the U.S. side of the Commission by the Russians. In 1992, JCSD received a list of 59 names compiled by the Russians entitled List of United States Air Force Personnel, Shot Down in Aerial Combat or by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point. All but one name on the list of 59 names were identified shortly after the list was received, despite the garbling of most names during transliteration from English to Korean to Russian and back into English. The unidentified name was “MAJ Dzhilliam.”

The Russians subsequently provided the U.S. side with the documents that the list of 59 was based upon. They have referred to these documents as interrogation reports. However, in some cases, the “interrogation” document was not an interrogation report per se, but a list of personal effects. The Russian explanation for this is that in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well. Entry # 26 on this list states, “14 April 1952...51<sup>st</sup> Wing...Major Dzhilliam, Chief Operations Department...Pilot died in the area 50 km north of Andung.”

TFR 76-42: This document is a list of personal effects entitled, “Documents from Major Dzhilliam, the Chief of the Operations Section of the 51<sup>st</sup> Wing. He was shot down by a MiG-15 on 14

APR 52 over the territory of the Peoples Republic of Korea in an area 50 km north of An'dun.” The 6<sup>th</sup> entry on the list is “ a photo of the deceased Major Dzhilliam and the plane he was shot down in.”

U.S. The two Russian documents identified “Dzhilliam’s” rank, unit, duty position, date of shoot down, and area of shoot down. When compared with U.S. records, each of these references correlates with [REDACTED]. Moreover, [REDACTED] is the only casualty on or about this shoot down date that matches any of the information on the Russian list. The U.S. has since regarded this name as [REDACTED].

#### Current Status

Both documents describe “Dzhilliam” as having perished in the crash. Based on this analysis, both sides of the USRJC agree the evidence is highly suggestive of the fact that

[REDACTED] perished in the crash.

\_\_\_\_\_

*Summary of Incident.* On 31 May 1952 at 1957 hours, a B-26 on which

\_\_\_\_\_ was a gunner departed South Korea to perform a night combat mission between Sinanju and the Yalu River in North Korea. Approximately one hour after departure, a routine report was received from the B-26 which revealed that it was experiencing no difficulty in flight and was proceeding on course to target area. No further contact was established with the B-26 and its crew was reported missing.

*Personnel Involved.*

_____	MIA	_____	MIA
_____	MIA		

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 249 is a 23 page document that entirely pertains to this particular case. The following excerpt is from page one, TFR 249-1, of this document:

“...A search group established that on 31 May 1952 a burning B-26 type aircraft passed at low altitude through the Sonchen region and crashed near the village An-Khari.

The aircraft broke into pieces upon impact; the three-man crew perished and was buried by Korean citizens on the following day. The force of the impact scattered aircraft fragments in a 50-to-100-meter radius.

At the crash, the search group gathered separate parts; documents; charred maps in English, scale 250000; plates from the plane and a pilot’s dog tag...”

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TFR 249-5 states, "Copy of a Dog Tag of a Perished Pilot from the Downed Type B-26 Enemy Aircraft on 31 May 1952." Below this title is a drawing of the dog tag of [REDACTED], the pilot, including serial number and blood type.

10 February 1994, The Washington Times ran an article that was quoted from Izvestia, a Russian newspaper. The Russian article was the story of how the dog tags (probably sketches) of [REDACTED] were found in a military archive in Russia. The Russian article and TFR-249 contained the same information.

*U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.*

#### Current Status

Based on the Russian report, photographs and physical evidence found in this case, there is little doubt that [REDACTED] and the entire crew perished in the crash.

██████████

*Summary of Incident.* On 12 April 1953 at 0630 hours, the F-84 piloted by ██████████ “went into a bomb run over the target. Approximately two seconds after the explosion of his released bomb, an additional explosion was observed approximately 200 feet ahead of the bomb burst. Search of the area revealed burning wreckage of what appeared to be a crashed aircraft. No parachute or sign of life was observed.”

*Personnel Involved.*

██████████ MIA

Archival Records

*Russian.* TFR 261: Operational Summary Number 102 from the 64<sup>th</sup> IAK in Andung for 12 April 1953 states, “at 1604, eight MiG 15s from the 913<sup>th</sup> IAP (led by Captain Semenov) flying in the Bikhen region at 500 m altitude, engaged four F-84s. One pilot, Captain Semenov, fired and shot down one F-84 at a distance of 800 m on the target’s rear aspect.”

*U.S.* According to USAF records, two F-84s were lost on 12 April 1953. The one above piloted by ██████████ and the other piloted by LT de Luna (see the case study of LT de Luna for details). Both individuals are listed as MIA.<sup>63</sup>

Current Status

Russian Operational Summary Number 102 most likely refers to one of these two incidents. Unfortunately, the report does not contain sufficient details to narrow it down to one. Moreover, the Russian report does not state the fate of the pilot of the shot down F-84. In any case, the loss of at least one F-84 on 12 April 1953 is confirmed by this Russian document. The possibility exists that this may have been ██████████ aircraft. ██████████

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<sup>63</sup> According to Paul Cole, the Soviet records appear to be more consistent with the loss of ██████████. However, based on the documents available to the U.S., it is our assessment that the Russian data is inconclusive.

## **TRANSFER OF AMERICAN POWs TO THE SOVIET UNION**

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs has collected a significant amount of information that suggests that there is a high probability that during the Korean War American POWs were transferred from Korea to the Soviet Union.

While information in support of this assessment that Americans were transferred is incomplete and sometimes ambiguous, it is, nevertheless, highly suggestive. Indeed, when viewed in a broad context, one can see a consistent pattern of events such that there is a high probability that some transfers took place.

The notion that American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union was articulated in a preliminary 1993 study produced by the Defense POW/MIA Office and titled The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union.<sup>64</sup>

The primary goal of the report was to show the Russians that a body of information exists suggesting that the Soviets had taken American POWs to the Soviet Union. The U.S. believed that once confronted with the evidence, albeit circumstantial, the Russians could no longer lightly dismiss American suggestions that the transfers took place.

The report succeeded in this goal. The Russians publicly went on record stating that the possibility of the transfer of American POWs could not be dismissed. The Russians did not confirm such transfers, but they did move away from an adamant denial of the possibility.

The 1993 Transfer report tied together disparate sources to suggest initially that hundreds, if not thousands, of POWs could have been taken to the USSR. The report reviewed numerous sources of information. It was, however, a tentative report because time prohibited a close and careful assessment of all the data then available. Over the past three years, U.S. analysts have analyzed the data collected, compared it with other, newer data, and refined its analysis. In the last several years, the information in support of the transfer question has grown stronger. However, the data does not support the notion

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<sup>64</sup> This study is often popularly called “The 77 Page Report”.

that “hundreds” of Americans were transferred to the Soviet Union. Rather it suggests that perhaps only thirty to forty were transferred. The evidence in support of this conclusion is detailed later in this report.

### Soviet Recollections

Information suggesting that American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union can be divided into three categories. The first is recollections of former Soviet officers, soldiers, and citizens who played a role in the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union. As a group, these individuals are the most persuasive sources. Although the recollections of some have been clouded by the passage of years, their fundamental thrust and outline remains consistent. Especially impressive is the fact that these men did not know one another. Yet, they have independently come forward of their own volition to offer their unique piece of the story. It should be noted that these sources are people who held respected and responsible positions in the Soviet military and civil society.

Since the original publication of *The Transfer* report, U.S. analysts have interviewed additional figures, re-interviewed others, and analyzed still more documents. The most striking development since the publication of “*The Transfer*” is that there is now testimony by the former commander of Soviet forces in Korea (as recounted in the notes of an interviewing Russian journalist) that American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union. Perhaps even more compelling is the testimony of a former Soviet sergeant who claims he saw American POWs in a hospital in the Soviet Far East.

General Georgi Lobov, the senior Soviet commander in Korea, not long before his death recounted to a Russian journalist that he knew that at least thirty to forty American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union (see Appendix on General Lieutenant Georgi Ageyevich Lobov for additional details).

Sergeant Vladimir Trotsenko, a former Soviet NCO, was in 1951 in a hospital in the Soviet Far East. His hospital bed was placed outside a room that held four injured American flyers. The details of Trotsenko’s testimony are compelling and point to the presence of American servicemen within the borders of the Soviet Union (see Appendix on Sergeant Vladimir Trotsenko for additional details).

The testimony of these two men is buttressed by the recollections of two retired Soviet colonels. Colonel Pavel Derzskii recounted that there was a standing order to send all captured pilots to the

Soviet Union. He also claims that in response to orders from his superiors, he had an assistant arrange the transfer of a captured American/British intelligence agent, an American pilot, and an American general to the Soviet Union (see Appendix on Colonel Pavel Derzskii for additional details).

Yet, another retired colonel, Gavril I. Korotkov, recounted how he interrogated American POWs on the territory of the Soviet Union. Moreover, he described how the MGB would have handled American POWs both during the transfer phase and later when they were being interrogated in the Soviet Union<sup>65</sup> (see Appendix on Colonel Gavril Korotkov for additional details).

Pavel Umnyashkin, an aircraft mechanic in Andung during the Korean War, claims that a captured American pilot spoke before an assembly of Soviet servicemen. The American serviceman supposedly said, “I no longer believe that the Soviets are the beasts they have been portrayed to be.” The American was then, according to Umnyashkin, flown to the Soviet Union.

Colonel Nikolay Belyakov told a Commission investigator that an American pilot was captured when his F-86 was forced down. The American was sent to Moscow, according to Belyakov, “because Stalin wanted to speak with him”. Moreover, Colonel Ivan Kozhedub, a Soviet regimental commander at the time, interrogated the American who told the colonel “he wanted to go to Moscow.”

In another case, Nikolai Kazersky, a former gulag inmate and decorated Soviet soldier, told of meeting an American flyer in the gulag during the Korean War (see Appendix on Nikolai Kazerskii for additional details).

A former Chinese officer Shu Ping Wa (also spelled Ping Hwa Xu) recounted that in 1951 he turned over three captured American flyers to Soviet officers. As befitting a bureaucracy, the Russians provided the Chinese with “hand receipts” for the American flyers.

Yurii Klimovich, a design engineer at the Sukhoi Design Bureau, recounted that a senior colleague told him that a captured American F-86 pilot lectured Soviet design engineers on the

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<sup>65</sup> It should be noted that Colonel Korotkov’s testimony has changed over time. In a 1994 appearance before the Joint Commission, he would not venture beyond hearsay testimony.

capabilities and handling characteristics of an F-86. The pilot was allegedly held in the Lubyanka prison and was occasionally driven to the design works for technical discussions with the engineers.

Valentin Konstantinovich Pak, although he did not have direct contact with American POWs, was a highly placed official in the North Korean government. He became First Deputy Foreign Minister of the newly independent North Korea although he was technically a Soviet citizen. Valentin Pak recounted to U.S. investigators that during the Korean War a Chinese foreign service officer named Lu told him that American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union via China during the Korean War.

### U.S. Intelligence Reports

U.S. intelligence reports constitute the second type of information. Throughout the Korean War and for several years afterwards, there were, according to one American colonel, “hundreds of prisoner reports”.<sup>66</sup> One such report was by a Russian railroad worker who recounted seeing POWs passing from China to the Soviet Union at a small border station.<sup>67</sup>

Reports such as these were so common, the American intelligence community in the early 1950s gave high priority to the collection of information on Americans held in the Soviet Union and behind the “Iron Curtain”. By the mid-1950s a high level Inter-Agency Committee on Americans Held in the Communist Countries was founded.

The U.S. Government took these reports seriously. Indeed, John Foster Dulles, then U.S. Secretary of State, instructed the American ambassador in Moscow to present the Soviet Foreign Ministry an Aide-Memoire that said in part, “The United States Government has recently received reports which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea have been transported to the Soviet Union.”<sup>68</sup>

### Soviet Technology Demands and Central Policy Direction

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<sup>66</sup> Statement by LTC Phillip Corso, USA, Ret. to Task Force Russia, 23 February 1993, “Bridging the Gap - 40 Years, 1952-1992” and video tape interview of LTC Corso conducted with Task Force Russia on 23 February 1993.

<sup>67</sup> Foreign Service Dispatch, Amcongong Hong Kong, Desp. No. 1716, 23 March 1954.

The third type of information documents the Soviet demand for foreign technology and expertise. In the late 1940s through the 1950s, the Soviet Union saw itself in a desperate race to develop its scientific/technological base. The Soviet leaders placed a great deal of emphasis on developing nuclear weapons, high performance aircraft, and rockets.<sup>69</sup> Since the Soviet Union had lost many of its best young minds in the Second World War, it was woefully short of scientists. Consequently, General Colonel Serov, then a senior NKVD official, ordered Soviet intelligence personnel to develop lists of German scientists who “worked in the past at design offices and research institutes on jet technology”.<sup>70</sup>

Not long afterwards, the NKVD began kidnapping German scientists and sending them to the Soviet Union to work in Soviet design bureaus on aircraft and rockets.<sup>71</sup> This need for German scientists suggests the need for other Westerners with technological knowledge.

Closely related to documents that demonstrate the Soviet Union’s acute need for technology are documents that provide insight into the thinking of the senior Soviet leadership. A document that records the minutes of a meeting between Joseph Stalin and Cho En-Lai is the most revealing.

Stalin: “Concerning the proposal that both sides temporarily withhold twenty percent of the prisoners of war and that they return all of the remaining prisoners of war - the Soviet delegation will not touch this proposal and it remains in the reserve for Mao Tse-Tung.”

This exchange clearly indicates that the Soviets and Chinese actively discussed the idea of holding back POWs.

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<sup>68</sup> Aide Memoire (No. 947) from U.S. Embassy Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 5 May 1954

<sup>69</sup> David Holloway, **Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994)

<sup>70</sup> Irina Shcherbakova, “NKVD Hostage” in **The Moscow News**, No. 35, 27 August 1993

<sup>71</sup> Aldona Volynskaya, a former NKVD operative, described one such kidnapping: “Late at night we drove up to some house got off the truck. A German and his wife were inside the house. We offered him a paper saying that he wants to go to the USSR of his own free will, which he must sign...The officer, Melnik, was holding a pistol. The German trembles and signs. **That is the way specialists were taken to our country.**” from Irina Shcherbakova, “NKVD Hostage” in **The Moscow News**, No. 35, 27 August 1993.

As has already been discussed, these three disparate types of information do not prove that American POWs were taken to the Soviet Union. However, when taken together and viewed as a whole, the information strongly suggests that the probability is high that transfers took place. But this still begs the key question, if the transfers took place, how many American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union?

Transfer of Only Thirty to Forty POWs: General Lobov's statement to a Russian journalist that possibly only thirty to forty Americans POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union seems compelling to the U.S. side. It seems unlikely to the U.S. side that thousands or hundred were transferred.

This assessment is based first on statements by people who would have been knowledgeable of the transfer. Second, it is based on a macro-analysis of the number of missing Americans.

Also a former high ranking KGB official told a U.S. Government contractor during an unofficial discussion that "the number of Americans taken to the USSR was quite small, 25 or 30 or so."<sup>72</sup>

The information provided by these two men is buttressed by an analysis conducted by an U.S. government contractor who analyzed a list of 8,140 Americans missing in action from the Korean War.<sup>73</sup> He discovered that most of the missing in action cases are really BNR [Body Not Recovered] cases. When a serviceman is listed as missing in action - body not recovered, it does not necessarily mean that the serviceman in question survived. Friends and comrades may have seen him fall and perhaps even buried him in a hasty grave. But because no remains were ever returned, the serviceman was listed as MIA-BNR.

Consequently, when he examined all 8,100 cases of American MIAs, he was able to eliminate 5,945 cases as BNR cases rather than true missing in action cases, leaving by his conclusion 2,195 cases of soldiers missing in action - body not recovered who theoretically could have gone to the Soviet Union. And no doubt, this number would be significantly smaller if one takes into consideration the

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<sup>72</sup> Paul Cole, **POW/MIA Issues: Volume 1 - The Korean War** (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, National Defense Institute, 1944), p 183; the high level KGB source requested anonymity.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., pp. 182-183.



lethality of the battlefield, if not Korean War era POW camps. Bombs and artillery exploding near a person cause the virtual disintegration of a soldier. Few if any distinguishable body parts can be found. As for POW camps, men died by the hundreds, victims of exposure, malnutrition, sickness, and by North Korean hands during so-called death marches to, and between, POW camps.

It is not possible to say with precision what proportion or percentage of the 2,195 missing are victims of catastrophic aircraft crashes or the nearby explosion of an artillery shell. But to the degree that recent conflicts are an indicator, the number is high.

The statements by General Lobov and the senior KGB official together with a macro-assessment of the number of Americans missing in action, strongly suggest that the number of Americans possibly sent to the Soviet Union is small, between thirty and forty. Moreover, those taken most probably were chosen for the technical expertise.

A more detailed discussion of the information passed on by various Russian citizens is provided in the following appendices. Also included in these appendices is a discussion of 262 interrogations of Americans supposedly conducted under the auspices of the Soviets as well as a discussion of the role of the Soviet security services with American POWs.

- Appendix A: Vladimir Aleksandrovich Trotsenko
- Appendix B: General Lieutenant Georgi Ageyevich Lobov
- Appendix C: Colonel Gavril Ivanovich Korotkov
- Appendix D: Colonel Pavel Grigorevich Derzskii
- Appendix E: Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kazersky
- Appendix F: Dr. Valentin Konstantinovich Pak
- Appendix G: Unraveling the Mystery of the 262 Interrogations
- Appendix H: The Soviet Security Services and American POWs

## **VLADIMIR ALEKSANDROVICH TROTSENKO**

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Trotsenko is a sixty-seven year old pensioner and former Soviet Army sergeant. In the early 1950s when he was still in the Soviet Army, he served as an aircraft mechanic for C-47 aircraft. He was assigned to the aviation transport regiment of the 99<sup>th</sup> Airborne Division. Although the Division was based at Manziva, Chernigovka, Sergeant Trotsenko was assigned to an air base near the village of Starosysoyevka. While not a paratrooper as such, Sergeant Trotsenko made airborne jumps.

In November 1951, while on a training exercise, Sergeant Trotsenko injured his leg. He was sent to Hospital 404 in the town of Novosysoyevka in the Primorskiy Krai. Novosysoyevka is a small village located near the city of Arsenyev. Hospital 404 was not an ordinary hospital. It provided above average medical care and was normally reserved for aircrew members and officers.<sup>74</sup>

Hospital 404, according to Vladimir Trotsenko, was a very old rectangular building made of red brick. Other witnesses later clarified his recollection confirming that the red brick building had existed on the hospital grounds at the time of Trotsenko's hospitalization. This building was razed some time later. He felt certain that it was constructed prior to the Revolution of 1917. Vladimir Aleksandrovich remembered the hospital as set in a wooded area. Nearby the hospital were the railroad tracks to Arsenyev.

Because there was a shortage of space, Sergeant Trotsenko was provided with a bed in the corridor on the second floor of the hospital. (Initially Vladimir Trotsenko said the medical ward was on the second floor, but he later changed this to the third floor). His bed was next to a room that contained four Americans.

The Americans were kept in a room that was about 12 x 15 meters with a window on one end and a door at the other end. The side walls were of solid construction and did not have a door or window. However, the end with the door was really a lattice of metal bars.

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<sup>74</sup> R 011207Z Jun 95 FM Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA: Task Force Russia Meeting with Vladimir Aleksandrovich Protsenko [Trotsenko]

Peering into the room, Sergeant Trotsenko could see five beds parallel to the walls. Just outside of the door was a desk behind which a guard sat. There was little sense of urgency or security. The guard was in reality a hospital staff member - an unarmed private detailed to watch the American flyers. When the guard needed to visit the restroom or eat, he would turn toward Trotsenko, whose bed was next to the room, and ask him "to keep an eye on the Americans".

Sergeant Trotsenko could see four patients in the room. Patient Number 1 had some sort of back injury. His left arm was in a plaster cast. In spite of his back injury, Patient Number 1 was ambulatory and able to speak. His bed was closest to the wall.

Trotsenko described Patient Number 1 as between 22 and 27 years of age with light color hair, blue eyes, and slender. He also had a noticeable limp. His height was approximately 1.68 to 1.7 meters.

Although unable to speak each other's language, the American still managed to communicate. Based on random words he recognized as well as gestures, Sergeant Trotsenko believes that the American was from Cleveland and had two children.<sup>75</sup>

Patient Number 2 was in the bed directly next to Patient Number 1. He was in a prone position, on his back, unable to leave his bed. His arms were suspended in traction with padding on each side of his body to keep him from rolling to the right or left.

Endowed with a dark complexion, dark but not black hair, dark eyes, and with a height of about 1.70 meters, Patient Number 2 was heavy set with a weight of between 70 or 80 kg. He was also older - at least forty years of age.<sup>76</sup>

As for Patient Number 3, he was in the bed next to the wall while Patient Number 4 was in the bed next to the window. Both Patients Number 3 and 4 had bandages on their faces. Patient Number

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<sup>75</sup> In his 22 June 1995 testimony, Vladimir Trotsenko indicates that it was Patient Number 2 who had two children.

<sup>76</sup> 22 June 1995 Interview with Vladimir Trotsenko conducted by Task Force Russia members Michael Groh and Scott Fellows.

3 was about 1.68 meters in height. He showed some signs of life by moving slightly. The face of Patient Number 4 was burned and most of the time he was unconscious. He was approximately 1.72 m in height.

There was a fifth American who Sergeant Trotsenko never saw. He had already died. One day, when Sergeant Trotsenko was able to get around, a hospital worker took him out to the graveyard near the hospital and showed him a grave where, the hospital orderly said, the American was buried.

Meanwhile, for the fifteen to twenty days he was in the hospital, Sergeant Trotsenko was able to observe the activity of the Americans and those that visited them.

The flyers were given excellent care. For instance, they ate the same rations as the Soviet patients. Moreover, the Americans were treated by one of the ablest doctors in the hospital - LTC Lypachev who at the time was about sixty years of age.<sup>77</sup>

The Americans were also interrogated regularly by a lieutenant colonel and a captain. The colonel wore an air force uniform, and he arrived in an "Opel" car, i.e. a car of foreign manufacture. The captain also wore an air force uniform. During the interrogations, he served as the interrogator. He arrived at the interrogations in a ¾ ton Dodge truck.

The captain evidently spoke English, and it was he who spoke to the four flyers. The lieutenant colonel was about forty-five years old with medium to tall height - 1.72 meters.

The Americans were interrogated periodically while Trotsenko was in the hospital. The interrogations generally did not last long and Trotsenko saw no evidence of coercion.

There is one incident, however, that is prominent in Trotsenko's memory. On one occasion, the colonel came into the room, he "approached the second bed where the burnt older man was lying, and he pulled something out from under the sheet from around the neck of this patient. At first, I thought it was a cross. I did not really know what it was. It was some kind of medallion - a round medallion<sup>78</sup>.

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<sup>77</sup> Major Anna Lypacheva, the wife of LTC Lypachev, was an internist assigned to Trotsenko's unit.

<sup>78</sup> Presumably this round medallion was a military dog tag or identification tag of the sort used by the U.S. Navy at the time.

He pulled it out, looked at it, and then stuck it back under the sheet. He went around to all of the other patients and did the same thing. He looked at the medallion on the neck of each patient. He did not make any comments or say anything. He simply looked and stuck them back under the sheet.”<sup>79</sup>

Not long after meeting the Americans and while still a patient in the hospital, a hospital worker led Vladimir Trotsenko to a cemetery where the fifth American was buried. He remembers the hospital cemetery was only 1.5 to 2 km away from the hospital. Moreover, as he entered the cemetery, the ground rose in front of him. Trotsenko remembers this because he was still on crutches and had some difficulty walking up an incline that ran almost the entire length of the cemetery. There was, he recalls, a wooden fence, apparently constructed to keep out farm animals. The fence formed a corner with the left side running a ways down the length of the cemetery and the end side extending to the right. The grave was freshly dug in the far left corner with about 10 to 20 meters of clear ground before reaching the fence. Further identifying the location of the grave was a steep decline to the left of the grave.<sup>80</sup> The grave was fourth, from left to right, in a row of four graves side by side.

#### Is Trotsenko a Credible Witness?

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has come to the conclusion that Trotsenko is a highly credible witness. The Commission reached this conclusion after a thorough and exhaustive analysis of Mr. Trotsenko’s testimony.

Mr. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Trotsenko first came to the attention of the U.S. Russia -Joint Commission on 24 March 1995. During a routine visit to Khabarovsk by TFR, Anatoly Follin, Director of the American Business Center in Khabarovsk, passed to the U.S. that a former Soviet Army sergeant claimed to have seen Americans in a military hospital.

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<sup>79</sup> Testimony of Vladimir Trotsenko, Twelfth Plenary Session, U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, Joint Session/Trotsenko testimony, 28 August 1995, Moscow, Russia

<sup>80</sup> R 090550Z Aug 95 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: "JCSD-Moscow Trip to Novosysoyevka Cemetery, July 23 - August 2, 1995"

Vladimir Trotsenko called the American Consulate in Vladivostok after an advertisement in a local Khabarovsk newspaper caught his eye. The U.S. placed the advertisement and asked the public to come forward with any information on American servicemen who may have been sent to the Soviet Union. Remembering his experiences forty-four years ago in the Novosysoyevka Hospital, Vladimir Trotsenko came forward. Motivated, it appears, only by a sense of public duty.

The U.S. was eager to interview Mr. Trotsenko and did so on 14 May 1995 in his home - a house that Trotsenko built himself and the very house where he raised two sons and a daughter.

Vladimir Trotsenko's testimony was so compelling that two days later on 16 May 1995, U.S. investigators visited the military hospital at Novosysoyevka. The visit only fueled more interest in Mr. Trotsenko's recollections. Consequently, on 20 May and again on 22 June 1995 Vladimir Aleksandrovich was re-interviewed.

During the first visit of the U.S. to the Novosysoyevka Military Hospital, the commander, LTC Evgeniy Nikolayevich Alsenshka, expressed some doubt about the accuracy of Vladimir Trotsenko's testimony.<sup>81</sup> For example, LTC Alsenshka noted:

1. The Novosysoyevka Hospital while it is named Hospital Number 404 now was not so named in 1951 /1952.
2. He doubted that there had ever been lattice work or bars in the hospital since it was not a psychiatric hospital.
3. The hospital was small and unimportant and would not have been used to treat American POWs.
4. There had never been a cemetery on the hospital grounds.

These apparent contradictions in Vladimir Trotsenko's testimony were pause for some concern. The U.S. decided to return to the hospital for further investigation. Two MVD officers, Colonel

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<sup>81</sup> The first visit to the Novosysoyevka Hospital took place on 16 May 1995, the second on 29 June 1995, and the third, which included Mr. Trotsenko, on 26-27 July 1995. For details on the first visit see R 051140Z Apr 95 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA: Task Force Russia Trip to Khabarovsk March 23-24, 1995"

Boltkov and LTC Aleksandr Mikhailovich, accompanied the U.S. during this second visit. They met with LTC Viktor Mikhailovich Aleksandrov, the acting hospital commander. The three Russian officers raised several points in refutation of Trotsenko's testimony:<sup>82</sup>

1. The Novosysoyevka Hospital was built in 1936, nearly two decades after the revolution and not before the revolution as alleged by Trotsenko.
2. The hospital is "U" shaped and not a simple rectangle.
3. The hospital is not red bricked but plaster covered.
4. The cemetery used by the hospital is 4 to 5 km away with the next nearest cemetery 10-12 km from the hospital.

The criticism leveled by the Russian officers generated concern to the U.S. Yet, they still found Vladimir Trotsenko's testimony compelling. Consequently, in an effort to "get to the bottom" of the issue, the investigators decided to return to Novosysoyevka, but this time with Vladimir Trotsenko.

On Wednesday, 26 July 1995 after a forty-four year absence, Vladimir Trotsenko returned to Novosysoyevka. The experience was a revelation to both the Russians and Americans. Indeed, it was a turning point for it confirmed the acuity of Trotsenko's memory even after four and a half decades.<sup>83</sup>

As the TFR team approached the hospital, Vladimir Trotsenko pointed to a spot and indicated that the path to the cemetery was there. And, indeed, it was, although it was not visible from the road. The path itself was overgrown and not in general use, but still clearly recognizable. Then in the company of LTC Aleksandr Mikhailovich Vasilkov, a local MVD officer, Trotsenko walked along the path to the cemetery - a distance of only about 2 km, not the 4 to 5 km the authorities described.

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<sup>82</sup> Summary of Vladimir Trotsenko Testimony written by SSG Michael Groh, Task Force Russia, sent as e-mail message 12 July 1995.

<sup>83</sup> R 090550Z Aug 95 FM Amembassy Moscow, Subject: JCSD-Moscow Trip to Novosysoyevka Cemetery, July 23 - August 2, 1995



Two local residents accompanied them along the path to the cemetery. They confirmed that a fence had once existed along the left side of the cemetery and running east to west. One long time resident, Aleksei Yakovlevich Lazarenko, said not long after World War II he helped other villagers build the fence in order to keep animals out the cemetery.

Based on Trotsenko's earlier description, the grave of the alleged American and the four graves next to it were in the northern part of the cemetery. Moreover, these four graves laid north to south and not east to west as is the Russian Orthodox tradition. Once inside the boundaries of the cemetery, the U.S. found an area in the northern section which matched Trotsenko's recollections.

A long time resident of the area volunteered additional pertinent information. He stated that soldiers who died while at the hospital, who had no relatives to claim the remains, were buried in unmarked graves in the northern end of the cemetery. The area corresponded to where Trotsenko said the American was buried.<sup>84</sup>

Next, the U.S. visited the hospital accompanied by a local policeman - Konstantin Mikhailovich Maksimov. LTC Viktor Mikhailovich Aleksandrov, the hospital commander, was hostile and argumentative. Once again, he pointed out that the hospital was stucco and not red brick. Also he maintained that two large wings extending from the main building had always been a part of the hospital, thus contradicting Trotsenko's description.

This inconsistency was resolved during a later visit to the hospital grounds by the U.S., Colonel Vasilkov, and Vladimir Trotsenko. During the visit, the group met Proskovya Fyoderovna who was working in the hospital laundry. Fyoderovna, who had lived in Novosysoyevka since 1947 and had worked in the hospital since 1957, stated that there had previously existed a red brick building on the hospital grounds. This building was separate from the main hospital building and contained a barakamero<sup>85</sup> and vertushka.<sup>86</sup> She remembered these facts because as a young woman she had seen

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<sup>84</sup> Aleksei Yakovlevich Lazarenko, R 090550Z Aug 95 FM Amembassy Moscow

<sup>85</sup> A **barekamero** is a pressure chamber used to familiarize pilots with the various effects of pressure changes.

how the pilots were spun around in the vertushka.<sup>87</sup> Fyoderovna's earlier testimony is highly suggestive.<sup>88</sup> It is unclear why she later wavered in her testimony. Whether she felt pressure to do so from Popov's presence or whether she honestly changed her mind, is not clear. But even Popov's recollections do not contradict the fact that there may have been a barekamera on the hospital grounds in the early 1950s. The barekamera that Popov worked at was not installed until 1956.

In addition to interviews with Fedorova and Popov, the U.S. team was given a guided tour of the hospital. The U.S. investigators noticed several other interesting items:

- In places where the exterior stucco had fallen away, it was clear the building was made of red brick.
- The manner in which the exterior walls were joined, i.e. not interlaced and uneven suggests that wings were added later.

The U.S. met with Mikhail Ivanovich Vasechko, a retired driver at the hospital. He started work at the Novosysoyevka Hospital in 1942 and worked there until his retirement. He pointed out that during World War II the hospital was called 307 Military Hospital, but after the war was changed to 404 Military Hospital - the number that Trotsenko remembers it as.

Next, through the good graces of Colonel Vladimir Giorgiovich Raduzin, Deputy Chief of Correctional Affairs, U.S. investigators were able to meet with Colonel Aleksandr Pavlovich Lavrentsov, a KGB (now SVR) official who had been helpful to the U.S. in the past.

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<sup>86</sup> A **vertushka** is a large wheel in which a person is spun to experience different "G" forces.

<sup>87</sup> R 3411308Z Oct 95 FM Amembassy Moscow, Subject: Joint Commission Expedition to Novosysoyevka Cemetery, 23 - 26 October 1995

<sup>88</sup> In March 1996, Joint Commission investigators interviewed Vasily Ivanovich Popov. In 1956 he installed and operated a barekamera on the grounds of Military Hospital 404. According to Popov, the barekamera he helped install - model SBK 48 - was placed in a wooden building and not a brick one. Later when Proskovye Fyoderovna was re-interviewed in the presence of Vasily Popov, she agreed that the barekamera was housed in a wooden building. When asked about her earlier testimony that it was in a brick building, she said she must have been wrong because "Popov worked there and he should know." R 121104Z Apr 96 FM Amembassy Moscow

While interviewing Colonel Lavrentsov, U.S. investigators mentioned that Trotsenko said that the colonel who interrogated the Americans drove a German Opel. Colonel Lavrentsov responded that after World War II many German cars were confiscated and distributed to MGB and MVD officers for their use.<sup>89</sup>

On 27 July 1995, the last day before returning to Moscow, the U.S. members, Vladimir Trotsenko, and LTC Vasilkov returned to the cemetery for one last look. They came to a mutual agreement that the most likely spot for the American's grave is an unmarked grave in the northwest corner of the cemetery, near where the old fence once stood and with three other graves that lay in a north to south manner.

### What Were The Results?

The trip to Novosysoyevka was revealing. Doubt about the veracity and accuracy of Vladimir Trotsenko's testimony disappeared. Even local Russian authorities who had viewed Trotsenko with great skepticism seemed convinced as to the authenticity of his recollections.

As a result of this trip, the following became clear to all sides:

1. Trotsenko's description of the cemetery with a wooden fence, a handful of graves lying north to south, and a short path leading to the cemetery was confirmed.
2. The existence of a "red brick" building with a barekamera in which Trotsenko saw the four Americans was confirmed on the fourth visit to the hospital grounds.
3. Trotsenko's description of the hospital in 1951 as a three story, red brick, rectangular hospital was confirmed.
4. Trotsenko's recollection of the German "Opel" driven by one of the interrogators was confirmed.

Other aspects of Trotsenko's testimony have been confirmed by other sources. For example, Trotsenko recounted how a Soviet colonel, "...pulled something out from under the sheet from around the neck of this patient...some kind of medallion - a round medallion." Clearly this was a dog tag or

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<sup>89</sup> R 090550Z Aug 95 FM Amembassy Moscow

military identification tag.<sup>90</sup> Yet, the description of it as a round medallion was confusing. We believed that American dog tags were rectangular. However, the U.S. Navy Artifacts Historian revealed that from 1940 until approximately 1956, the U.S. Navy employed round dog tags.

### Russian Response

On Monday, 28 August 1995, Vladimir Trotsenko addressed a general session of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs. His testimony was moving and convincing. The Russians made no serious attempt to discredit Trotsenko. Colonel Semin from the National Archives of the Ministry of Defense, however, did point out that a review of the admission records for Hospital 404 indicated that Sergeant Trotsenko was a patient there from 24 March to 4 May 1951 and not in the October/November 1951 time frame.

At the end of the 12<sup>th</sup> Plenum in his closing remarks, General Volkogonov summed up the Russian position when he publicly stated, “I agree with the remarks of Ambassador Toon that the witness Vladimir Aleksandrovich Trotsenko is the first witness who displays a sufficient degree of reliability and honesty.”<sup>91</sup>

### Subsequent Trips

In an effort to find the grave that reputedly contained the remains of the fifth American, the Joint Commission sent a team of American and Russian investigators out to Novosysoyevka Cemetery for the period 24 - 26 October 1995.

Working together, American and Russian soldiers commenced digging the first of three pits in the Novosysoyevka Cemetery on 24 October. Despite the use of modern anthropological methods the digging was slow and uneventful. Then, towards the end of the day in an effort to square off the left corner of the pit, one American jumped into the pit. As his boots hit the ground of the pit, they made an

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Closing Remarks - Plenary Session, 12th Plenum of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs, 30 August 1995, Moscow, Russia

odd sound. The other soldiers noticed this and asked him to jump to the right side of the pit. It then became apparent to everyone that the sounds were different. Something was under the dirt in the left corner of the pit.

The next morning the excavation continued. It was soon apparent that the odd sound was caused by a coffin under the dirt. Further digging uncovered a coffin, but it was not lying north-south as expected, but east-west. The excavation continued in such a manner that any graves oriented north-south would have been revealed.<sup>92</sup>

Nevertheless, Russian and American forensic specialists opened the coffin. With respect and care, they examined the remains. Based on an analysis of the overall condition of the teeth, it was clear to both countries' specialists that these were not the remains of an American. Moreover, the lay of the grave substantiated the conclusion that this was not the area Trotsenko remembered.

The forensic specialists replaced the remains and decided to halt the operation for the present time. Both the Russians and Americans agreed to seek additional information that would help any future excavation teams to more precisely locate the graves described by Trotsenko.

Then a few months later, 17 March - 3 April 1996, the Joint Commission sent out another team of Russian and American investigators. This time the team came with a ground radar set provided by CILHI.<sup>93</sup>

As a result of the efforts of the Joint Russian-American team using the ground radar, two graves buried in a north-south configuration and a third grave which lay in an east-west configuration were uncovered.

Of the two graves oriented north-south, according to the CILHI anthropologist on the scene, one contained the remains of an Asian. These remains were returned to the grave. The second set was

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<sup>92</sup> R 311308Z Oct 95 Fm Amembassy Moscow

<sup>93</sup> Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii - a U.S. Army laboratory dedicated to retrieving and identifying remains.

identified as probably the remains of a Caucasian male. The teeth of this unidentified male did not match the dental records of any of the missing crew members of a 6 November 1951 Navy P2V shot down by the Soviets. Nevertheless, with Russian permission, a small bone sample was taken for possible DNA testing. The remains were re-buried and their location carefully noted.

Although the remains of the American reputedly buried in the Novosysoyevka Cemetery could not be located, the U.S. side of the Joint Commission still places much credibility in Vladimir Trotsenko's recollections. The focus of the U.S. side of the Commission has changed from trying to find the one set of remains said to be in the Novosysoyevka Cemetery to a search for clues on the names and fates of the four men seen alive in Military Hospital 404.

### Conclusions

There are two conclusions that can be drawn from the testimony of Vladimir Trotsenko:

- Vladimir Trotsenko quite probably saw four American servicemen in the Novosysoyevka Hospital in 1951.
- These four American servicemen did not return to U.S. military control.

While Trotsenko's testimony requires verification, similar testimony from other witnesses reinforces his credibility and the possibility that American servicemen were held in the Soviet Union during the Korean War. The U.S. will continue to investigate these allegations.

## **GENERAL LIEUTENANT GEORGI AGEYEVICH LOBOV**

General Lieutenant Georgi Lobov was the commander of the 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps in China/North Korea during the Korean War. As such, General Lobov was the senior Soviet unit commander in the Theater of Operations. Only Generals Krasovsky, Razuvaev, and Shtykov were more senior.

From October 1951 until the end of 1952, General Lobov commanded the 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps. It was an enormous command encompassing virtually all the Soviet troops engaged in combat operations in the Korean Peninsula.<sup>94</sup> The 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps included not only air divisions but anti-aircraft and search light divisions as well. It reached its peak strength with 26,000 personnel in 1952.<sup>95</sup>

Given the political sensitivities surrounding Soviet involvement in the Korean War, the commander of the 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps did not answer to the normal military chain of command. General Lobov stated it succinctly, "I took my orders directly from Moscow."<sup>96</sup>

Below is an extract of an interview conducted with Lobov. It contains that portion of the interview where Lobov discusses the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union. General Lobov's seniority, access, and unique command position gave him insight into virtually all aspects of the war - military operations, intelligence operations, military-civilian relations, etc. Little went on in the Korean theater of operations that Lobov was not aware of.

Unfortunately, General Lobov passed away a few years ago. However, before his death in February 1992, he consented to an interview. The person who interviewed him is a native speaker of

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<sup>94</sup> S. Ruban, "Sovetskie letchiki v nebe korei" This is a short, informal history of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps in Korea written by a Russian archival official.

<sup>95</sup> Yefim Gordon and Vladimir Rigmant, **MiG-15: Design, Development, and Korean War Combat History** (Osceola, Wisconsin: Motorbooks International Publishers & Wholesalers, 1993), p. 120.

<sup>96</sup> Jon Halliday, "Secret War of the Top Guns" in **The Observer** [London], unknown date.

Russian and a Russian citizen - Igor Morozov. In 1995, Mr. Morozov provided by the U.S. with a transcript of his interview with the General.

During the interview, the General discussed the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union:

Question: Were not one-half of the (American) prisoners transferred to Soviet territory?

General Lobov: I don't have any accurate information about POWs. But I can testify to the following; I know that in summer 1952 at least 30-40 American POWs were placed in a separate and closely guarded carriage, attached to a goods train, and sent to the USSR. The most 'valuable goods' on this train was the American pilot of Russian origin Colonel Mahurin - he was a wing commander in the USAF, and by Soviet standards a 'wing' amounts almost to a division. I know that Mahurin agreed to work with our intelligence people, and he helped us a lot. In particular, he explained details of the 'Sabre', which we were greatly interested in at the time. We have to presume that the other 30-40 prisoners were also of some value to our intelligence. They must have been a treasure-trove. I imagine that it was specifically from these people that the GRU's remarkable knowledge of our adversary came. If necessary, I could request from Moscow information on any squadron and that information would be supplied immediately. Furthermore, it was surprisingly detailed - right down to what brand of whisky the commander of the squadron preferred, and even what sort of women he preferred - blondes or brunettes. Incidentally, I know that it was accurate information of this sort, gathered from these Americans held on Soviet territory, which in 1951 helped us seize a Sikorsky helicopter from the Americans. This was something Moscow was extremely interested in at the time. You have to guess that this helicopter helped our military-industrial complex greatly in producing our own Soviet military helicopter.

That is what I know for certain. As regards the subsequent fate of those 30-40 Americans, I, like yourself, can only guess..."



Given the political sensitivity of General Lobov's statement, it is not surprising that controversy surrounds this statement.

Igor Morozov, the Russian journalist who interviewed General Lobov, did not tape record nor video tape the interview. Instead, he took detailed notes, and then went back to his office where he wrote up the interview. Once he reconstructed the interview, he failed, however, to obtain Lobov's signature on the transcript verifying the accuracy and authenticity of the interview.

For several years the Lobov interview lay in Morozov's files. Then in 1994, the prestigious Russian newspaper *Komsomolskaia Pravda* published a long article by Igor Morozov on the Korean War.<sup>97</sup> A close reading of Morozov's article in *Komsomolskaia Pravda* shows that it follows point-by-point the transcript of the Lobov interview. Indeed, the article follows in the same order the issues that Lobov discussed in his interview. First, he describes the size of his command, then the number of American aircraft shot down, next the merits of the MiG-15, the POWs issue, background political issues, etc. Often quotes are taken directly from the transcript.

However, when the POW issue is addressed, the article departs from the Lobov transcript. Rather than quoting directly that "at least 30-40 American POWs were ... sent to the USSR", the article takes a speculative turn. After noting the ability of the GRU to provide details on such matters as the type of whiskey that American squadron commanders' drank or their preference for blonde or brunette women, the article suggests:

"Even if there would have been in the American Army on the Korean Peninsula hundreds of intelligence agents at work (and it is agreed that there is little probability of this) - even then to collect such detailed and exhaustive formation for us it would have been hardly possible. In such a case there remains one plausible explanation as to how the Soviet GRU was so well-informed about the enemy - information this complete could only be received from tens or hundreds of American POWs already on the territory of the Soviet Union. By the way, we repeat - this is above all only a hypothesis which demands documentary evidence."

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<sup>97</sup> Igor' Morozov, "Koreiskii poluostrov: sckhvatka vnich'iu" in **Komsomolskaia Pravda**, 16 July 1994, p. 4

This passage is very revealing for two reasons. First, the editors of the Komsomolskaia Pravda, a respected newspaper not known for sensationalism or yellow-journalism, obviously found Morozov's interview of Lobov credible otherwise they would have rejected the article for publication.

Second, the Komsomolskaia Pravda article closely followed the form and content of the original Morozov transcript of the interview. The only deviation from this pattern is when the article addresses the POW/MIA issue. No doubt realizing the political sensitivity of the issue, the editors dropped General Lobov's statement "at least 30-40 American POWs were...sent to the USSR." In its stead, the editors replaced Lobov's direct statement with a more speculative one, that perhaps "tens or hundreds of American POWs (were) already on the territory of the Soviet Union."

As a consequence of these two factors, the U.S. side of the KWWG believes that the interview with General Lobov accurately reflects what the General knew to be the case, i.e. the Soviets indeed sent some American POWs from Korea to the Soviet Union.

## **COLONEL GAVRIL IVANOVICH KOROTKOV**

Colonel Gavril Ivanovich Korotkov is a retired senior Soviet military officer who, while serving in the Soviet Far East, helped collect intelligence on the morale of U.S. servicemen.

In the first of several interviews with U.S. investigators, Colonel Korotkov related how he had interrogated two American POWs in Khabarovsk during the Korean War. He also discussed the system whereby American POWs would be screened in North Korea and selected for further interrogation in the Soviet Union.<sup>98</sup> Later suggesting he had been pressured by Russian authorities, Colonel Korotkov retracted some of his earlier statements. However, the central core of his testimony remains consistent, i.e. Americans were interrogated by Soviets and some were taken to the former Soviet Union.

Gavril Korotkov is a soldier-scholar, a man who has dedicated much of his career to Far Eastern issues. He has served as a staff member at the Institute U.S. and Canada, Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and is currently at the Ministry of Defense's Scientific Research Institute.

He was first introduced to Far Eastern affairs in 1950 upon his graduation from Institute of Foreign Languages. As a young lieutenant, he was assigned to the Special Analytical Group of the General Staff reporting to Marshall Rodion Yakovlovich Malinovskiy, then the Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern Military District. Lieutenant Korotkov was a psychological warfare officer.

Lieutenant Korotkov's responsibility at the time was analyzing the morale of American fighting men. But such analysis required intelligence on the values, perceptions, and concerns of American military men and such data was not readily available. Consequently, Korotkov and his colleagues were eager to interrogate American POWs in order to learn first hand the answers to these vital questions.

Colonel Korotkov asserts that Soviet military specialists were given permission to conduct interrogations of American POWs. However, these interrogations were conducted in a covert manner.

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<sup>98</sup> R 241259A August 1992 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA Team Interview with Colonel Korotkov

The Soviet interrogator, for example, would wear a Chinese military uniform. The Soviets were concerned that open, blatant interrogation of Americans would reveal the level of their involvement in the Korean War.

While some interrogations of Americans by Soviet officials did take place, the Russians maintain that such interrogations were prohibited. To stress this point, the Russian side of the commission has produced several directives signed by senior Soviet officials expressly forbidding the interrogation of Americans. Nonetheless, Colonel Korotkov remains firm in his statement that the Soviets routinely conducted interrogations of Americans.

Korotkov described an interrogation system that resembles medical triage methods. The first stage took place in North Korea. Newly captured Americans would be interrogated. There those deemed of value due to their technical skills and knowledge would be tagged for further interrogation in the Soviet Union. Second stage interrogations usually took place in the Soviet Union. Apparently, during this stage, technical experts would question the Americans in an effort to obtain the most detailed information possible.

Those Americans selected for interrogation in the Soviet Union would normally be sent to the Soviet naval base at Pos'yets<sup>99</sup>. From there, they would be flown to Khabarovsk, where the second stage interrogations took place.

The NKVD, forerunner of the KGB, maintained control over the American POWs sent to the Soviet Union. Generally the Soviet military interrogators had only a few hours with the Americans, but on occasion they had several days in which to interrogate the POWs. After interrogation, the NKVD would spirit them away to some unknown destination. From this point on, Gavril Korotkov had no further knowledge of the fate of these American servicemen.

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<sup>99</sup> The Pos'yets Naval Base is located in the Soviet Union near the tri-border region [China, North Korea, and the USSR].

Colonel Korotkov stated clearly in his first interview with the U.S. that he personally interrogated two Americans in Khabarovsk. He can not remember precisely the names of the two men. However, he recalls that one was an Army officer from the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.

In a subsequent interview, Colonel Korotkov described the interrogation point as a pre-detention facility or “KPZ”.<sup>100</sup> He would arrive in the morning and the prisoner who was to be interrogated would already be there. He never saw any Korean or Chinese guards, just Soviet Border Guards. Gavril Korotkov does remember seeing, however, one female North Korean interrogator at the facility.

Once they completed the interrogation of a POW, a report would be written and sent on to Far East Military District Headquarters. Another copy was also sent to Moscow and to the Main Political Administration’s Seventh Directorate. The reports from the technical group were sent through GRU channels to Moscow.

Based on the information he obtained from the interrogation of American POWs, Gavril Korotkov wrote a Psychological Operation (PSYOP) study entitled “Morale of U.S. Service Men in Korea”. This analytical work outlined the psychological vulnerabilities of American fighting men and served as a guide to Soviet psychological warfare specialists in the field.

#### Visit From the Security Services

On 29 September 1992, several members from the U.S. side re-interviewed Colonel Korotkov. The interview was held at the old Central Committee building - Ilyinka 12.

At the very start of the meeting for all to hear, Colonel Korotkov recounted a late night visit to his apartment the night before. The visitor came to discuss Korotkov’s forthcoming testimony. What was said is unknown, but he behaved in such a manner, Korotkov said, as to leave one with the impression he was from the “special services”, a Russian euphemism for secret police.

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<sup>100</sup> In Russian **kamera predvoritel'nogo zaklyucheniya**

Korotkov was raised under the old repressive Communist system which was characterized by late night police visitations. Such a visit by a man who comported himself in the “old manner”, must have been a source of concern.

By mention of this visit, Colonel Korotkov put the Commission on notice. Henceforth, his subsequent testimony became tentative, contradictory, and more equivocal. For example, he now said that American POWs were not held in Khabarovsk, contradicting what he had said earlier. Rather, the Americans were held in a mountainous area near where the borders of the Soviet Union, North Korea, and China meet.<sup>101</sup> He could not definitely identify the country because no border marking were present. However, he suspected that it was in North Korea, or, perhaps, in an unclaimed zone. He also now claimed that he had been in North Korea whereas earlier he said he had not.

Had Colonel Korotkov simply retracted his earlier statements or amended them consistently, then his subsequent testimony would have been less troublesome, more understandable. But after saying in September 1992 that no Americans were taken to Khabarovsk and implying that none were sent to the Soviet Union, he contradicted himself eighteen months later. In another interview, Korotkov stated, “Yes, I think I knew then and state now that part of these (American) POWs, a certain group of them, of course, found themselves in the Soviet Union.”<sup>102</sup>

Then less than a month later, Gavril Korotkov appeared before a plenary session of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission in Moscow. And he again changed the tenor of his testimony.

“In June 1950, I was sent to the Far East for service, to the headquarters of the military district...You should know, that I had nothing at all to do with prisoners of war...There were rumors to the effect that prisoners, who could have been Americans, and who could have been taken to the USSR, were captured. But I never saw them. These were just rumors...I can say

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<sup>101</sup> R 261132Z Oct 92 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA: Follow-up Interview with Colonel Gavril Korotkov

<sup>102</sup> BBC interview May 1994

it again. I never saw Americans taken to the Soviet Union. I saw U.S. prisoners of war in China and Korea.”<sup>103</sup>

Then a month later, in an interview with a South Korean newspaper, Gavril Korotkov, again reversing himself, is quoted as saying that many South Korean and American captives (from the Korean War) were sent to POW camps in the Soviet Union and China, with many of the South Koreans going to camps in Soviet Central Asia.<sup>104</sup>

### Conclusions

The critics point to these contradictions in Korotkov’s testimony as evidence that he is an unreliable and unstable witness. Furthermore, Korotkov can not provide documentary evidence to support his earlier statements. Much of what he purports to know is based on hearsay.

Indeed, these are valid criticisms. It is, however, quite possible that many of the shifts in testimony by Korotkov can be traced to real or imagined intimidation by authorities, especially when he was requested to testify before official bodies. Nevertheless, Colonel Korotkov has stated and restated when not in official venues that American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union.

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<sup>103</sup> 9th Plenary Session of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission, 1 June 1994

<sup>104</sup> "Many ROK Prisoners of War Reportedly Sent to Central Asia", R 221237Z Jul 94 Fm FBIS Seoul KOR

## **COLONEL PAVEL GRIGOREVICH DERZSKII**

In September 1993, U.S. team members visited the Kiev War Museum to take photographs of captured American war equipment. While there, museum officials suggested they contact a Colonel Derzskii, a World War II and Korean War veteran.

Consequently, on 17 September 1993, the U.S. interviewed Colonel Derzskii in his small Kiev apartment. He revealed to the U.S. investigators that he helped arranged the transfer of American fliers from Korea through China to the Soviet Union during the Korean war.<sup>105</sup>

Colonel Pavel Grigorevich Derzskii is an old man now - born before the First World War in December 1913. He had a long and distinguished military career.

Pavel Grigorevich Derzskii graduated from the Kiev Infantry School in 1934 and went on to serve in the Soviet Army through World War II and the Korean War leaving military service only in mid-1957. During the Second World War he served with Terenty Famich Shtykov - then a Soviet general officer. Shtykov was a rising star in both military and party circles.

In 1950 Shtykov was both a general-colonel and ambassador to North Korea. More importantly, he was Stalin's trusted advisor and his eyes and ears in Korea. As Shtykov was Stalin's trusted advisor, Derzskii was Shtykov's trusted advisor. Colonel Derzskii summarized his relationship with General Shtykov as, "He trusted me completely. He didn't trust anyone else. He felt he could trust me and tell me everything that he couldn't tell anyone else."<sup>106</sup>

For reasons that still are not clear, whether it was Shtykov's intervention or just the caprice of Soviet military bureaucracy, Colonel Derzskii in early 1949 found himself and his family in a GRU villa near Moscow - held virtually incommunicado. Then in March 1949, he received orders to report to

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<sup>105</sup> R 271401Z September 1993 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA: Trip to Kiev, 14-18 September 1993

<sup>106</sup> Transcript September 1993 Interview with Colonel Derzskii



North Korea and to the chief of staff of the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.<sup>107</sup> His family, meanwhile, moved to a settlement in China not far from the Korean border.

One of Colonel Derzskii's first duties was to write the Operations Order (OPORD) for the 4<sup>th</sup> Division's role in the attack on South Korea. It was an act that Derzskii considered shameful, but one he executed nonetheless. Later, he encouraged an aide to provide a copy to U.N. officials in order to unmask the Soviet Union's dishonesty in the war. As a consequence, Colonel Derzskii was denied a promotion to general and transferred to lesser duties.

In the course of several interviews with Colonel Derzskii, he made three points. First, he helped arrange the transfer of a captured U.N. intelligence agent to the Soviet Union. Next, he said there was a standing order to send all captured F-84 pilots, later changed to all pilots, to the Soviet Union. Third, and finally, he said he helped arrange the transfer of General Dean, the captured commander of the U.S. 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division to the Soviet Union.

Colonel Derzskii was unable to provide many details on the U.N. intelligence agent other than his name being Andreiko. Derzskii was not certain of the intelligence agent's nationality, but believed he was either British or American. Andreiko was captured in Seoul in June of 1950. Based on the nature and number of documents found on Andreiko, the Soviets were convinced he was a "rezident" or senior agent.

The NKVD, forerunner of the KGB, was deeply interested in Andreiko and ordered that he be sent to the Soviet Union. Colonel Derzskii appointed another colonel - a political officer named Colonel Nikolaev - to accompany Andreiko to the Korean/Soviet border. There, in Derzskii's words, "He was taken to the Soviet Union. He was taken to the border, met there, and taken to the Soviet Union."<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> It should be noted that there is some uncertainty over exactly what dates Colonel Derzskii served in Korea. In his first interview he gave the dates 1950 to 1951. In a second interview he said he served in Korea from March 1949 to June 1951. When this apparent contradiction was pointed out to him, Colonel Derzskii replied, "Yes. I wanted to be more accurate."

<sup>108</sup> Transcript September 1993 Interview with Colonel Derzskii

In his several interviews with U.S. staffers, Colonel Derzskii noted that there were standing orders to send captured pilots to the Soviet Union. Indeed, Derzskii made this point several times. On each occasion, however, he varied the story somewhat. During his first interview, he said the GRU ordered all captured F-84 pilots be brought to the Soviet Union. Later, he said the orders were to send “all pilots”. This time, however, he attributed the order to the General Staff, but said it was General Shtykov who told him personally of this directive.

In spite of the apparent contradictions in Derzskii’s recollections, much of it tracks with what is already known, especially when viewed in a broader context. For example, at one point Derzskii said that the GRU ordered that pilots be sent to the Soviet Union. Later he says the General Staff issued the order. However, it is important to note that technically the GRU is part of the General Staff. It is the intelligence support apparatus in direct support of the General Staff.

Colonel Derzskii originally said that all captured F-84 pilots were ordered sent to the Soviet Union. He made this statement, however, in the broader context of a discussion of the GRU’s desire to capture an intact F-84. At a later interview, he broadened the statement to include all pilots.

There is no doubt that during the Korean War the Soviets wanted to capture a high performance American jet. It is, however, unlikely that they wanted a F-84 since it was a ground attack aircraft rather than an high performance air superiority fighter. While modern, the technology of the F-84s was not the most sophisticated. The Soviets wanted an F-86, then the top-of-the-line fighter in the American inventory.

In an effort to capture an intact F-86, the Soviets formed a special group under LTG A. Blagoveshchensky. Composed of test pilots and other elite pilots, the so-called Blagoveshchensky Group had the unenviable mission of forcing an F-86 to land at a Soviet controlled airfield.<sup>109</sup> They were not successful.

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<sup>109</sup> Yefim Gordon and Vladimir Rigmant, **MiG-15: Design, Development, and Korean War Combat History** (Osceola, Wisconsin: Motorbooks International Publishers and Wholesalers, 1993), p. 113.

Colonel Derzskii does relate the capture of an “F-84”.<sup>110</sup> When returning from a visit with his family in China, he saw a plane make a forced landing in a rice paddy not far from the road on which he was traveling. Initially, he thought it was a Soviet plane, but upon reaching the site, he realized that it was an American aircraft. Derzskii immediately sent his interpreter to call Colonel General Shtykov with the news. Then together with his driver, he helped the American pilot out of his aircraft and administered first aid to him.<sup>111</sup>

The interpreter returned a short while later with instructions from General Shtykov. They were to stand by and wait for a truck to transport the plane to place where it could be examined more safely. Also, Soviet specialists from Andung would escort the pilot to an undetermined location. Later, a truck showed up and took the aircraft and pilot away.

This aircraft was most likely the same F-86 taken to Moscow where Pavel Antonovich Koval'skii and three other engineers at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute disassembled the aircraft. The key components of the F-86 were dispatched to the relevant engineering institutes so that they could be studied in detail. Meanwhile, Pavel Koval'skii and his associates took apart the aircraft and produced detailed drawings so that a similar aircraft could be reconstructed.<sup>112</sup>

The fact that Colonel Derzskii confuses an F-84 with an F-86 is the result of his advanced years, lack of technical expertise, and the passage of more than four and a half decades. He is correct on the central issue: the Soviets wanted to capture a high performance jet fighter in order to study its advanced engineering capabilities.

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<sup>110</sup> Colonel Derzskii has described this aircraft as both an F-84 and later an F-86. In his September 1993 interview, he said it was "an F-84, this I remember." Then in early 1994 he said it was an F-86 because General Shtykov told him it was.

<sup>111</sup> R 240820Z Mar 94 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA: Re-interview of Colonel (Ret) Derzskii

<sup>112</sup> Minutes of the 9th Plenary Session of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs, 1 June 1994

While the F-86 was clearly evacuated to the Soviet Union, the fate of the pilot is less certain. When asked whether higher headquarters in the Soviet Far East ordered the pilot sent to the Soviet Union, Colonel Derzskii replied, “Yes, (we were ordered) to send the pilot to China and to the Soviet Union”.

Derzskii recounts that direct orders to “transfer American pilots to China for further travel to Moscow” were conveyed to him by two very senior General Staff officers who had come to Korea to review the military situation. One used the cover name Pavlov. In reality, he was General Pavlovskii, future Chief of Operations of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. The other man used the cover name of Matveyev, but in reality was Army General Matvey Vasilievich Zakharov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff.<sup>113</sup>

In the course of several interviews, Colonel Derzskii stated that he believed approximately 100 American were taken to China and another thirty or so taken to the Soviet Union. It should be noted, however, in all of these events, Colonel Derzskii had “knowledge of” transfers of American POWs, but he did not directly witness the events. As befits a senior officer, he directed subordinates such as Colonel Nikolaev to actually conduct the transfers.

Colonel Derzskii is steadfast in his insistence that Major General William F. Dean, commander of the U.S. Army’s 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, following his capture was sent to the Soviet Union.<sup>114</sup> General Dean was a distinguished and courageous American fighting man. He was captured early in the war during the first desperate weeks of fighting when he went forward to set the example and to rally

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<sup>113</sup> Colonel Derzskii said in his first interview that “Matveyev” was in reality General Maximov. Derzskii, however, recounted his story from memory. He did not have access to notes. A scholar with recent access to the archives revealed more details behind the surprise visit of the Soviet delegation to Korea. See Alexander Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the War Sept 16- Oct 15 1950, New Evidence From the Archives” from paper delivered to the Cold War History Project, Washington, DC, 13 December 1995.

<sup>114</sup> Dr. Valentin Konstantinovich (Kil-Yong) Pak, a Korean/Soviet and former deputy to Kim Il Sung in a recent interview stated that the North Koreans tried to convince General Dean to make propaganda broadcasts against the UN, but he refused to do so.

the soldiers of the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. Major General Dean was repatriated and at no time did he state that he went to the Soviet Union.

Colonel Derzskii recounts his efforts to interrogate General Dean under the guise of a Red Star reporter. But General Dean recognized Derzskii from an earlier pre-war encounter, and the interrogation came to an abrupt end. A short time later General Shtykov told Derzskii to arrange for General Dean's transfer to the Soviet Union.

Derzskii, who was, no doubt, busy with affairs at the front, instructed Colonel Nikolaev to carry out the transfer of General Dean. This is the same Colonel Nikolaev who arranged the transfer of the intelligence agent Andreiko. Of course, Colonel Nikolaev complied with his orders. When he returned from his mission, he described to Derzskii in some detail how the transfer of General Dean was actually conducted.

According to Colonel Derzskii, Nikolaev escorted the General to a bridge that spanned the Soviet/Chinese border. There he was met by several Soviet generals with vehicles. They took control of General Dean and delivered him to a nearby airport for further transportation within the Soviet Union. From this point on both Derzskii and Nikolaev washed their hands of General Dean.

### Conclusions

Colonel Pavel Derzskii enjoyed a unique position during the Korean War. He was a senior officer, entrusted with important state secrets. Moreover, he was a close advisor to Colonel General Shtykov, then Ambassador to North Korea and de facto governor-general of the region.

As a consequence, Colonel Derzskii was informed of much that went on in North Korea. This is especially true given that he was a close and trusted associate of the Soviet Ambassador - Colonel General Shtykov. But also, as befits a senior officer, Colonel Derzskii instructed other, more junior officers to carry out orders.

Consequently, much of what Colonel Derzskii related to U.S. investigators is "hearsay evidence". Moreover, it is possible to point to the lack of documentary evidence to support Derzskii's assertions. And, there are errors in the various months and dates that Colonel Derzskii cites.

In spite of this, we find the testimony of Colonel Derzskii to be highly credible. This is not to say that we accept all aspects of his testimony. We are reluctant, for example, to accept his recollections on General Dean. Nevertheless, he is very convincing. Colonel Derzskii is not, for instance, the only former Soviet military officer to come forward with recollections of transfers of American POWs - at least three other retired Soviet officers have done so as well. Moreover, details such as the capture of the F-86 - which he first related to U.S. investigators in 1993 - have since been confirmed.

## **NIKOLAI DMITRIYEVICH KAZERSKY**

Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kazersky is a veteran of the Second World War. He was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner as well as numerous other decorations. In 1950, he was arrested on felony charges, convicted, and sentenced to twenty years in the gulag.<sup>115</sup>

In the fall of 1952 or spring of 1953, while serving time in the Zimka Camp, he had a single encounter with an American pilot whose plane had been badly shot up over North Korea and forced to land in the Soviet Union near Vladivostok. The American pilot told Kazersky that his plane had a crew of three.

The Zimka Camp was an appropriate place to “hide” American POWs. Located in a desolate portion of Siberia on the Veslyana River, it was far from civilization and other population points. It was a work camp. And the American worked in the Consumer Goods Section making frames for greenhouses. The discipline was strict and it was hard for inmates to mix and talk with other inmates.<sup>116</sup>

Nevertheless, Nikolai Kazersky had one fleeting opportunity to meet with the American pilot. The pilot had been in isolation for a year or more and had learned little Russian, and Kazersky knew little English. Yet they managed to communicate.

The pilot told him that there were two other crew members from the plane. His radioman had been at Zimka with him, but the American pilot thought the radioman had been transferred to another camp - named “Yaser”. As for the other crew member, the American pilot had no idea what fate had befallen him. The American also told Kazersky that he was from California.

According to Nikolai Kazersky, the American pilot remained at the Zimka Camp for three to six months and then was transferred to another, unknown camp.

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<sup>115</sup> Nikolai Kazersky was released after four and a half years upon receiving an amnesty following the death of Stalin.

<sup>116</sup> R 301715Z Oct 92 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA: Interview with Nikolay Dmitriyevich Kazersky

In spite of the passage of many years, Kazersky was able to provide a description of the American pilot. He was about thirty years of age at the time. He was approximately 5' 7" tall, slender, with dark hair and complexion. Unlike most Soviets, he did not smoke. Kazersky remembers that the American had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks. He was, Kazersky believes, of Southern European ethnic extraction, possibly Greek or Italian.

Task Force Russia provided Nikolai Kazersky's description of the American to the Air Force Casualty Office. After a computer search, Air Force Casualty concluded LT Mooradian came the closest to fitting the description for several reasons:

1. LT Mooradian's shootdown date (23 October 1951) would place him in the time frame such that he could have been sent to Zimka at the same time as Kazersky.
2. LT Mooradian fit the physical description to include a round scar on one cheek.
3. LT Mooradian was Armenian with the typical the dark hair and dark complexion associated with that ethnic group.
4. LT Mooradian came from California.

There were only a few minor points that did not match with the information Kazersky provided to TFR:

1. LT Mooradian aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea on the opposite side of the Korean Peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. LT Mooradian was a bombardier and not a pilot.
3. LT Mooradian crew had thirteen members and not three.

On 17 December 1992, Nikolai Kazersky was shown sixteen photographs of American airmen who had disappeared during the Korean War. After reviewing all the photos, Kazersky chose three that he thought looked like the American he met in the gulag. LT Mooradian picture was among them.



## Conclusions

There are numerous people who claim to have seen American POWs in the Soviet gulag. Nikolai Kazersky is one of those who said he saw Americans. The details of his description, moreover, increase the plausibility of his testimony. Unfortunately, it is not possible to be certain that the man Kazersky saw in the gulag was in fact LT Mooradian although his identification of LT Mooradian photograph is highly suggestive.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Unfortunately the U.S. investigators did not use the most scientifically valid methods. Nikolai Kazersky should have been shown more and varied photographs rather than being asked to choose from a pool of only sixteen. The scientific validity of the identification would have been increased significantly.

**DR. VALENTIN KONSTANTINOVICH (KIL-YONG) PAK**

Dr. Valentin Konstantinovich Pak is a Moscow pensioner. An ethnic Korean, but of Soviet, now Russian citizenship, Dr. Pak was drafted into the Soviet Army during World War II. In 1945 he accompanied the Soviet Army into Manchuria and Korea. He then served in the Soviet occupation forces in Korea until 1948. He was next ordered to demobilize and to become a North Korean citizen. As a good communist, he followed orders.

While in Pyongyang, Valentin Pak became a trusted deputy to Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea. He soon became First Deputy Foreign Minister, the second highest post in the North Korean Foreign Ministry. During this time, he became privy to many of the secrets of the then nascent North Korean government. And, indeed, Pak knew about or participated in many of the most important policy decisions made in North Korea at the time.

Near the end of the Korean War, he left Pyongyang to serve as North Korean Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and then to East Germany. He returned to Moscow in the early 1960s to attend the Higher Party School. By that time, he had fallen out of favor with Kim Il Sung and he chose to remain in Moscow.

Dr. Pak was interviewed recently in his Moscow apartment.<sup>118</sup> He said he was told by a Chinese foreign service officer named LU (NFI) that American POWs were sent through China to the Soviet Union. In an earlier interview, he was less specific but did say he heard rumors during the Korean War that the Chinese took their POWs to a camp in Mongolia and then sometimes the Chinese did transfer some U.S. prisoners of war to the Soviets. The Soviets would then in turn exploit the POWs for their knowledge of U.S. technology.<sup>119</sup>

While this is hearsay information, what gives this unconfirmed testimony greater than normal importance is that it comes from a former highly placed official in both the North Korean and Soviet

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<sup>118</sup> MFR date 5 March 1996 "Interview with Valentin Konstantinovich Pak"; interview took place on 7 February 1996.

<sup>119</sup> R 151245Z September 1995 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: JCSD-Moscow Interview with Dr. Valentin Konstantinovich Pak

governments. For Valentin Pak was no mere functionary at the time, but a trusted aide and advisor to President Kim Il Sung.

Obviously the testimony of one man is not sufficient to make the case that American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. But when taken in the broader context, here is yet again another person, and a senior figure as well, who has heard about or had knowledge of the transfer of U.S. POWs to the Soviet Union.

## **262 INTERROGATIONS**

A few days before Christmas 1954, General Slyusarev, commander of the 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps, sent a long ciphered telegram to Moscow. Addressed to the Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union N. A. Bulganin and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Marshal of Aviation P. F. Zhigarev, the message outlined the accomplishments of the 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps in the Korean War. It was a dry, detailed report written in Soviet bureaucratic style full of statistics and facts.

Buried in this rather lengthy report was a brief, matter-of-fact statement, “During this period (the Korean War), 262 American flyers, shot down in air battles or by anti-aircraft artillery, were taken prisoner and processed through an interrogation point.”<sup>120</sup> The report went on to explain that the interrogation point was established so that tactical and technical information could be gleaned from captured airmen.<sup>121</sup>

The message did not identify the location of the interrogation point, but did indicate that “the interrogations were conducted under the direction of the (64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps’) intelligence department.”<sup>122</sup> The Chinese and North Koreans actually conducted the interrogations, according to the message, but the Soviets provided overall direction. And, of course, the Soviets received copies of all the interrogation reports.

That the 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps conducted 262 interrogations during the Korean War raised more questions than it answered. In late 1992, the Russian side provided the Americans with the so-called “List of 59” along with interrogation reports. The List of 59 was supposedly a list of fifty-nine American airmen who were interrogated during the Korean War. On closer analysis, the List of 59 was

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<sup>120</sup> Deciphered Telegram entry No. 307717/sh

<sup>121</sup> The precise words used in the message were, "An interrogation point was organized for captured fliers who were shot down in air battles over the territory of northern Korea and China in order to obtain enemy operational tactics, radar sets, and radio information."

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

really a list of 56. Two of the names on the list were duplicates and one of those listed was an Australian. Moreover, when one examined the accompanying “interrogation reports”, it was clear that only thirty were really full interrogation reports. Some of the reports were extracts from larger reports, others were merely mentions of people seen, still others were short, simple one paragraph biographies, and finally some were just lists of personal effects.

Upon learning that 262 American flyers transited the 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps’ interrogation point, the key question therefore became - where are the remaining 206 interrogations?

Consequently, at the 9<sup>th</sup> Plenum of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs held in Moscow, Russia, the U.S. side brought up this question directly. The Russian response to the question was tentative and vague.

“Not all interrogations, or let’s say answers, were of great interest. Some, let’s say, that had the most valuable information, or were from the most valuable pilots, these interrogations were forwarded to higher headquarters. Regarding other pilots that didn’t have valuable information, or were not themselves of great value, their interrogations were most likely retained at an interrogation point. They might have been destroyed there and the only thing that was reported to higher headquarters, was that such and such an individual, or pilot was interrogated, and they would attach any documents that they picked up from him.”<sup>123</sup>

Another Russian commissioner added,

“I am convinced that we are not going to find 262 interrogation reports. Why? Because I remember, specifically the 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps and the aviation section of it, we made summaries out of the interrogation reports, and the reports themselves were sent back to the Koreans or Chinese. Brief summaries of the interrogation reports were forwarded up to

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<sup>123</sup> Minutes of the Ninth Plenary and Working Group Sessions, U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs, 2 June 1994, Moscow, Russia, p. 33.

another headquarters. Therefore, the interrogation reports that we have, are from 1952-1953, when it was more formalized.”<sup>124</sup>

While the Russians were no doubt sincere in explaining the absence of 206 interrogation reports, their explanations are not entirely satisfying. For example, one of the Russian representatives stressed that only “...the most valuable information, or [interrogations that] were from the most valuable pilots, these interrogations were forwarded to higher headquarters.”<sup>125</sup> Yet, the aforementioned report to Marshal Bulganin makes special mention of Colonel Walker “Bud” Mahurin, “commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Group” and Major Richardson, “chief of staff of the 33<sup>rd</sup> Aviation Group” as being “among those captured and processed” through the interrogation point.<sup>126</sup> Clearly General Slyusarev viewed these interrogations as important and surely they must have been forwarded to Moscow. While the U.S. side can not say that these interrogations exist, it seems likely that they do. Moreover, it seems probable that many of the two hundred or so other unaccounted for interrogations exist as well.

A further reason that the U.S. side of the Korean War Working Group is inclined to believe that there are still some interrogation reports yet to be provided to the American side rests on an assessment of the nature of Soviet bureaucratic culture. A hallmark characteristic of Soviet communist culture was the demand that all collectives at least meet or better yet over fulfill the plan. Quantity rather than quality counted. Even the military could not escape this emphasis on meeting quantitative goals.

Consequently, it is certain that the intelligence chiefs of the 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps, not to mention its commander, were interested in producing the maximum number of interrogations and forwarding them to GRU [military intelligence] headquarters in Moscow as well to Far East Military District Headquarters in Khabarovsk.

Indeed, the fact that General Slyusarev was able to state with precision that 262 interrogations took place is indicative of not only good record keeping but an interest in numbers and quantity.

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<sup>124</sup> Minutes of the Ninth Plenary and Working Group Sessions, p. 36.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., p. 33

<sup>126</sup> Deciphered Telegram entry No. 307717/sh

The interest of the U.S. side in the 206 unaccounted for interrogations derives from a fundamental hypothesis. That is, if any Americans were sent to the Soviet Union, they were no doubt first pre-screened. During this pre-screening process that probably took place in North Korea or China, those judged of value to the Soviet Union would be pulled aside. And, of course, interrogations were the basis of this pre-screening.

The American side considers the review of any extant interrogations of particular value. This is not so that former American POWs can be prosecuted for providing aid and comfort to the enemy, but rather because the reports may be an indicator of Soviet efforts to select out some American POWs for transfer to the USSR.

Given the Soviet penchant for producing as many reports as possible as well as its emphasis on record keeping, the U.S. side finds it difficult to accept that only 56 interrogations are available and that 206 still remain unaccounted for.

## **THE SOVIET SECURITY SERVICES AND AMERICAN POWs**

In the nearly seventy-five years of the Soviet Union's existence, the KGB, or MGB as it was known then, was one of the pillars of the Soviet state.<sup>127</sup> Charged with domestic political security, counter-intelligence, foreign intelligence collection, border security, signal intelligence, and the protection of political leaders, the security organs were given the most sensitive missions.<sup>128</sup>

In 1992 a retired Soviet colonel - Gavril Korotkov claimed that American POWs were taken to the Soviet Union for interrogation. Colonel Korotkov recalled that while on the territory of the Soviet Union the NKVD maintained control over the Americans. Soviet military interrogators were given only a few hours with the Americans and then they were returned to NKVD control.

In part, because of Colonel Korotkov's testimony, a working hypothesis by the American side has been that the MGB and/or its subordinate organs played an important role in any transfer of Americans to the Soviet Union and almost certainly had control over Americans on the territory of the Soviet Union.<sup>129</sup> Moreover, because the MGB was a political agency subordinate directly to the Central Committee and the Politburo, it did not report to or through the military chain of command. Hence, directives from Moscow that military officials were to have no direct contact with American POWs did not pertain to MGB officials.

In the course of conducting research over the last three years, the U.S. has found from time to time indications of MGB activities. The evidence is not conclusive but it is highly suggestive. For example, there is evidence that MGB organized the interrogation of American POWs as well as participated in the interrogations. Unlike the military's GRU intelligence department, the MGB does not

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<sup>127</sup> The Soviet security services have gone by numerous names in its history - Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, MGB, MVD, and KGB. At the start of the Korean War, it was still known as the NKVD, but by the end of the war it was called the MGB.

<sup>128</sup> Russians often refer to the MGB/KGB as the **spets-sluzhba** or special services. The plural is used because of the magnitude of all the responsibilities that fall to the MGB/KGB.

<sup>129</sup> See discussion of Colonel Gavril Korotkov in preceding section.



seem to have faced a prohibition against contact with Americans. There are, moreover, strong indications that the MGB had, and quite probably still has, interrogation reports in its possession.

Indicative of MGB involvement with American POWs is a long report sent to Moscow by General Slyusarev, commander of the 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps, on 26 November 1952. Addressed to Colonel General Malinin and Colonel General Batitskii and marked “urgent”, the message was a summary of the interrogation of an RB-29 assigned to the 91<sup>st</sup> Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron that was shot down over North Korea in the summer of 1952. The Soviets obviously placed great emphasis on interrogating the crew because at the end of the document the statement was made,<sup>130</sup>

“Representatives from the MGB USSR and China have arrived from Peking to conduct further prisoner interrogations, to gain more precise information on spy centers, landing strips, and incidents of overflights of the territory of the Soviet Union. The interrogation will be continued in Pekton.”

“I consider it advisable as well to send specialists on other matters.”

“I request your instructions as to the procedures for sending you the materials and advisability of our participation in the interrogations.”

At the very bottom of the document was a note penned by Colonel General Malinin that contained instructions to organize immediately a supplementary interrogation of the Strieby crew.

This message indicates that the MGB was involved in the interrogation of American POWs. Second, the statement, “I request your instructions... and advisability of our participation in the interrogations” confirms that Soviet military officials were prohibited to interrogate American POWs without permission. Yet, the statement “Representatives of the MGB USSR and China have arrived to conduct further prisoner interrogations” clearly suggests that the MGB, which is not part of the military, did not need permission to conduct interrogations of Americans.

There is yet another example where the MGB played a role in the interrogation of American POWs:

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<sup>130</sup> TFR 300-15 & 16, Deciphered Telegram Msg No. 503826/sh, Correspondent 3

“I am reporting that, according to the report of the MGB USSR advisor in China, 9 crew members of an aircraft shot down from the 91<sup>st</sup> Reconnaissance Detachment, American Strategic Aviation, which was shot down in the An’dung region on 12 January 1953, were taken prisoner...On the instructions of the TsK (Central Committee) of the Communist Party of China, they will be sent to Peking and subject to interrogation.”

“The Minister of Public Safety of China, having reported on 27 January 1953 to our advisor on this decision of the TsK KPK (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China), requested that our advisor help the Chinese investigators organize the interrogation of the prisoners of war and check their work.”

“The MGB USSR advisor was ordered to render us such help.”<sup>131</sup>

The shoot down mentioned above refers to the so-called Arnold crew. Colonel John K. Arnold, Jr. was the commander of the 91<sup>st</sup> Strategic Reconnaissance Wing and senior officer aboard a B-29. On 12 January 1953 Colonel Arnold’s B-29 was on a PSYOP leaflet drop when it was attacked at approximately 2245 hours by MiG-15s and radar controlled anti-aircraft fire. The aircraft was hit and crashed.

Eleven of the fourteen member crew were repatriated. The Chinese, who captured the crew near Andung, China, sent them to Beijing for interrogation - an interrogation organized by the MGB.

Both of these reports clearly show that the MGB was active in the interrogation of American POWs. Moreover, one of the documents (TFR 300-15/16) suggests that the MGB, unlike the Army, was not restricted from establishing direct contact with American POWs. Furthermore, since the MGB helped organize the interrogations, it seems probable that the Chinese would have given the Soviets at least a courtesy copy of the interrogations.

There is in fact direct evidence that the MGB did receive at least some of the interrogations. One of the documents provided to the U.S. side is titled “A List of Documents on the Testimonies of the

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<sup>131</sup> TFR 37-23

Prisoners of War; Colonel Arnold, Captain Llewellyn, and A1C Kiba”.<sup>132</sup> The U.S. side received the interrogation of Colonel Arnold but not the interrogation of Captain Llewellyn or of A1C Kiba. The U.S. received only short one paragraph biographies on each, but not interrogations.

Moreover, A1C Kiba, who returned to military control after the war, distinctly remembers being interrogated by Russians, and Soviet records such as the one above clearly indicate they had possession of Kiba’s interrogation. Furthermore, it seems quite likely that these and other interrogations are still extent in the archives of the Russian security services.

In summation, a review of the evidence of MGB (KGB or security service) involvement with American POWs is not conclusive. However, it is highly suggestive that the MGB was more deeply involved with American POWs than previously recognized. While the MGB cannot be directly linked with any transfers, it can be linked with interrogations. The MGB also appears to have had unfettered access to prisoners. Finally, there is a high probability that the Russian security service archives still hold interrogation reports on American POWs.

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<sup>132</sup> TFR 182-25